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"My grandmother was her master's daughter; and my mother was her
master's daughter; and I was my master's son; so you see I han't got but
one-eighth of the blood. Now, admitting it's right to make a slave of a
full black nigger, I want to ask gentlemen acquainted with business,
whether because I owe a shilling, I ought to be made to pay a dollar?"
- Lewis Clarke, fugitive slave, 18421
"If the old saying 'one drop of Black blood makes you Black' were
reversed to say one drop of White blood makes you White, would the
biracials still be seeking a separate classification?"
- Letter to the Editor, Ebony Magazine, November 19952
INTRODUCTION

For generations, the boundaries of the African-American race
have been formed by a rule, informally known as the "one drop
rule," which, in its colloquial definition, provides that one drop of
Black blood makes a person Black. In more formal, sociological
circles, the rule is known as a form of "hypodescent"3 and its mean
ing remains basically the same: anyone with a known Black ances
tor is considered Black. Over the generations, this rule has not only
shaped countless lives, it has created the African-American race as
we know it today, and it has defined not just the history of this race
but a large part of the history of America.
Now as the millennium approaches, social forces require some
rethinking of this important, old rule. Plessy v. Ferguson,4 which
affirmed the right of states to mandate "equal but separate accom
modations" for White and "colored" train passengers, is a century
Brown v. Board of Education, 5 which effectively overruled

old.

Plessy

and instituted the end of de jure discrimination, was decided

over a generation ago. Nearly thirty years have passed since the
Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, 6 invalidated any prohibition
against interracial marriage as unconstitutional. Since the 1967

Loving

decision, the number of interracial marriages has nearly

1. JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, SLAVE TESTIMONY 152 (1977).
2. Mary Smith, Letter to the Editor, EBONY, Nov. 1995, at 298.
3. Hypodescent is the practice by which "racially mixed persons are assigned to the status
of the subordinate group." F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? 5 (1991) (citing MELVIN
HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 56 (1964)).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the United States Supreme Court distinguished Plessy
holding that, "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place." 347 U.S. at 495. However, lower federal courts interpreted it as prohibiting all state
authorized segregation and the Supreme Court regularly affirmed such rulings. See ALFRED
H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 591 (1991).
6. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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quadrupled.7 This trend has even extended to Black-White
couples,8 whose intermarriage rate has traditionally lagged behind
that of other racial and ethnic groups.9 For the first time, opinion
polls indicate that more Americans approve of interracial marriage
than disapprove.10 The number of children born to parents of dif
ferent races has increased dramatically,11 and some of the offspring
of these interracial marriages have assumed prominent roles in
American popular culture.12
Some of these children of interracial marriages are now arguing
cogently for a reappraisal of hypodescent. Their movement13 has
sprung to public consciousness with the recent bid by multiracial
7. In 1970, there were 310,000 mixed race couples. By 1992, there were 1,161,000 such
couples. See Arlene F. Saluter, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1992, in U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, X
(Dec. 1992).
8. The number of intermarriages between Whites and Blacks has increased significantly
since Loving. Census figures indicate that there were 65,000 Black-White couples in 1970. In
1992, there were 246,000 such couples. This represented an increase from 0.1 % to 0.5% of all
marriages. Between 1980 and 1990, Black-White interracial marriages increased over 50%.
See id. at XI.
For a fuller discussion of intermarriage trends, see E. Porterfield, Black-American Inter
marriage in the United States, 5 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 17 (1984); M. Belinda Tucker &
Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, New Trends in Black American Interracial Marriage: The Social
Structural Context, 52 J. OF MARRIAGE & TliE FAM. 209 (1990); see also Steven A. Holmes,
Study Finds Rising Number of Black-White Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1996, at A16.
9. The African-American intermarriage rate hovers at about 7%. See Saluter, supra note
7, at XI. In contrast, interracial marriage in some Asian-American communities is normal.
The Japanese-American/White intermarriage rate is at 55%, while the current Chinese
American/White intermarriage rate is at 40%. See Interracial Marriages Blur Social, Ethnic
Lines, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 13, 1995, at 44A.
10. A 1991 Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of all Americans approve of marriage between
African Americans and Whites, while 42% disapprove. Apparently the rate of approval var
ies by race. While 71 % of African Americans approve of interracial marriage, only 44% of
Whites approve. Significantly, 64% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 approve of
marriage between African Americans and Whites. See Most in Poll Approve of Interracial
Marriage, ST. Loms POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 1991, at 16A.
On the other hand, a 1994 poll showed that 14.7% of White Americans still favor a law
making interracial marriage illegal. See Up From Separatism, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995 at
30.
11. In 1991 alone, it is estimated that over 128,000 children were born to parents of differ
ent races. See Jane Gross, UC Berkeley at Crux of New Multiracial Consciousness, L.A.
T1MES, Jan. 9, 1996, at Al. It also is estimated that nearly two million children have parents
that identify with different racial groups. See Linda Mathews, More Than Identity Rides on
New Racial Category, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1996, at Al.
12. For example, playwright August Wilson, mystery author Walter Mosely, Olympic
Gold Medalist Dan O'Brien, golfer Tiger Woods, actress Halle Berry, and musician Lenny
Kravitz are all "biracial."
13. Some cite the genesis of the "movement" as the 1992 Loving Conference, held in
recognition of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Vir
ginia. The primary purpose of the conference was to organize a federal lobbying effort to
modify existing racial classifications and to put "the American government on notice that a
new multiracial movement had found its way on to the national political stage. " Bijan
Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 183, 184 (1993).

March 1997]

One Drop Rule

1165

organizations, over the objections of civil rights groups,14 to put a
"multiracial" category in the "race" section of the forms that will be
used when the next decennial census is conducted in the year 2000.
This proposal has immense practical importance because the census
provides the nation with its main source of racial and ethnic data.
For example, implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Equal Employment Opportu
nity Act of 1972 all depend on racial and ethnic statistics culled
from the census, and the addition of a new category could change
the count of the existing racial groups and alter the way these laws
are implemented.ls
One wing of this new multiracial movement argues that a new
"multiracial box" should be made available for the growing number
of children of interracial marriages. Another wing of this move
ment, in books and law review articles, suggests that the addition of
this category should be part of a wholesale redefinition of the racial
identities of most Americans. The thinking of both wings of the
multiracial movement is informed by their rejection of hypodescent
and the "one drop rule." To date, the participants in this discourse
have emphasized the racist notions of White racial purity that gave
rise to the one drop rule. They have concluded that the effects of
this old rule are mainly evil and that the consequences of aban
doning it will be mainly good. Based in part on such reasoning, the
more activist wing of this movement has proposed several neat,
symmetrical, and radical redefinitions of African-American racial
identity. Under one such proposed definition, any Black person
with White or Native American ancestry would become "multi
racial."16 Under another, any Black person with a "majority of [his]
origins in the original peoples of Europe" would become European
American. 11
My purpose in this article is to critique this discourse. I agree
that the one drop rule had its origins in racist notions of White pu14. Organizations that expressed reservations about the addition of a multicultural cate
gory at Congressional hearings include the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund, the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders, the
National Urban League, and the National Congress of American Indians. See Hearings
Before the Subcomm on the Census, Statistics, and Postal Personnel of the Comm. on the Post
Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong. 93·101, 171-82, 229-39 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings].
15. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CENSUS REFORM: EARLY OUTREACH AND
DECISIONS NEEDED ON THE RACE AND ETHNIC QUESTIONS 12-13 (1993).
16. For a discussion of this proposal, see infra note 167 and accompanying text.
17. Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualiz
ing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REv. 513,
563 {1995).
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rity. However, many scholars have misunderstood the way that this
rule has shaped the Black experience in America, and this misun
derstanding has distorted their proposals for a new multiracial cate
gory on the census forms. As we examine the one drop rule and its
importance in the current discourse, we should recall the famous
exchange between Faust and Goethe's Devil:

Faust: Say at least, who you are?
Mephistopheles: I am part of that power which ever wills evil yet
ever accomplishes good.is
So it was with the one drop rule. The Devil fashioned it out of
racism, malice, greed, lust, and ignorance, but in so doing he also
accomplished good: His rule created the African-American race as
we know it today, and while this race has its origins in the peoples
of three continents and its members can look very different from
one another, over the centuries the Devil's one drop rule united this
race as a people in the fight against slavery, segregation, and racial
injustice.
However valid the multiracial viewpoint may be in some con
texts, it has tended to overlook the good the Devil did in using the
rule of hypodescent in order to forge a people. This paper there
fore is intended to bring a more balanced view of the one drop rule
to the discourse surrounding the proposed new multiracial category
and to question the proposals to invent neat new racial classifica
tions to replace the categories that the social history of the United
States has created over the last four hundred years. This article
concludes with a proposal for counting the new generations of bi
racial Americans on the census in a way that will not ignore the
social history of the African-American race.
I noted above that the one drop rule has shaped countless lives,
and as "place markers" in the discussion, here, I will use incidents
from two such lives: those of my great uncles, one documented in
the 1944 volume of the Pacific Reporter, the other chronicled in a

1956

issue of

Time Magazine.

My Uncle Clarence Jones was a Los Angeles lawyer who prac
ticed law in the days when Black lawyers could not join county bar
associations or be considered for government employment but were
18. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, Faust, in GoETIIES WERKE, Part I, Lines 1334-36
(Erich Trunz ed., Hamburg, Christian Wegner Verlag 1949) (1808). I would like to thank
Vera Pardee for her assistance with the English translation. The original German reads as
follows:
Faust: Nun gut, wer bist du denn?
Mephistopheles: Ein Tei! von jener Kraft,
Die stets das B1lse will und
stets das Gute schafft.
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limited to providing probate, family law, and real estate services to
an exclusively Black clientele. Reversing the norm, Uncle Clarence
worked as Black but his rather fair complexion allowed him and his
family to live in a neighborhood without reference to their race.
Despite the ambiguity of their light-brown skin, the Jones family in the eyes of their White neighbors - could not really have been
Black: Uncle Clarence was a hardworking lawyer who had gradu
ated from Ohio State Law School in the teens, his three daughters
were all attending U.C.L.A., and his wife's skin was nearly white.
So for years, he lived with his family in a home that he loved in a
pretty neighborhood.
The home, however, was subject to a restrictive covenant that
prohibited occupancy by any "persons other than the Caucasian
race."19 Refusing to acknowledge the validity of this racist restric
tion, Uncle Clarence had ignored the covenant and moved his fam
ily in. Some years later, when his eldest daughter married, she
decided on a home wedding. And as the various guests arrived, the
neighbors were forced to see what their social training had not let
them see before - the Jones family was undeniably Black. A law
suit was brought to enforce the restrictive covenant and to force the
Jones family out of its home.
When he received the summons, Uncle Clarence made two deci
sions. First, he would fight this eviction to the highest court in the
state. Second, he would not deny his identity; he would not claim
that his light skin made him any less of a Negro - even if it cost
him his home. He retained two of his colleagues to represent him,
lawyers who are legends among Black lawyers in Los Angeles,
Loren Miller and Willis 0. Tyler.20
Miller and Tyler made all the right arguments to the Calif omia
Superior Court and, quite predictably, lost. In affirmin g the trial
court's decision to evict the family, the California Court of Appeal
summarily rejected the constitutional challenge to the covenants21
and refused to reach the question of whether it was appropriate to
19. Stone v. Jones, 152 P.2d 19, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
20. Loren Miller became a judge and leader of the civil rights movement. He was one of
the counsel in Brown v. Board of Education and an author of a legal history on the racial
struggle in the United States. See LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS (1966). Willis 0. Tyler,
in addition to handling a wide variety of criminal and family law cases, was the first Black
lawyer in Los Angeles to serve in any judicial capacity when he was appointed to serve as a
judge pro tempore. See Telephone Interview with Katherine Bush Mason (May 10, 1996).
21. See Stone, 152 P.2d at 22. The Court of Appeal held that "[t]he same proposition
[that the enforcement of racial housing restrictions violated the U.S. Constitution] was
presented in Burkhardt v. Lofton [146 P.2d 720 (1994)] and there held untenable; the discus
sion is supported by abundant authority." Stone, 152 P.2d at 23.
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restrict residency on the basis of race. Instead, the court considered
·

the case to "involve issues that are the direct product of a contrac
tual relation,"22 and it held that the restrictive covenant was con
tractually valid. After losing in the court of appeal, Uncle
Clarence's attorneys filed a Petition for Hearing with the California
Supreme Court.

Of the seven justices, only Justice Roger J.

Traynor voted to grant a hearing.23
So in the end, the family was forced to move - under the
twisted logic by which racism is reified into law, Uncle Clarence
could own his house but he could not live in it. Still, as they relin
quished their home, the family left with their heads held high and
with no regrets. Just recently, when Uncle Clarence's daughters,
now all in their seventies, visited my house, I passed around a copy
of the old court of appeal opinion.

"Makes you mad all over

again," one of them commented, these fifty-two years later. Mad,
but also proud that their family had fought the good fight when
they were sure to lose.
A decade later, in Detroit, a second uncle (my grandmother's
brother on the other side of the family) faced a similar situation but
chose a different path. According to family lore, my Uncle Jack
"couldn't find work as a Black man" so he crossed the color line
with his fair skinned wife.24 Across the decades, Uncle Jack now
looks out at me from his photo in the April

26, 1956 edition of Time

and with his pale white skin, snowy straight hair, and aquiline fea
tures - he looks White.
age

69,

Time

reports that in early April

1956,

at

Uncle Jack had decided to move to a new home "on De

troit's comfortably middle class Robson Avenue."25 Shortly after
he moved in, however, the neighbors discovered that he was a Ne
gro, perhaps because his grandchild, who met the moving van, had
darker skin and curlier hair. Soon the neighbors were throwing
rocks through the windows and a delegation from the neighbor
hood "improvement association" arrived at his door with the offer
to purchase the home for

$18,500,

which was

$2,000 more than Un

cle Jack had paid for it. While these "sales discussions" were under22. 152 P.2d at 23.
23. See 152 P.2d at 23. Four years later, Justice Traynor would write the landmark plural
ity opinion in Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), the first judicial opinion overturning an
antimiscegenation law as unconstitutional. Also four years after the Stone v. Jones decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that enforcement of such racially restrictive covenants to be
unconstitutional. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
24. Interview with Izella Hickman Davenport Vincent, Dec. 1, 1995. Notes on file with
Author.
25. Buyer Beware, TIME, Apr. 16, 1956, at 24.
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way, "a crowd of 500 milled outside," recruited to emphasize the
consequences of any failure to sell.26
In dealing with this appalling situation, Uncle Jack chose a dif
ferent course than the one Uncle Clarence had taken: he implicitly
denied that he was Black, telling the reporter from Time that he
was "half Cherokee and half French Canadian," leaving out his
African-American ancestry. But, Time reported, when he made
this denial of his Black heritage, "nobody listened," and he was
forced to move.21
Of course, it would not be fair to find fault with Uncle Jack's
denial. As Professor Karst notes, under circumstances such as these
"it is hard to locate any authenticity in an individual's 'choice' to
repudiate the disfavored label."28 In addition, Uncle Jack had
fewer options available to him than did Uncle Clarence: Uncle Jack
was not a lawyer; he was a retired bodyguard with a mob outside of
his house. But still, these forty-two years later, we read the Time
article with a touch of sadness and a twinge of disappointment, be
cause Uncle Jack denied who he was, and the milling mob did not
even listen. In a different way than Uncle Clarence, Uncle Jack lost
his home.
These two incidents are relevant to many of the topics I discuss
in this article, and I will return to them from time to time. Part I of
this article begins by discussing the origins of the American system
of racial classification, which has roots that are deep and old. This
Part then analyzes some of the earliest cases and legislation dealing
with racial intennixture, which indicate that by deliberate design
and by operation of law the African-American race was, from the
beginning, constructed to include those of mixed African-Euro
pean-Native American descent. After briefly sketching the classifi
cation of African Americans through the ensuing centuries, I tum
to an analysis of the previous attempt by the census to count mixed
race people - "mulattoes" - from 1850 until the Census Bureau's
formal adoption of the one drop rule in 1920.
Part II critiques the discourse surrounding the proposed new ra
cial categories. Section II.A examines how recent law review arti
cles and essays by historians have misperceived the one drop rule.
Because these commentators have focused on formal analysis of the
rule and its "asymmetry," they have ignored how the rule worked in
26.
27.
28.
Sexual

Id.
Id.
Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 323 (1995).
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practice, and they have not examined the African-American experi
ence sufficiently to see the good that the Devil did. These commen
tators overlook the way that this rule has forged a unified Black
community that . has been an effective force in battling racism.
More surprisingly, they assume that other classification systems
would have been better, without ever comparing hypodescent to
those other systems. I conclude this discussion by making such a
comparison - with the system in South Africa - which is formally
more pleasing and symmetrical than hypodescent. I argue that in
South Africa, this symmetrical, White-Colored-Black classification
system was more effective than the one drop rule in ensuring the
subordination of Black South Africans.
Section II.B analyzes the proposals found in recent law review
comments for a broad multiracial category that would include any
one with "mixed blood." While the proponents of such a category
all correctly deny that there is any biological basis for race, the cate
gory that they suggest would, ironically, "rebiologize" race, by
drawing a line between those African Americans who have White
"blood" and those who do not. Turning to an example of this rebio
logization of race, I examine one critic's argument that the Harlem
Renaissance was a form of "cultural suicide" because writers such
as Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston failed to embrace
their mixed-race identity. Using incidents from Hurston's life as an
example, I argue that Hurston's only tie to her "mixed race heri
tage" was a biological one, and that history and a powerful sense of
identity forged in actual experience made her - and the many
other African Americans like her with White ancestry - Black. I
conclude this discussion of the "rebiologization" of race by analyz
ing certain old "racial credential cases." in which courts attempted
to adjudicate "who is Black," as a reminder of our legal system's
previous experience with treating race as biology.
Section II.C turns to one of the consequences of the misunder
standing of the one drop rule and the rebiologization of race - an
effect known as "distancing" - which is the creation of unneces
sary and pernicious distinctions between light-skinned and dark
skinned African Americans. I identify several examples of this dis
tancing in recent legal journals.
Part III examines how the lessons from the one drop rule inform
the debate over the nature of race itself. I begin by using the expe
rience of mixed-race people in America to respond to philosopher
Anthony Appiah's now-famous argument that there is no race. I
conclude that the African-American experience shows that races do
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exist; history creates races from people who share a common mor
phology and genealogy. I then briefly critique recent suggestions in
law reviews that race is a metaphor, a "metonym" for culture, or an
essence. Finally, I tum to the issue that has the most relevance to
the census (where Americans are asked to "self-identify"), namely,
whether race is a choice. I note that for my uncles forty years ago,
and for us now, race, at least African-American race, is not just a
matter of choice and that the argument that we "choose" our race
by our daily actions holds special dangers for African Americans.
Finally, Part V argues that the 2000 Census should contain a
multiracial inquiry directed at the growing number of Americans
with parents from two different racial groups and that this inquiry
should be on a line of its own and not part of the race question. To
date, the proposals for adding a multiracial category to the census
all have called for placing "Black" and "multiracial" in competition
on the same line of the census form. Part V argues that this ar
rangement would set up a no-win rivalry between racial and multi
racial groups for the allegiance of Loving's children. Worse, it
could lead to a profoundly inaccurate count of Americans with par
ents from two different races, since it will falsely omit all biracial
people who are identified strongly with the race of one parent
(these people will check "Black," "White," "Asian," or "Native
American" instead of "multiracial") and it will falsely include many
members of traditional racial groups. Giving the multiracial inquiry
its own line on the census form will avoid these conflicts and inaccu
racies and lead to the first reliable count of the new generations of
Americans who have parents from different racial groups.
l.

T REATM EN T OF MIXED-RACE PEOPLE: THE EARLY LEGAL
RECORD

Race mixing between Whites and Blacks in America is not new.
Rather, it began almost immediately after the first Africans arrived
in the United States. As nineteenth-century historian Robert
Shufeldt rather dramatically claimed, "[t]he crossing of the two
races commenced at the very out-start of the vile slave trade that
brought [African slaves] thither . . . indeed in those days many a
negress was landed upon our shores already impregnated by some
one of the demoniac crew that brought her over."29 Winthrop
29. R.W. SHUFELDT, THE NEGRO: A MENACE TO AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 60 (1907),
quoted in JAMES HUGO JOHNSTON, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND MISCEGENATION IN
THE SOUTH 1760-1860, at 165-66 (1970).
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jordan writes that "it seems likely there was more [intermixture]
during the eighteenth century than at any time since."30

The unique American definition of "Black" has roots that are

almost as old as race mixing on this continent. This Part will briefly

illustrate how early legislatures and courts dealt with the presence
of mixed race people and guided the formation of the African

American race to include not only the recent African arrivals but
also the offspring of any union between these arrivals and the

White settlers. The legal record illustrates that from the beginning,
by deliberate design and by operation of law, anyone with any sig

nificant African ancestry was pulled toward the African-American
race.

In later Parts of this article, I will argue that the three

hundred years of history that began with these early cases and stat

utes created a strong and resilient African-American people and
gave them the tools to fight slavery, segregation, and racism and

that multiracial theorists tend to overlook this aspect of the Black
experience in America.

This Part concludes with a review of the previous attempt by the

census to count "mulattoes" and how that effort ended in

the formal adoption of the one drop rule.
A.

1920 with

The First African Americans and the First Race Mixing

The roots of African Americans on this continent are deep and

old. It was in

1619,

a year

before the Pilgrims

landed on Plymouth

Rock, that twenty "Negars" arriving on a Dutch man-of-war were
sold to British colonists.31

rather quickly. As early as

Race mixing appears to have begun

1632,

a mere fourteen years after the

first Blacks arrived in Jamestown, Captain Daniel Elfrye was repri

manded by his employer for "too freely entertaining a mulatto."32

The legal records are few and not a model of judicial explica
tion,33 but certain themes emerge from the early documents: inter
racial

mating

began

almost

immediately

and

was

officially

30. WINTiiROP D. JORDAN, WmTE OVER BLACK 137 (1968).
31. John Rolfe, who himself was intermarried to the Powhatan Pocahontas, was Secretary
and Recorder of the Virginia colony. An apparent eyewitness, he recorded that at the end of
August 1619 there came to Virginia "a dutch man of warre that sold us twenty Negars." Id.
at 73 (quoting 2 TRAVELS AND WORKS OF CAPTAIN JoHN SMITH 541 (Edward Arber ed.,
1910)). The "Negars " probably were captured from Spaniards by whom they had been
enslaved.
32. Id. at 166.
33. The fragmented record makes a definitive Black history of the period difficult. Helen
Catterall has noted the difficulty: "To write the history of slavery of Virginia in the seven·
teenth century is like . . . reconstructing a Greek vase from a few shards." 1 HELEN CATIER·
ALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 53 (1926),
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disapproved; a mulatto was considered to be of lower status than
her White parent and was excluded from the White race and ab
sorbed into the Black race. Race mixing, especially between White
men and Black women, persisted despite legal disapproval.
While formal statutes prohibiting interracial mating would be
introduced in Maryland as early as 1664,34 judicial and legislative
commentary on race mixing began in the colonies almost immedi
ately. Eleven years after the first "twenty Negars" arrived in Vir
ginia,

there is

a

reported

opinion

ordering

punishment for

fornication between a White and a Black person. Significantly, it is
this interracial sex case that is the first reported judicial decision to
allude to Blacks in any way. In this 1630 case, colonist Hugh Davis
was sentenced to be soundly whipped "before an assembly of ne
groes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and
shame of Christianity by defiling his body in lying with a negro."35
From the sparse record available, it is unclear whether the grava
men of Davis's offense was the act of fornication itself or the fact
that the object of his affection was a "negro."36 However, the fact
that the court deemed it necessary to specify the race of the "ne
gro" and designate as a punishment that Davis be whipped before
an assembly of Negroes suggests, at the very least, a consciousness
of the racial differences and that such racial differences were rele
vant enough to be noted in the legal record.
A decade later, in 1640, Robert Sweat was required to do public
penance for having "begotten with child a negro woman servant."37
The "negro woman" is not only identified by race but is given a
harsher punishment, that of being "whipt at the whipping post."38
From the record, it is unclear whether the harsher sentence is due

34. See DAVID FOWLER, NORTHERN ATI1TUDES TOWARD INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE 41
{1987).
35. In re Davis, Mcilwaine 479 (1630), reported in 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 76.
36. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATIER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 23 {1978) (noting ambiguities due to
limited record).
37. In re Sweat, Mcilwaine {1640), reported in 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 78.
38. Id.
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to race, gender, class, a combination of these factors,39 or other un
reported circumstances.4o
B.

Mulattoes: Black by Law41

The legal treatment of mulattoes as Blacks, with all of the at
tached legal disabilities, may have begun as early as the seventeenth
century. One of the earliest judicial uses of the term "mulatto" to

describe a person of mixed Black-White descent, appears in the

Virginia case of

In Re Mulatto.42

The opinion was issued in

1656,

just as race-based slavery was taking a firm hold.43 Although the

opinion consists of a single sentence, and we know of no supporting

record to ·illuminate the facts of the case, its logic constructs the
American view of racial mixture between Black and White that has

endured for over three hundred years. In re Mulatto in its entirety
states: "Mulatto held to be a slave and appeal taken."44

Without discussion or debate, the court thus apparently articu

lated the first judicial expression of the rule of hypodescent.45 Im
plicit in its opinion is the finding that the litigant was of both

African and European descent, but the court found that the Euro

pean ancestry made no legally significant difference at all, and the

holding is likely to have severed whatever ties this racial hybrid had
with his European ancestry. In fact, it was the African ancestry that
both defined his status and determined his fate.46

39. For an excellent discussion of legislative and judicial regulation of sexual behavior
during slavery, see Karen A. Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding South: The lmple·
mentation and Maintenance ofa Racial Caste System, 7 HARV WoMEN's L.J. 115 (1984). For
a discussion of the intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, see Kimberl� Crenshaw, Map·
ping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L REV. 1241 (1991).
40. While the meaning of the punishment meted out in the cases of Hugh Davis and
Robert Sweat may be ambiguous, the legislative intent in Virginia's 1662 fornication statute
was clear. The statute doubles the nonnal fine for fornication if the partner was Negro,
thereby enacting "the first clear-cut example of statutory racial discrimination in American
history." GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY 101 (1981).
41. For a discussion of the converse, see IAN F. HANEY LoPEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
42. Mcilwaine 504 (1656), reported in 1 CATTERALL, supra note 33, at 78.
43. There is evidence that planters had been categorizing their White servants and Black
servants separately as early as 1644. Legal historian Paul Finkelman writes that by the 1650s,
"blacks were more likely to be treated as slaves than as indentured servants." PAUL
FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 13 (1986). Legislation
unambiguously linking slavery and race first appeared in Virginia in 1667. See infra note 46.
44. Jn re Mulatto, Mcilwaine 504.
45. For a definition of hypodescent, see supra note 3.
46. The practice of race-based slavery was fonnalized by the Virginia legislature in 1667,
when the Virginia legislature passed the following act in 1667:
Whereas some doubts have risen whether children that are slaves by birth, and by the
charity and piety of their owners made pertakers of the blessed sacrament of baptisme,
.
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A statute passed by the Virginia legislature in 1662, less than a
decade after In Re Mulatto and forty-three years after the first Afri
cans arrived, shows the early importance of drawing broad bounda
ries around the Negro race. Undoubtedly in recognition of the fact
that most interracial fornication occurred between White men and
Black women, the law provided: "[C]hildren got by an Englishman
upon a negro woman . . . shall be held bond or free only according
to the condition of the mother .. . . '' 47 Significantly, this law broke
with the traditional English common law rule that the children fol
low the status of the father. 48 Instead it provided that children born
of a Black mother and a White father would follow the common
law applicable to farm animals 94 - the child would follow the sta
tus of the mother. os
Keeping "mulattoes " on the Black side of the color line 1s was
both psychologically and economically important. Its psychological
importance arose because, as Winthrop Jordan writes: "The social
identification of children requires self-identification in the fa
thers."52 White fathers were thus excused from social responsibility
for their children and in this way benefited from the classification of
should be by vertue of their baptisme be made free; It is enacted .. . that the conferring
of baptisme doth not alter the condition of the person as to his bondage or freedome.
2 Hening 260 (1667), quoted in 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 57. Catterall explains that
"color became the 'sign' of slavery: black or graduated shades thereof." 1 CATIERALL,
supra note 33, at 57.
47. 1662 Act XII, II Hening 170 (1662), quoted in FINKELMAN, supra note 43, at 16.
48. This doctrine was known as patrus sequitur patrem. See HIGGINBOmAM, supra note
36, at 44, 194.
49. Animal imagery persists in legal description of mixed-race people. For example, the
term mulatto is from the Spanish mulatto, the diminutive of mulo, a mule. See EDWARD B.
REUTER, RACE MlxruRE 12 (1931). A mule is the sterile offspring of a female horse and a
male donkey. See WEBSTER'S '_l'HIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1484 (1986).
50. This rule, partus sequitur ventrem, was defined by Blackstone to mean "[o]f all tame
and domestic animals, the brood belongs to the owner of the dam or mother." 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *390. The point of the law is to ensure that the owner of a
female animal retains ownership of the offspring, since the male animal who impregnated the
animal is generally unknown. A further rationale is that since the dam is almost useless to
the proprietor during her pregnancy, the proprietor is compensated by gaining ownership of
the offspring. See id.
51. There is evidence that "mulattoes" were treated as a buffer race in some parts of the
country during certain historical periods. Eugene D. Genovese writes that "in Charleston,
New Orleans, and Mobile some semblance of a three-caste system appeared and played an
important role within the local Negro community." EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN,
ROLL 431 (1974). For a further discussion of the treatment of mulattoes in the lower South,
see IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS (1974) (focusing on free blacks in general);
DAVIS, supra note 3, at 34-37. For a thorough account of the history of the mulattoes of
Louisiana, see VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN
CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986). Discussion of the experiences of these mixed-race people is
outside of the scope of this article.
52. JoRDAN, supra note 30, at 167.
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their illegitimate children as "Black." They escaped responsibility
not only for including these children in their families but also for
including them in their larger family of the White race.5 3 "If [the
White father] could not restrain his sexual nature, he could at least
reject its fruits and thus solace himself that he had done no
harm. . . . By classifying the mulatto as Negro he was in effect
denying that intermixture had occurred at all."5 4
This classification scheme had several economic benefits for
white settlers. It insulated White males from any responsibility for
supporting their offspring by Black women slaves; these offspring
became the property, and the responsibility, of the woman's master.
Thus, the birth of mulattoes provided an economic advantage to
both the father, in the form of freedom from parental responsibility,
and to the mother's slaveholder, in the form of a new slave. This
latter factor perhaps added another perverse incentive for the sex
ual abuse of slave women:55 The birth of mulatto children to a
Black mother increased the plantation's inventory as though the
child were a lamb or a bale of cotton. The economic advantages of
rearranging the lines of descent were thus significant.
In addition to providing that biracial children took the status of
their racially enslaved mothers, early statutes reinforced the point
that mulattoes were not considered desirable offspring in any event.
A 1691 statute, which provided for the banishment of Whites who
intermarried with a Negro or mulatto, was enacted for the express
purpose of thwarting the births of that "abominable mixture and
spurious issue " - mulattoes.5 6 In fact, Carter Woodson argues that
the underlying intent of miscegenation laws in the colonial period
was not to prevent sexual relations but "to debase to a still lower
53. James Baldwin's comments to a White southerner on such selective paternal denial
are instructive: "You're not worried about me marrying your daughter. . . . You're worried
about me marrying your wife's daughter. I've been marrying your daughter ever since the
days of slavery." GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 414.
54. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 178. This double standard, of course, affected White
women as well. Diarist Mary Boykin Chestnut laments:
Like the patriarchs of old, our men live all in one house with their wives and their concu
bines; and the mulattoes one sees in every family partly resemble the white children.
Any lady is ready to tell you who is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody's
household but her own. Those, she seems to think, drop from the clouds. My disgust
sometimes is boiling over.
GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 426.
55. For example, a master theoretically could become a breeder of slaves, thereby in·
creasing his slave holdings.
56. Virginia, Act XVI, quoted in HmoINBOTIIAM, supra note 36, at 44. This same lan
guage was used in a 1714 North Carolina statute. See JoHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE Frum
NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA 1790-1860, at 35-37 (1943).
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status the offspring of blacks ...[and] to leave women of color
without protection against white men." 57
While the majority of mulatto children were born to Black
mothers and inherited their slave status, legislation was passed to
ensure that the mulatto offspring of free White women did not go
unpunished. The 1691 Virginia law mentioned above imposed a
fine on a White woman who had a "bastard child by a Negro, " ad
ded five years to her term if she were an indentured servant, and
committed the mulatto children to slavery until the age of thirty
regardless of the status of the White mother.58 This type of punish
ment was not unusual.59 For a time, Maryland took even a stronger
stand, enslaving White women who, "to the disgrace of our nation, "
married Negroes, as well as enslaving their children.6 0
In many of the colonies, then, interracial marriage was formally
prohibited;6 1 those who engaged in interracial fornication paid a
double :fine;6 2 those who intermarried were banished;6 3 those who
performed marriages for mixed couples were punished;6 4 Whites
who engaged in interracial marriages were enslaved;6 5 the offspring
of such marriages followed the slave status of the mother if the
57. CARTER
1830 xv (1925).

G. WooDSON, FREE NEGRO HEADS OF FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN

58. And it is further enacted, that if any English woman being free shall have a bastard
child by a Negro she shall pay fifteen pounds to the church wardens, and in default of
such payment, she shall be taken into possession by the church wardens and disposed of
for five years and the amount she brings shall be paid one-third to their majesties for the
support of the government, one-third to the parish where the offense is committed and
the other third to the informer. The child shall be bound out by the church wardens
until he is thirty years of age. In case the English woman that shall have a bastard is a
servant she shall be sold by the church wardens (after her time is expired) for five years
and the child serve as aforesaid.
1691 Act (Act XVI), quoted in HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 36, at 45.
59. Pennsylvania passed a similar statute. See JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCE
GENATION AND MULATIOES IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1980).
60. Id. at 10-11.
61. Antimiscegenation statutes were enacted in many colonies: Maryland adopted a law
in 1662, Massachusetts in 1705, North Carolina in 1715, Delaware in 1721, and Pennsylvania
in 1725. See JOHNSTON, supra note 29, at 166.
62. See 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF Vm
GINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE Y EAR 1619 (William Waller
Hening ed., New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823), quoted in JOHNSTON, supra note 29, at
167.
63.

See supra note

56 and accompanying text.

64. See Act of 1681 (Maryland). The Act imposed a fine of 10,000 pounds of tobacco on
any priest who performed a marriage ceremony for a Negro slave and a White woman
servant.
65. White women who married Negro slaves in Maryland were required to serve their
husband's masters during their husband's lifetime. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 10 &
198 n.15 (citing ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS AND Acrs OF THE GENERAL AS
SEMBLY OF MARYLAND, JANUARY, 1637/38 - SEPTEMBER, 1664 (William Hand Browne ed.,
Baltimore, Maryland Historical Society 1883)).
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mother were Black66 and were enslaved anyway if the mother were

White.67 Nevertheless, the law was an ineffective deterrent to inter
racial relations. On the contrary, "[t]he greatest number of all the

cases of the intermixture of the races were regarded as outside the

province of the law and the courts, and the larger part of the mu
latto population was, no doubt, due in colonial times and thereafter,

to the exercise of passions by those who took no thought of mar

riage, law, or consent of clergy."68 The law was powerless to stem
the tide. One observer of the time described Virginia during the

colonial period as "swarming with mulattoes."69
As early as

1705, the Virginia legislature, in a statute prohibiting

interracial marriage, provided an ancestrally based, biological,

mathematical definition of who was Black, to include "the child,

grand child or great grand child of a negro" meaning anyone who

was one-eighth Black.70 During this period, North Carolina defined
a mulatto as anyone who was one-sixteenth Black, which would

mean that having a single great, great grandparent who was Black

would demarcate an individual as mulatto rather than White.71 Of
this time Jordan writes, "[T]here is no reason to suppose that these
two colonies were atypical."72

Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, laws dealing with

Negro slaves added the phrase "and mulattoes" to ensure that mu-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See supra note 46.
See sources cited supra note 56.
JOHNSTON, supra note 29, at 181.
Id. at 161.

H. Leon Higginbotham & Barbara Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in Co
lonial and Antebellum Virginia, 11 GEO. LJ. 1967 (1989).
71. See Winthrop D. Jordan, American Chiaroscuro: The Status and Definition of Mulat
toes in the British Colonies, 19 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 183, 185 (1962).
72. Id. at 185. This fractional, blood-borne approach would remain in some states until

the twentieth century. At different times,
Alabama and Arkansas defined anyone with one drop of "Negro" blood as Black; Flor
ida had a one-eighth rule; Georgia referred to ascertainable non-White blood; Indiana
used a one-eighth rule; Kentucky relied on a combination of any appreciable admixture
of Black ancestry and a one-sixteenth rule; Louisiana did not statutorily define Black
ness [but] did adopt via its Supreme Court an "appreciable mixture of negro blood"
standard; Maryland used a "person of negro descent to the third generation" test[;] Mis
sissippi combined an appreciable amount of Negro blood and a one-eighth rule; Missouri
used a one-eighth test, as did Nebraska, North Carolina, and North Dakota; Oklahoma
referred to "all persons of African descent" adding that the "term 'white race' shall
include all other persons"; Oregon promulgated a one-fourth rule; South Carolina had a
one-eighth standard; Tennessee defined Blacks in terms of "mulattoes, mestizos, and
their descendants, having any blood of the African race in their veins"; Texas used an
"all persons of mixed blood descended from negro ancestry" standard; Utah law re
ferred to mulattoes, quadroons, or octoroons; and Virginia defined Blacks as those in
whom there was "ascertainable any Negro blood" with not more than one-sixteenth Na
tive American ancestry.
LoPEZ, supra note 41, at 118-19.
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lattoes were subject to the same restrictions as Negroes.
73 "From
the first, every English continental colony lumped mulattoes with
Negroes in their slave codes and in statutes governing the conduct
of free Negroes: the law was clear that mulattoes and Negroes were
not to be distinguished for different treatment. "7 4 Thus, those colo
nies that chose not to deal separately with mulattoes simply added
the term "mulatto " to statutes that regulated and limited the rights
of Negroes. As Eugene Genovese notes, "[f]or the South as a
whole whites made little distinction between Blacks and
mulattoes."75
By the beginning of the 1700s, the legal structure that would
persist for well over two-hundred years was set in place. Individual
rights of those who had any significant amount of Black ancestry
were restricted severely by law. Negroes were presumed to be
slaves in slave-holding states, and most mulattoes with a minimum
amount of "Black blood " were treated the same as Negroes and
presumed also to be slaves.
For mulattoes and Negroes, all rights were rooted in the past, in
remote African ancestry. Ancestry alone determined status, which
was fixed. A Negro could not buy out of her assigned race;she
could not marry out of it, nor were her children released from its
taint. As historian Gilbert Stephenson bluntly stated,
"[m]iscegenation has never been a bridge upon which one might
cross from the Negro race to the Caucasian, though it has been a
thoroughfare from the Caucasian to the Negro."7 6

73. This practice extended to colonies outside of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland.
Edward Reuter reports that
[i]n New York, in 1706, twenty-two years after the first introduction of Negroes [in New
York], mulattoes were sufficiently numerous to be made the subject of legislative enact
ment. Connecticut began her black code in 1690 by passing a series of measures in
which mulattoes were enumerated with Negroes and Indians. The first act of Rhode
Island was one recognizing the manumitting or setting free of mulatto and Negro slaves.
New Hampshire never legally established slavery, but as early as 1714 passed several
laws regulating the conduct of "Indian, Negro and mulatto servants or slaves." The first
legislation of Delaware in 1721 mentions mulattoes. North Carolina was settled from
Virginia and as some of the settlers brought slaves with them into the new territory,
there were probably mulattoes in the colony as soon as there were Negroes. The first
statutory recognition of slavery was in an act against intermarriage passed in 1715.
South carolina's first positive slave act, 1712, mentions . . . mulattoes, Negroes and Indi
ans . . • . In New Jersey the usual formula including Negro, Indian, and mulatto slaves
appears in the legislation at least as early as 1714.
EDWARD BYRON REUTER, THE MULA'ITO

IN THE UNITED

STATES 111 (1918).

74. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 168.
75. GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 431.
76. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS

IN AMERICAN LAW

19 (1910).
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C. A Study in Contrasts: Exclusion of Mulattoes from De
Crevecoeur's "New Race of Men "
While legislators kept busy discouraging or prohibiting sexual
relations between Blacks and Whites and limiting the rights of their
offspring, there were no bars to intermarriage between Whites of
different ancestry. The union of two Whites, no matter how diverse
their European background or economic class, was not the subject
of legal comment. For judicial purposes, "[u]nions . . . of two white
persons were never called mixtures of two kinds of blood. "77
For White Americans, "the core of 'the American national char
acter' [was] a denial of legitimacy and privilege based exclusively on
descent. "78
America was seen as a severing of roots, a liberation from the stifling
past, an entry into a new life, an interweaving of separate ethnic
strands into a new national design. . . . "The bosom of America,"
Washington said, "is open . . . to the oppressed and persecuted of all
Nations . . . ." [who] would be "assimilated to our customs, measures
and laws: in a word soon become one people."79

This spirit of amalgamation, of intermarriage between arrivals
from different European countries, is celebrated in the famous 1782
Letters from an American Farmer, written by immigrant J. Hector
St. John de Crevecoeur:
What then is the American, this new man? He is either an European,
or the descendant of an European, hence that strange mixture of
blood, which you will find in no other country. I could point out to
you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was
Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four
sons have now four wives of different nations. He is an American,
who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, re
ceives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new
government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an
American by being received in the broad lap of our great Alma Ma
ter. Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men,
whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the
world.80

But just as "White " Americans were leaving behind the "an
cient prejudices, " intermarrying with other Europeans and "melt
ing " into a new race of "men, " they were enacting into law new ·
77. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 166.
78. WERNER SOLLORS, BEYOND ETHNICITY: CONSENT AND DESCENT IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 4 (1986).
79. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 23-25 (1992).
80. SOI,LORS, supra note 78, at 75-76 (quoting J. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR,
LETIERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 39 (London, Thomas & Lockyer Davies 1782)).
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prejudices that prevented mulattoes from melting into this new
race. In fact, for practical legal purposes, the mulatto was usually
placed squarely in the same category as Blacks with all the legal
disadvantages that accompanied it. In direct contrast to
Crevecoeur's new, free spirit of amalgamation, laws directed at
mixed-race Blacks restricted their rights in the smallest details. In
Crevecouer's adopted home state, New York, for example, it was
"not Lawfull for any Negro ...or Maletta Slave to Sell any Oysters
in the City of New York, "8 1 and it was prohibited for any free "Ne
gro, Indian or Mallatto " to "enjoy, hold or possess any Houses,
Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments within this Colony."82 Slave
or free, African ancestry, no matter how remote, was a one-way
ticket toward the Black race, not to Crevecoeur's new race.
Perhaps the most poignant illumination of the difference be
tween the status of the offspring of intra-European marriage and
Black-White unions can be found in another American letter sent
to Europe, just two years after de Crevecoeur penned the letter
quoted above. This second letter is from a Savannah merchant
who, as executor of an estate, was left with the responsibility for
two free mulatto children, perhaps the offspring of the decedent.
He wrote, pleadingly, to a friend in Ireland:
These young Foiles are very unfortunately situated in this Country . . .
their descent places them in the most disadvantageous situations, as
Free persons the Laws protect them - but they gain no rank in life
. .so many of their own Colour (say the mixt breed) being Slaves,
they too naturally fall in with them.83
.

The executor begs his Irish friend to accept the "rnixt breeds " as
wards in Ireland noting that "this [leaving the United States and
moving to Ireland] alone can save them."8 4 As the wards were mu
latto, they were inexorably pulled toward the Black race and ex
cluded from the vaunted privileges of White America described by
de Crevecoeur.
Hypodescent, thus, began at the beginning of the Black experi
ence in America. While the Revolutionary War and the Civil War
surely affected the status of Blacks, for the most part they did not
alter the fact that, for all practical purposes, Blacks with significant
81. An Act for Preserving of Oysters (1715), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAws OF NEW
YoRK 845 (Albany, James B. Lyon 1896).
82. An Act for preventing Suppressing and punishing the Conspiracy and Insurrection of
Negroes and other Slaves (1712), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 761, 764
(Albany, James B. Lyon 1896).
83. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 170-71.
84. Id.
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White ancestry were included within the boundaries of the Black
race.
Of course, the social status of mulattoes vis-a-vis Blacks did not
remain constant over the centuries. Williamson argues that in the
lower South, an important number of mulattoes were born of prom
inent fathers, and until 1850 they enjoyed a status "markedly ele
vated above that of the black mass, slave and free."SS Similarly, Ira
Berlin notes that "[t]he somatic similarities between whites and
light-skinned freemen also encouraged whites to share their prized
attributes with mixed-bloods."S 6 In the Carolinas, Mobile, and New
Orleans, mulattoes approached but never quite reached the status
of a buffer race, at least for a period of time.s7 Everywhere else in
antebellum America, in the Upper South and the North, there were
fewer social distinctions between Blacks and mulattoes, and after
the Civil War whatever distinctions there were began to fade away
as mulattoes everywhere were pushed more and more into the
Black race. Williams argues that even in the deep South, the "ani
mus against miscegenation and mulattoes seemed to reach a cres
cendo " in about 1907. By 1920 mulattoes, even there, had become
firmly part of the Black race, where they remain to this day .ss
D.

The Census and the Mulatto Category,

1850-1910

As we debate the wisdom of categorizing African Americans
separately from multiracial people, it is instructive to review the
census's earlier attempt to do so.Although Whites and Blacks have
been identified in every census since 1790,s9 the census began to
distinguish between Blacks and mulattoes with the Seventh Census
of 1850.
The decision of the Bureau of the Census to count mixed-race
Blacks separately from Blacks does not seem to have resulted from
any policy aimed at changing the status of mulattoes from that of
Blacks, creating a buffer race, or even assessing the extent of un85. WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 15: cf. PAUL R. SPICKARD, MIXED BLOOD 440 n.7
(1989).
86. BERLIN, supra note 51, at 196.
87. See GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 431.
88. This is not to suggest that there was no intra-racial prejudice between Blacks and
mulattoes. For a full discussion of colorism within the African-American race, see BERTICE
BERRY, BLACK-ON-BLACK DISCRIMINATION: THE PHENOMENON OF COLORISM AMONO
AFRICAN-AMERICANS (UMI Dissertation Services 1988). See also KATIIY RussELL ET AL.,
THE COLOR COMPLEX (1992).
89. See BUREAU OF TIIE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CFF No. 4, HISTORY &
ORGANIZATION 4 {1988).
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checked miscegenation. Rather, the attempt to count mulattoes in
the census of 1850 was part of a widespread effort of the "infant
statistical community ...to press for the creation of a more profes
sional national statistical system."9° For the first time, responsibil
ity for the census was placed in the hands of a congressionally
created Census Board, which turned to statistical experts in deter
mining the scope of the inquiry.91 The census was redesigned to
collect individual-level data on everyone in the country.92 The deci
sion to count mulattoes can be viewed as part .of a larger scheme of
the census reform of 1850, which created a complex new structure
for taking the census and "opened a new phase in the statistical
history of the country. "9 3
This is not to say that there was no political concern about the
expansion of the scope of the census questions. Indeed, as the
United States was poised on the brink of a sectional crisis in the
slavery debate, Southern congressmen were concerned about how
the data collected would affect the discourse on slavery.
9 4 Expan
sion of information on the characteristics of individual slaves would
lead to analysis of the statistical differences between Whites and
Blacks that could be used by the abolitionists.95 Thus, there was
some controversy about the level of individual detail that should be
required as to the slave population. Through congressional action,
questions on the individual names of slaves,9 6 the number of chil-

90. MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 33 (1988).
91. Congress created the Bureau of the Census and appointed as its head Joseph Camp
Griffith Kennedy, a farmer and political supporter of Zachary Taylor. Kennedy, however,
consulted with scholars and statisticians who pressed for substantial revision of the census
process. Lemuel Shattuck of the American Statistical Association and Archibald Russell of
the American Geographical and Statistical Society spearheaded the reform effort. For a dis
cussion of the creation of the Bureau of the Census, see id. at 35-36.
92. See id. at 36-37. Prior to 1850, the population census only named heads of household
and simply gave anonymous statistics for household members. See BUREAU OF THE CENsus,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CFF No. 4, FACTFINDER FOR THE NATION 3 (1988).
93. ANDERSON, supra note 90, at 34.
94. See id. at 40-41.
95. See id.
96. In the Congressional debate on the census, Senator Borland urged that to require the
census enumerators to take the names of the slaves would be too labor intensive. Senator
Clemens noted, "[a]s to their names, [the master] would not know anything about that until
the children had reached the age of twelve or fourteen." CoNG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess.
673 (1850).

1184

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1161

dren born to female slaves,97 and information on degree of an indi
vidual's removal from White blood98 were deleted.
As S.M. Lee notes, " [r] acial classifications can be usefully inter
preted as reflections of prevailing ideologies . . . the dominant ideas
and beliefs of society."99 In the 1850 census, it does not appear that
the decision to count mulattoes separately was based on a desire to
elevate or recognize mulattoes as an intermediate status superior to
Blacks and inferior to Whites. On the contrary, one basis for the
decision appears to have been to test a scientific theory of mulatto
physical inferiority. The Congressional Record contains commen
tary suggesting that the decision to count mulattoes and ascertain
their life span and fertility was to test the theory of polygenesis es
poused by Southern physician Josiah Nott.mo According to Nott's
theory, Blacks and Whites did not belong to the same species, and
when Blacks and Whites mated, the resulting hybrids - mulattoes
- would be physically inferior to either the White or the Black.
The congressional testimony also suggested that "the power of en
durance of plantation labor diminishes in proportion to the admix97. The rationale offered for this deletion was especially degrading to slave women. Senator King asserted:
Now, sir, it is impossible to ascertain the number of children upon a plantation that any
woman has had. The woman herself, in nine out of ten cases, when she has had ten or
fifteen children, does not know how many she has actually had [A laugh.] . . . Where is
the advantage, then, of filling up considerable space with this item, and swelling the
document without getting any information at last?
Id. at 674.
98. This inquiry was rejected on the grounds that information would be too difficult to
ascertain. Senator Borland argued that this inquiry required the enumerators
to go into the most delicate questions of physiology . . . [requiring] the census taker to
ascertain the degrees of removal between the white and the black races. Now, I respect·
fully suggest that it will require a high degree of science, an acute discrimination, too
determine anything of the sort. I am not aware that physiologists agree on these points;
and to suppose that any young men whose service could be obtained for the paltry com
pensation of the deputy marshal, would be qualified to determine, for the miserable
compensation of two cents per individual, these delicate and important questions of
physiology . . . why, sir, it seems to be the most extraordinary proposition that I ever
heard in my life.
Id. at 674.
99. Sharon M. Lee, Racial Classifications in the U.S. Census: 1890-1990 16 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. 75, 80 (1993).
100. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 96, at 676-77. The proceedings refer to a "Southern
physician," who apparently was Josiah Nott. His thesis of polygenesis held that there was a
separate creation of each of the races so that Blacks and Whites were not considered to be of
the same species. The human race descended from many original pairs, "placed by God in
climates best suited to their organization." REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST
DESTINY 130 (1981); see also BERLIN, supra note 51, at 197 (quoting Josiah C. Nott, The
Mulatto as Hybrid - Probable Extermination of Two Races if the White and Blacks are Al·
lowed to Intermarry, AM. J. OF THE MED. SCI. VI 254 (1843)); FOWLER, supra note 34, at 212·
14.
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ture of white blood; that the mulatto has, in a word, neither the
better properties of the white man nor the negro."101
The congressional testimony, however, shows that some held a
different view of mulattoes, as better than Blacks. In arguing
against the decision to count mulattoes, one representative argued
that the census should not be in the business of gathering details to
test philosophical theories of scientists, but noted, "I believe the
general opinion is, that the mulatto exceeds the black both in intel
ligence and pride." 102 However, in the end, it appears that the main
reason for the addition of the mulatto category was that statisticians
were happy to have a new category to count.
The "science" of distinguishing between Blacks, mulattoes, and
Whites appears to have rested with the visual acuity of the "set of
beardless boys,"103 the youthful census enumerators. The terms
"Black" and "mulatto" were not defined in either the census of
1850 or 1860. In 1850, the enumerators were simply instructed to
write "B" for Black or "M" for mulatto and further admonished
that "it is very desirable that these particulars be carefully re
garded."104 Unlike the modem census, the classifications were as
certained by the enumerator; they were not self-ascribed.1os
The census proceeded on the theory that physical appearance
corresponded to some ratio of White "blood" to Black "blood."
Enumerators in the census of 1870 still were required to differenti
ate between "mulattoes" and "Negroes," but they were given a def
inition of "mulatto" that included "quadroons, octoroons and all
person having any perceptible trace of African blood. " 106
101. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 96, at 676. It was stated further that
[t]he gentleman [who suggested that mulattoes be counted] in conversation with me said
that he believed that a certain class of colored people had fewer children than a certain
other class; and he believed that the average duration of the lives of the children of the
darker class was longer than that of the children of the lighter colored class, or the
mixed. And it was for the purpose of ascertaining the physiological fact, that he wanted
the inquiry made. This was the motive for its insertion . . . .
Id. at 676.
102. Id. at 677.
103. Id. at 674.
104. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SEVENTii CENSUS OF TIIE
UNITED STATES: 1850, at xxii (1853).
105. The accuracy of this census, as well as every census in which mulattoes were
counted, is highly questionable. See Spickard, supra note 85, at 433 n.27. In reviewing the
19th century census records for my own family, I noted that a "W" had been crossed out and
replaced with an "M," suggesting that my great, great grandparent may have gently corrected
the mistaken impression of the beardless boy.
106. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NEGRO POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1790-1915, at 207 (William Loren Katz ed., 1968) (hereinafter NEGRO
POPULATION].
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By 1890,107 the enumerators were instructed to categorize, by
visual inspection, among different artificially constructed categories
of Black, and "octoroon" and "quadroon" joined mulatto as sepa
rate classifications. How the enumerators were to make these dis
tinctions was never - and could never have been - made clear.
Rather, in the same way that an English speaker might speak more
loudly to a non-English speaking person in the hopes that the vol
ume would translate the language, the instructions kept getting
more specialized by degree as though that would increase the likeli
hood of an accurate result. The enumerators were admonished to

[b]e particularly carefal to distinguish between blacks, mulattoes, qua
droons, and octoroons. The word "black" should be used to describe
those persons who have three-fourths or more black blood; "mu
latto," those persons who have three-eighths to five-eighths black
blood; "quadroon," those persons who have one-fourth black blood;
and "octoroon," those persons who have one-eighth or any trace of
black blood.10s
The enumerators were instructed to become, in effect, clairvoyant
gene counters. 109
Even the Census Bureau admitted that the data collected under
this method was "of little value,"110 and, with an almost audible
107. There is no data available for the census years 1890 and 1900.
108. NEGRO POPULATION, supra note 106, at 207 (emphasis added).
109. The impossibility of ascertaining the exact proportion is highlighted by the following
analysis:
If, for example, six individuals, in which the proportions of Negro blood are respectively
precisely one-sixteenth, one-eighth, two-eighths, four-eighths, six-eighths, and eight
eighths, be presumed to intermarry, the number of possible different proportions in their
children are 14; and if the group be presumed to be segregated for several generations,
the possible different proportions their great-grandchildren would be represented by ap
proximately 70 fractions having 128 as a denominator and numbers ranging between 17
to 100 as numerators. If the proportions of Negro blood in the original parents were not
precisely represented by the fractions given above - as would almost certainly be the
case in any group of individuals selected from the Negro population of mixed blood the number of possible different proportions in the children of third generation would be
much greater. Under the assumption made, of complete segregation the extreme range
of differences in the proportion of Negro blood would tend to become less from genera
tion to generation, but the number of different proportions, owing to the finer gradation,
would tend to increase indefinitely. The tendency would be for the group collectively to
approach a uniform proportion, from which individual proportions would vary by grada
tions becoming increasingly minute and various. In the hypothetical group supposed
above, this limiting uniform proportion would slightly exceed seven-sixteenths Negro.
In the mulatto population of the United States as a whole the number of proportions of
interrnixture is exceedingly great, and there is no reason to suppose that these propor
tions are concentrated in any considerable degree upon such simple fractions as one
eighth or one-quarter, or one-half. In the Negro population at the present time, it is not
mathematically improbable that any given union of a mulatto with either a black or a
mulatto, will in its offspring represent a unique proportion of admixture of white blood.
Id. at 208 n.1.
110. Id. at 207 n.1 (quoting BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS
OF 1890, POPULATION, pt. I, at xciii).
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sigh of relief, the Census Bureau stated that the data was especially
misleading "as an indication of the extent to which the races have
mingled." 111 Presumably, this meant that the mulatto category in
cluded the offspring of mulattoes who married each other.
By the Fourteenth Census in 1920, when the color line had hard
ened, the Census Bureau stopped counting "mulattoes" and for
mally adopted the one drop rule:

The term "white" as used in the census report refers to persons un
derstood to be pure-blooded whites. A person of mixed blood is classified according to the nonwhite racial strain. . . . [t]hus a person of
mixed white . . . and Negro . . . is classified as . . . a Negro . . . regardless of the amount of white blood . . . .112
This formal adoption of the one drop rule appeared in legisla
tive definitions as well. For example, in 1924, a Virginia Act for
"Preservation of Racial Integrity" defined a White person as some
one with "no trace whatsoever of any blood other than Cauca
sian. " 113 By 1930, Virginia defined as colored anyone "in whom
there is ascertainable any negro blood." 114 The one drop rule was
enshrined in social practice as well. In 1944 in Los Angeles and in
1956 in Detroit, it cost my uncles their homes.
The rule of hypodescent thus had its origins with the arrival of
European and African people on this continent. During the ensu
ing three hundred years, hypodescent drew broad boundaries
around the African-American race, including within these bounda
ries the offspring of Europeans and Native Americans, and it bound
this race firmly together as a people.
II.

PROPOSALS FOR A MULTIRACIAL CATEGORY: CRITIQUING
THE

DISCOURSE

In this Part, I turn to the discourse regarding the one drop rule
and the proposed addition of a multiracial category to the census
forms. To date, this discourse has mainly followed one well worn
path: Scholars and commentators recite and condemn the racist or
igins of the one drop rule and, armed with this condemnation, they
conclude that the effects of the rule are mainly evil and that the
consequences of abandoning it will be mainly good. Their path
therefore often leads them toward neat, symmetrical redefinitions

111. Id.
112. 3 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT.
THE UNITED STATES: 1920, at 10 (1923).
113. 1924 VA. Acrs ch. 371, § 5.
114. 1930 VA. Acrs ch. 85, § 67.
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of the racial identities of most African Americans (and of most eve
ryone else for that matter). But many of the participants in this
discourse have set off on this path without (as Barbara Fields and
Jayne Lee remind us we must always do) surveying the surrounding
terrain.11s The purpose of this Part is to raise a caution sign on this
path and to slow the travel so that we can examine this terrain,
which has been formed by the Black experience in America. I be
lieve that there are cliffs and chasms that have been overlooked and
that we continue to overlook them at our peril.
Section II.A discusses the common misperceptions of the effect
of the one drop rule. Section II.B first examines certain proposals
to redefine the African-American race and argues that these pro
posals abandon the racial categories that have been created by the
social history of this country in favor of neat, biological classifica
tions. Section II.B concludes by looking back on cases where the
courts used "biological" factors to adjudicate the race of litigants.
Section II.C argues that the proposals to divide the African
American race are evidence of a dangerous "distancing" between
dark-skinned and light-skinned African Americans.
A.

The One Drop Rule: The Misapprehension of the
Historical Context

The recent discourse addressing the one drop rule has focused
formal
analysis of the rule without examining how the rule actu
on
ally functioned on the terrain where it did its work. However valid
in other contexts, the discourse overstates the importance of the
one drop rule and often overlooks the ways in which it became fun
damental to the struggle against racism, a struggle that would have
been fragmented had a more symmetrical classification system been
in place.

1. Misperceptions of the One Drop Rule: Gotanda's Theories of
Racial Purity, Objectivity, and Subordination in
Recognition
An interesting example of this misapprehension of the hypo
descent system is found in Professor Neil Gotanda's pathbreaking
115. See Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of
America, 181 NEw LEFT REv. 95, 100 (1990); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topol
ogy ofRace, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 751 (1994) (reviewing KwAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY
FATHER'S HOUSE (1992)).
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article A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind. "116 In a sec
tion of this article, Professor Gotanda compares hypodescent unfa
vorably with other, more formally elaborate classification systems.
In this discussion, Gotanda becomes ensnared in formal abstrac
tions and overlooks not only the ways in which Black Americans
have lived under hypodescent but also the lives of the South Afri
cans who have lived under a more symmetrical racial classification
system.
Professor Gotanda's article critiques, among other things, the
argument that American laws - even laws designed to protect mi
nority rights - should be colorblind and race neutral. Gotanda
correctly notes that the formal definition of the White and Black
races in this country (hypodescent) is neither colorblind nor neu
tral; to the contrary, this definition is based on "assumptions of
white racial purity" (the one drop rule) and "white domination."117
Gotanda argues that "[t]he hypodescent rule when combined with
color-blind constitutionalism, conveys a complex and powerful ide
ology that supports racial subordination."118 After comparing hy
podescent with more "symmetrical" classification systems used in
other countries, Gotanda concludes that the hypodescent system
fosters subordination because (1) it creates a powerful metaphor of
White racial purity; (2) it lacks a sense of objectivity or neutrality;
and (3) it leads to "subordination in recognition."11 9
As the following discussion demonstrates, Gotanda is unsuccess
ful in showing that hypodescent, per se, is a significant force, either
in enforcing subordination or validating White racial purity. In
stead, it is racism itself - far more than any particular classification
system - that is the cause of this subordination and validation, and
classification systems that are facially more neutral and symmetrical
than hypodescent can just as effectively further racist goals.

a. Gotanda's Summary of Racial Classification Systems. Go
tanda begins by concisely distilling the age-old American system of
racial classification (hypodescent) into two rules:
1) Rule of recognition: Any person whose Black-African ancestry is
visible is Black.

116. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind, " 44 STAN. L.
(1991).
117. See id. at 30-35.
118. Id. at 26.
119. See id. at 25-27.
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2) Rule of descent: (a) Any person with a known trace of African
ancestry is Black, notwithstanding that person's visual appearance; or,
stated differently, (b) the offspring of a Black and a white is Black.120
Gotanda then correctly observes that these two rules create a sys
tem which is not "symmetrical." The White race includes only peo
ple who are pure White, while the Black race includes everyone
else with a known drop of Black "blood." As alternatives to hypo
descent, Gotanda posits four historically documented examples of
classification schemes that are "non-binary" and "logically
symmetrical":

1. Mulatto: All mixed offspring are called mulattoes, irrespective of
the percentages or fractions of their Black or white ancestry.
2. Named Fractions: Individuals are assigned labels according to the
fractional composition of their racial ancestry. Thus, a mulatto is one
half white and one-half Black. A quadroon is one-fourth Black and
three-fourths white, a sambo one-fourth white and three-fourths
Black, etc.
3. Majoritarian: The higher percentage of either white or Black an
cestry determines the white or Black label.
4. Social Continuum: This is a variation on the Named Fractions
scheme: Labels generally correspond to the proportion of white or
Black ancestry, but social status is also an important factor in deter
mining which label applies. The result is a much less rigid system of
racial classification.121
Analyzing these schemes,122 Gotanda observes that " [b]ecause
these schemes are symmetrical, nothing in them suggests inequality
or subordination between races."123
While Gotanda notes that the Named Fraction, Majoritarian,
and Social Continuum systems have been used in various parts of
the world, there have been no substantive proposals to import these
schemes into the United States for use by the Bureau of the Census,
and an analysis of these three classification systems is therefore be
yond the scope of this article.124 The Mulatto system, in contrast,
now has its proponents (who correctly prefer the term "biracial" or
"multiracial" to "mulatto"). Accordingly, the following discussion
will examine the way that Gotanda compares the Mulatto system
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id. at 25.
122. Gotanda asserts that all four of these classification schemes are "non-binary," and
this assertion appears to be correct with respect to the Mulatto, Named Fractions and Social
Continuum systems. The Majoritarian system, however, does appear to be binary, because it
splits people into two groups, Black and White: See id. at 125.
123. Id. at 26.
124. An exception is a proposal by Luther Wright, Jr. for a kind of hybrid between the
Mulatto and Majoritarian systems. This proposal is critiqued infra section II.B.3.

March 1997]

One Drop Rule

1191

with the hypodescent system when he makes his three-pronged cri
tique of hypodescent.

b. Racial Purity. Gotanda's analysis begins with the assertion
that hypodescent validates White racial purity. He notes:
The metaphor is one of purity and contamination: White is unblem
ished and pure, so one drop of ancestral Black blood renders one
Black. Black ancestry is a contaminant that overwhelms white ances
try. Thus under the American system of racial classification, claiming
a white racial identity is a declaration of racial purity and an implicit
assertion of racial domination.125
Here, Gotanda overstates the role of the classification system in val
idating White racial purity, ignoring the fact that the more "sym
metrical" systems that he praises have been able to accomplish this
task effectively. Consider, for example, the racial classification sys
tem that accompanied Apartheid in South Africa. There, a "mu
latto" system of racial classification divided the population (more
symmetrically) into "Whites," "coloreds,'' and "Blacks." Notwith
standing this symmetry, when a South African claims to be White,
this claim - as in the United States - is a declaration of White
racial purity. In South Africa, as in the United States, "White"
means "pure" White; people with any detectible African features
are not White, and the purity of the White race is thus validated.126
Moreover, the Mulatto system has its own version of the "one
drop" rule, which reinforces the superiority of the White race in a
way that is not found in the hypodescent system. Under this "one
drop" rule, White blood is seen as so virtuous and superior that it
elevates a Black person out of the Black race and into a formally
distinct "colored" or "mulatto" race. Accordingly, when the Mu125. Gotanda, supra note 116, at 26-27.
126. The Population Registration Act of 1950 thus defined a "White person" as follows:
(xv) "white person" means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally
accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance
obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a colored person.
An Act to Make Provision for the Compilation of a Register of the Population of the Union,
for the Issue of Identity Cards to Person Names or Included in the Register; and for Matters
Incidental Thereto, No. 30, 5 (1950) (S. Afr.), cited in Christopher Ford, Administering Iden
tity, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1277 n.231 (1994). Under this statute, the emphasis was on ap
pearance, rather than blood or genealogy. Nevertheless, the statute clearly stated that in
South Africa, as here, one may look White, but not "be" White. South Africa had formal
legal procedures to deal with those who wished to be reclassified from African to Colored or
from Colored to White. As one reporter noted, "Diligent apartheid bureaucrats once scruti
nized faces and hair, took photographs and sent thick reports back to government headquar
ters in Pretoria on each of the hundreds of blacks who applied annually to be reclassified as
Colored - and the many more Coloreds who applied to become whites." Scott Kraft, Four
Families in South Africa: Colored Family Finds Color Still Matters, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1992, at H2. In the case of Colored applicants, these bureaucrats would often run a pencil
through the candidate's hair.
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latto system is conceived and administered in a racist manner, it can
validate White racial purity in even more ways than the hypo
descent system. In fact, the salient feature of the Mulatto system
makes it far more effective than hypodescent in promoting White
racial domination: It formally divides the subordinated, not-pure
White people into two groups - colored and Black. In South Af
rica, this formal division of people of color was and continues to be
an effective tool in their subordination, a tool that is not formally
present in the system of hypodescent.

c. Biological Objectivity. Gotanda's next observation arises
from the symmetry of the mulatto system when compared to the
imbalance of hypodescent. This observation is surprising because
we find Gotanda - an incisive critic of those who defend racial
classifications on the grounds that they are scientifically or biologi
cally "objective" - apparently praising the Mulatto system because
of its "objectivity." Gotanda states: "The symmetry of racial cate
gorization systems other than hypodescent brings a sense of objec
tivity and neutrality to these schemes, and a comparison of
hypodescent to symmetrical systems exposes its nonneutral
assumptions."127
But what is the basis for the Mulatto system's vaunted sense of
"objectivity" and "neutrality"? The answer is biology. The Mulatto
system "objectively" and "neutrally" draws bright blood lines that
separate "pure-blooded" Blacks, "pure-blooded" Whites, and
"mixed-blooded" persons into their own biologically homogeneous
groups. From a formal standpoint, the "objectivity" and "neutral
ity" of the Mulatto system may be qualities to be admired, but in
practice they merely reinforce the categorization of the races on
biological grounds. As Gotanda himself recognizes, "the treatment
of racial categories as functionally objective devalues the socioeco
nomic and political history of those placed within them." 128 This is
precisely what the Mulatto system does: It gives the imprimatur of
biology to racial categories, and it makes these racial categories
look so neat and logical that we forget the socioeconomic forces
that have drawn the bright line between Whites on the one hand
and all people of African descent on the other.129
127. Gotanda, supra note 116, at 27 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. at 26.
129. The asymmetrical system of hypodescent, in contrast, undermines the biological ba
sis for racial categorization, because, genetically speaking, the requisite "one drop" of Afri
can blood cannot hold a race together. Instead, hypodescent finds its cohesive strength in
historical forces that have created the African-American race. See generally Gotanda, supra
note 116, at 30-35.
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Thus while the Mulatto scheme may seem more elegant because
it draws a symmetrical line between pure-blooded Blacks and
mixed-blooded Blacks, this is a line based on blood that has little
meaning except to biological racists, a line that would be better off
not drawn at an.130

d. Subordination in Recognition.

Gotanda next argues that the

"moment of racial recognition" bespeaks the racial hierarchy im
posed by hypodescent:

Under hypodescent, the moment of racial recognition is the mo
ment in which is reproduced the inherent asymmetry of the metaphor
of racial contamination and the implicit impossibility of racial equal
ity. The situation which bares most fully the subordinating aspect of
the moment of racial classification arises when a Black person is at
first mistaken for white and then recognized as Black.
Before the moment of recognition, white acquaintances may let
down their guard, betraying attitudes consistent with racial subordina
tion, but which whites have learned to hide in the presence of non
whites. Their meeting and initial conversation were based on the
unsubordinated equality of a white-white relationship, but at the mo
ment of racial recognition, the exchange is transformed into a white
Black relationship of subordination. In that moment of recognition
lies the hidden assertion of white racial purity. The moment of racial
recognition is thus characterized by an unconscious assertion of the
racial hierarchy implied by hypodescent.131
The fl.aw in this reasoning is that Gotanda again attributes to
hypodescent a phenomenon (the "moment of racial recognition")
that is, in truth, a function of racism. In fact, experience tells us that
such "moments" do not depend on hypodescent. Jews, Arab
Americans, and Iranian Americans experience these moments fre
quently (and anti-Semites therefore find themselves saying: "You
don't look Jewish"), even though the boundaries of their ethnic
groups are not strictly defined by hypodescent.132
With respect to African Americans, in order to test Gotanda's
hypothesis that these moments of racial recognition are a function
of the hypodescent system, imagine the two ways in which such mo
ments could play out between a White person and a mixed-race
person if a Mulatto system were in effect.
First, the moment could play out in the very same way as under
hypodescent: The White person assumes that the mixed-race per130. Of course, in South Africa this line now has social meaning because decades of
apartheid have successfully separated the Colored and African peoples into separate social
groups. See Kraft, supra note 126, at H2.
131. See Gotanda, supra note 116, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
132. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 13.
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son with whom she is speaking is White. After the White person
makes her slur, the mixed-race person makes his identity clear, and
the same "hidden assertion of White racial purity" occurs.
Second, something very different could happen. When the
White person makes her slur regarding Black people, the mixed
race person could declare his formal distance from the Black race
("I'm biracial and you're right, those Blacks do need to get off wel
fare") and agree with the slur, thus consciously asserting the racial
hierarchy implied by the Mulatto category. In both of these situa
tions "subordination in recognition" occurs with great effectiveness
under the Mulatto system.
Gotanda also overstates his case when he argues that "at the
moment of racial recognition, the exchange is transformed into a
white-Black relationship of subordination." In fact, "the moment
of racial recognition" is a two-edged sword, cutting both ways. Un
less the White person is an incorrigible racist, she suffers humilia
tion and embarrassment as a result of these "moments" - and she
may also learn something. While most African Americans can give
a personal example of such a situation, a very instructive one is
found in a story Professor Scales-Trent tells about an experience
her Aunt Midge had during a bus ride in the newly-desegregated
South:
The bus was almost full, a few seats here and there, black and white
scattered throughout the bus. And then, at one stop, a dark-skinned
black woman got on, looked for a seat, and went over and sat down
next to a white woman. . . . [T]his white woman was outraged. How
dare this colored woman come and sit down next to her without so
much as a by-your-leave! The white woman noisily gathered up all
her bags and packages, rolled her eyes, muttered under her breath,
and flounced over to sit next to Aunt Midge - Aunt Midge, a black
woman with porcelain skin and baby blue eyes. She settled in with a
haughty glance at the other bus riders, a glance that said: "No, in
deed! Some people may be willing to sit next to niggers, but I am not
one of them." The other black riders, friends and neighbors of my
aunt, tried to suppress a grin. But then Aunt Midge peered around
this white woman and her packages, and smiled and waved at them,
and they couldn't contain themselves any more. They exploded with
laughter. They laughed until the tears rolled down their cheeks. They
laughed until they had to hold their sides. They laughed until they
were out of breath.133
Imagine this "moment of racial recognition" under the Mulatto
system, where Aunt Midge would have been formally assigned to a
different race than many of the other Black passengers on the bus.
133.

JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN 42

(1995).
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At worst, Aunt Midge and her White seat-mate would have tacitly
agreed that the Blacks on the bus were the "Other" and that it was
unacceptable to sit next to them. At best, the laughter would have
been more muted and less heartfelt. Either way Aunt Midge's little
victory against racial subordination would have been less
pronounced.
Scales-Trent gives a final (tongue-in-cheek) warning that shows
that, under a hypodescent system, these "moments of racial recog
nition" have for years been an effective stealth weapon that Afri
can-Americans use to combat racism:
So don't forget, white folks: we see you, we hear you, and we tell
our stories. Was that you at a party joking about living in "Coon
City"? Little did you know that one of those "coons" was at the party
and is writing about you even now. Was it you at a bar talking about
that "new nigger basketball player at the university," not knowing
that the "nigger basketball player" was two chairs away? And when
you were in surgery performing a brain shunt and said it was hard to
cut through the skull of your patient because "Negro skulls are so
thick," you never knew that the brilliant new resident you were work
ing with was a "Negro."
We tell our stories.
And we are everywhere, white folks.
Beware.134
It is something deeper than the hypodescent scheme - some
thing that transcends any classification system - that is doing 'ra
cism's work. Comparing the history of the United States with that
of South Africa, it becomes clear that, historically, the symmetrical
Mulatto system has been just as pernicious as the asymmetrical one
of hypodescent; under both systems there was a bright line between
White people and people of African descent and a fainter line be
tween mulattoes and Blacks.135 The bright line was drawn not by a
formal classification system, but by centuries of racism, economic
forces, and sexual mores, along with the superficial physical differ
ences. In fact, had the more elegant, more symmetrical Mulatto sys
tem been selected in this country, the line between White people
and people of color might be much brighter than it is today.
Gotanda discussed the one drop rule obliquely in the context of
colorblind constitutionalism, but other commentators who focus
specifically on multiracial issues have fallen into the same traps. In
the next two sections, I discuss how such commentators overlook
the effects of the racial classification system in South Africa and the
134. Id. at 44.
135. See infra notes 140·61 and accompanying text.
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good Mephistopheles did when he designed the one drop rule in
America.

2. The One Drop Rule and "Buying into the System of Racial
Domination "
Even historian Paul Spickard, who has written the definitive his
tory of twentieth-century mixed-race Americans, is sometimes too
quick to denounce the work of the one drop rule. Spickard for ex
ample argues:
The function of the one-drop rule was to solidify the barrier between
Black and White, to make sure that no one who might possibly be
identified as Black also became identified as White. For a mixed per
son, then, acceptance of the one-drop rule means internalizing the op
pression of the dominant group, buying into the system of racial
domination.136
I agree that for a biracial person - a person who feels loyalty to
parents of two different races - accepting the one drop rule will in
some (but certainly not all) cases lead to the painful internalization
of societal racism. However, I do not agree that accepting this rule
constitutes "buying into the system of racial domination." History,
in fact shows us that the opposite is true: Often, those who fought
the one drop rule were the ones who "bought into" the system of
racial domination, and those who accepted this rule fought racial
domination. Consider the slave narrative quoted at the beginning
of this article: "[S]o you see I han't got but one-eighth of the blood.
Now, admitting it's right to make a slave of a full black nigger, I
want to ask gentlemen acquainted with business, whether because I
owe a shilling, I ought to be made to pay a dollar?"137 The slave
gives a cunning critique of the one drop rule but prefaces his cri
tique with the words: "it's right to make a slave of a full black nig
ger." He rejects the one drop rule, but accepts the system of racial
domination. Similarly, in the article Time Magazine wrote on my
Uncle Jack after the racists' bricks came flying through his window,
he was not quoted as denouncing the system of racial domination;
instead he implied that the bricks should not have been aimed at his
window, because he was not Black.1 38
136. Paul R. Spickard, The Illogic of American Racial Categories, in RACIALLY MIXED
PEOPLE IN AMERICA 19 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992). This observation is cited with approval
in Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong?: Racial Classification in
America and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 542
(1994). In other writings, Spickard does acknowledge the positive works of the one drop
rule. See Spickard, supra note 85, at 323.
137. BLASSINGAME, supra note 1, at 52.
138. See TIME, supra note 25, at 24.
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Compare these rejections of the one drop rule with the actions
of my Uncle Clarence when the neighbors sued to have him ejected
from his home because of his race. Uncle Clarence accepted the
one drop rule, stipulated on the record that he was Black, and then
argued at every level of the Califomia court system that in this
country nobody should be evicted from their home because of their
race.139 These three real situations, which undoubtedly have been
played out repeatedly throughout American history, cast doubt on
the conclusion that "acceptance of the one drop rule means . . .
buying into the system of racial domination." Who was it, after all,
who "bought into" the system of racial domination? Was it the op
ponents of the one drop rule, who said "you can't do that to me

-

I'm not Black"? Or was it the person who accepted the one drop
rule, and said "you can't do that to anyone" ?

3. Lessons from the South African Experience
Speaking of classification systems for race and sexual orienta
tion, Professor Karst observes that "[w]hen a binary classification of
personal identity is written into law, it is a better-than-even bet that
the law was written by members of the dominant group."140 Other
scholars who have contributed to the discourse also have assumed
that the most efficient way for one racial group to maintain its dom
inance is by imposing a binary system of racial classification, such as
the Black-White hypodescent system in the United States.141 This,
however, is not necessarily so. What has led the discourse astray is
the assumption that the architects of the Jim Crow system chose

the

most efficient means of ensuring racial domination. History, how
ever, presents no shortage of tyrants who were neither shrewd nor
smart, and simply because the tyrants who fathered Jim Crow chose
the one drop rule does not mean that this rule was the most effi
cient means of maintaining dominance over the Black population.
In fact, this dominance might have been far more efficiently and
permanently enforced if the architects of Jim Crow had fashioned a
more symmetrical, trinary, White-mulatto-Black classification sys
tem. By building a wall between light and dark African Americans
and then making a few concessions to those on the light side of this
wall, the designers of Jim Crow America might have extended the
life of their loathsome system for another generation.
139. See Stone v. Jones, 152 P.2d 19, 19 {Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
140. Karst, supra note 28, at 293.
141. See Maria P.P. Root, From Shortcuts to Solutions in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE
AMERICA, supra note 136, at 343.
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Indeed, many American racists realized this and proposed draw
ing such a line.142 In addition, as Higginbotham and Kopytoff note
when speaking of a Virginia statute that treated mulattoes in the
same way as Blacks: "What the white Virginians seemed not to re
alize was that they had greatly increased the danger of alliance by
classifying most mixed race individuals with blacks rather than with
whites in terms of their legal rights."143 They also observe that,
Whites in pre-Civil War Virginia paid a strategic price to maintain
their ideal of white racial purity. Had they declared, for example, that
anyone with more than fifty percent white blood was legally white,
they would have had less to fear from an alliance of free mulattoes
and slaves.144
Of course, we can never know how American history might be
different if the architects of Jim Crow had divided the Black race
into two races - a pure African race and a mulatto buffer race.
But as we evaluate the Devil's work in creating hypodescent here,
we should compare it to the work he did some years later in South
Africa, where he created an elegant, symmetrical, nonbinary classi
fication system. As we make this comparison, we should ask where
the Devil did more evil and where he did more good. Interestingly,
the recent discourse regarding the multiracial category and the one
drop rule has all but ignored the experience in South Africa.145
There, the racial classification system was one of the bedrock ele
ments of apartheid. Unlike hypodescent, it had an official interme
diate "colored" category, which contained the descendants of the
early White settlers, of the native inhabitants of South Africa (the
Khoikhoi), and of the Malay, Indian, and Chinese immigrants.146
142. For example, after observing race relations in Latin America and the Caribbean
where he believed that the mulatto category was a more "distinct third caste in-between the
white minority and the black majority," the conservative racist Alfred Holt Stone argued that
mulattoes be accorded a separate "caste" status, and that they be exempted from some of the
more discriminatory state laws. JOHN G. MENCKE. MULATTOES AND RACE MIXTURE 124-31,
139 n.122 (1979).
143. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 70, at 1996-97.
144. Id. at 1981.
145. The discourse includes several works on the subject of mixed race, hypodescent and
the one drop rule which barely mention South Africa or its racial classification system. See,
e.g., NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE 74 (1993); Gotanda, supra note 116; Lythcott·
Haims, supra note 136. Spickard puts a positive spin on the South African classification
system, noting, "Even South Africa's starkly divided society has had room for an interrnedi·
ate category
" Spickard, supra note 136, at 331.
146. George Frederickson notes that:
The initial constituent elements were the progeny of unions between whites and slaves
or ex-slaves of Asian or East African origin
and the offspring of white-Khoikhoi or
slave-Khoikhoi interrnixture. Eventually the unmixed slaves freed in 1838 and a large
proportion of the remaining full-blooded Khoikhoi intermarried with these original
Coloreds, thus increasing their nonwhite inheritance. But the white genetic contribution
to this population group did not cease with the abolition of slavery; for white men con·
• • . .

. • •
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The effects of this categorization system are metaphorically
summed up by President Mandela in his description of the alloca
tion of food at one of the segregated prisons where he was incarcer
ated: "[W]hite prisoners received white sugar and white bread,
while Coloured and Indian prisoners were given brown sugar and
brown bread." Black prisoners, Mandela notes, received no sugar
and no bread.147 This division of bread and sugar signalled the way
that all of South Africa's wealth and privilege was allocated under
the old regime. In Cape Town, for example, Whites lived in nice
houses, many in seaside neighborhoods, that were lavish in compar
ison to the brick bungalows where the colored population lived,
which, in turn, were luxurious in comparison to the shacks where
the African population was forced to reside.148 Mean income for
the colored population was only one third that of Whites but it was
twice that of Blacks. Similarly, educational spending on colored
children was only half that spent on White children but twice that
spent on Black students.149 The New Republic noted that
"[t]hrough a labor system that gave them preference over blacks,
coloreds were encouraged to feel superior to and distinct from
them."150 Formal housing segregation further isolated the colored
population from Black people. In many ways, Black and colored
South Africa were separate societies, with colored people often
called the "stepchildren" of White society.151
Prior to 1948, many colored voters had the franchise in South
Africa. When the National Party's D.F. Malan defeated Jan
Smuts's United Party in the 1948 elections, the National Party be
gan to build the formal system of Apartheid and, within eight years
of taking power, it had disenfranchised the colored electorate and
segregated the colored population.152 In an infamous episode in
tinued to marry or cohabit with Colored women, and most of their children now became
part of the mother's racial group.
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN
AND SoUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 132 (1981). For the gene counters, Frederickson notes: '"the
Cape Coloured population in Cape Town . . . are constituted by approximately equal propor
tions of European, Asian and Southern African genes."' Id. at 255 {alteration in original)
(quoting M.C. Botha & Judith Prichard, Blood Group Gene Frequencies: An Indication of
the Genetic Constitution of Population Samples in Cape Town, S. AFR. MED. J., Apr. 1, 1972,
at 20).
147. See NELSON MANDELA, LoNG WALK TO FREEDOM 212 {1994).
148. See Jonathan Steele, ANC Faces Suspicion from Mixed-Race Voters, THE GUARD
IAN, Apr. 8, 1994, at 122.
149. See Kraft, supra note 126, at 2.
150. Peter Beinart, United Coloreds: How Mandela Lost the Mixed Race Vote, NEW RE
PUBUC, Feb. 28, 1994, at 16, 17.
151. See Id.
152. See FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 40, at 279, 254.
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the Western Cape Province, approximately 60,000 colored residents
were forcibly removed from their homes in District Six in Cape
Town; these homes were razed so that a White neighborhood could
be built on the spot.153
Decades later, as 1994 brought the first free elections to South
Africa, this same Nationalist party sought to win the votes of the
colored people it had disenfranchised, segregated, and relocated,
and it began this task by emphasizing the line it had drawn between
the mixed race and Black populations. Professor Lawrence summa
rizes one campaign tactic employed by the National Party in order
to lure colored votes in the Western Cape:
The National Party's campaign comic book depicted a typical Miller's
Plain Coloured family: a mother, a father, three children, and a dog.
Each strip told a tale of how, if elected, Mandela and the ANC would
allow the Africans to take everything the Coloured family had
worked so hard to get. The depictions in the comic of both Coloureds
and Africans employed blatantly racist stereotypes. In one strip, an
unkempt African rings the doorbell. The mother goes to the door and
asks what he wants. "I've come to look at the house that Mandela is
giving me after the elections," he says.154
A review of newspaper accounts of events leading up to the
1994 campaign shows how effective the South African govern
ment's efforts to draw a line through the African race had been.
For example, the Daily Telegraph quotes one colored voter as say
ing "[s]ure the National Party did terrible things to us, but the white
men governed us all these years. They know how to rule. Black
men can't rule the world."155 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times
quotes a Colored man observing that "[m]ost of the so-called
Colored people would go for the National Party because of their
inherent fear of the black man. . . . They don't understand the black
man. Coloreds have been taught that he's the uneducated one who
steals without asking. "156 And shortly before the election, the Fi
nancial Times reported the following from a Cape Town election
rally:
153. See Paul Taylor, Coloreds: Oppressed Like Blacks, But Voting Like Whites, WASH.
Apr. 25, 1994, at Al3. After razing this vibrant and Bohemian neighborhood, the
government was unable to fulfill its plans and the land remained vacant for years. See
Brendan Boyle, South Africa's Notorious Apanheid Wasteland to be Redeveloped, REUTERS
LIBRARY REPORT, Aug. 26, 1991.
154. Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism and the Jurisprudence of
Transformation to Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society, 47 STAN. L. REV.
819, 832 (1995). For a press account of these tactics, see Steele, supra note 148.
155. Alec Russel, ANC Paints Itself White to Woo the Coloureds, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Sept. 18, 1993, at 15.
156. Kraft, supra note 126, at H2.
POST,
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But Mr Andre Hofmeister, a coloured [man] whose name underlines
his half-European ancestry, pointed to a crowd of [African National
Congress] supporters dancing with posters of Mandela and said:
"These people are too stupid to realise that, if a black man rules this
country, it will be run into the ground."157
When the election came, the colored electorate in the Western
Cape gave the majority of its votes to the National Party, the same
party that had oppressed it for forty-six years, thereby electing, as
premier of the Western Cape, Remus Kriel, the man who had
served the Apartheid regime in Pretoria as its last Minister of Law
and Order158 and who, one newspaper noted, had "opposed Presi
dent F W de Klerk's reforms until the last moment."159
Fortunately for us, the designers of Jim Crow segregation in the
United States were not quite as shrewd as D.F. Malan. Today, we
can only speculate as to how this country would have been different

if the architects of American racial classifications had designed
things slightly differently, walling off mulattoes in a separate racial
category; officially reserving for them slightly better jobs and neigh
borhoods, schools and water fountains; and poisoning them with ra
cist propaganda touting their superiority over the "pure-blooded"
African Americans.

In his essay

Paths to Belonging,

Professor

Karst persuasively reminds us that it is not difficult to pit one disad
vantaged minority group against another; Professor Lawrence notes
that in 1966 even some of California's Latino voters supported
Proposition 14, the initiative that would have repealed fair housing
laws.1 60 If a separate "mulatto" race had been formally created
here, would its voters - afraid of having "Blacks" as neighbors have supported this law? Would this separate category of Ameri
cans, like the South African coloured electorate, have voted for seg
regationists? With three racial categories instead of two, just how
differently would the struggle against racism have evolved?

Of

course, we cannot answer these questions with certainty, but we
must at least consider them as we survey the terrain.
157. Brendan Boyle, South African Elections: Mixed-Race Voters Ensure Nats Triumph in
the Cape, FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at 4.
158. See id.
159. Raymond Whitaker, Ominous Signs as Nats Claim Western Cape,
May 2, 1994, at 12.

THE INDEPEND

ENT,

160. See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REv. 303 (1986). For the ironic story of one such voter, see Lawrence, supra note
154, at 834. Given the existence of colorism within the African-American community, see
sources cited supra note 88, it is easy to imagine how a formal legal division of the African
American race could have splintered and slowed the struggle for racial equality.
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As we examine the African-American experience more closely
and compare it with the experience in South Africa, we come away
with a more realistic view of the workings of hypodescent and the
one drop rule. As noted at the outset of this article, when Mephis
topheles was asked to "self-identify," he responded that he was
"part of that power that ever wills evil and ever accomplishes
good."161 So it is with the one drop rule. It was begotten of racism,
hatred, and ignorance, but it also created a people and united that
people in the fight against those evils.

B. Rebiologizing Race
With the one drop rule placed in a more balanced light, I now
turn to the arguments for a radical redefinition of American racial
categories. Among those who promote a multiracial category, one
group urges such broad boundaries for that category that it would
swallow up a great percentage of Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Native
Americans, and Filipinos. In this section, I argue that these com
mentators, in a quest for new biologically symmetrical racial classi
fications, have overlooked much of the social and historical context
that has created the African-American race. They have, for exam
ple, forgotten that even the Devil is bound by the laws of motion,
which declare that actions and reactions are proportional, and thus
when the Devil made the White race exclusive, the necessary con
verse was that the African-American race became inclusive. Doro
thy E. Roberts is thus correct when she observes:
Sharing genetic traits seems less critical to Black identity than to
white identity. The notion of racial purity is foreign to Black folk.
Our communities, neighborhoods, and families are a rich mixture of
languages, accents, and traditions, as well as features, colors, and tex
tures . . . . There is often a melange of physical features - skin and
eye color, hair texture, sizes and shapes - within a single family. We
are used to "throwbacks" - a pale, blond child born into a dark
skinned family, who inherited stray genes from a distant white ances
tor. My children play with a set of twins who look very different from
each other. The boy has light skin, green eyes, and "kinky" sandy
colored hair; the girl has dark skin, brown eyes, and long, black, wavy
hair.162
Because the commentators discussed below have overlooked this
social reality, their classification systems would return us to notions
of racial purity; they would reduce racial categorization to a matter
of biology and blood.
161. GOE.THE, supra note 18, at Part I, Lines 1335-36.
162. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L.

REv.

209, 237 (1995).
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1. The Collapse of Biological Race
Many anthropologists now reject the concept of physical race.
Of course, they do not deny that morphological differences exist
between population groups; rather, they deny that these differences
have much deeper genetic significance.163 These anthropologists
note that the genetic differences that do exist among peoples do not
track the traditional racial groups. In fact, there are huge genetic
variations among people in the same racial group, and there are
significant genetic similarities among people of different racial
groups. For example, in inventorying the genetic makeup of vari
ous population clusters, researchers have found that the largest ge
netic difference exists between two groups of black skinned people
- the West Africans and the Australian aborigines.164
While the rejection of the genetic significance of racial catego
ries is by no means unanimous,165 it has reached the point of con
sensus among the participants in the discourse that I address here.
All of these participants recognize race as a social rather than a
biological category.166 Ironically, however, these same commenta
tors now propose to breathe new life into the biological construc
tion of race that they unanimously reject.

2. Proposals for a Broad Genetically Based Multiracial Category
Some commentators and advocacy groups have recently sug
gested that the census should include a broad "multiracial" cate
gory that would be "inclusive of all racially mixed persons."161 The
163. See Robert Lee Hotz, ls Concept ofRace a Relic?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995, at Al.
For a compelling exposition of this view, see KwAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FAnraR's
HOUSE 36-38 (1992); see also STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981).
164. See Hotz, supra note 163. Genetic traits that correlate with population groups often
do not correlate with the traditional racial groups. For example, if races were formed on the
basis of the ability to retain lactase, the enzyme needed to digest milk, one race would in
clude some African Blacks, East Asians, Native Americans, Southern Europeans, and Aus
tralian Aborigines; the other race would consist of West Africans, Arabs, and Northern
Europeans. Id. Similarly, the sickle cell trait appears "wherever people had to cope with
prolonged exposure to malaria. It is as prevalent in parts of Greece and south Asia as in
central Africa." Id.
165. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE - INTELLI
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
166. See NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE 13-17 (1993); Gotanda, supra note 116,
at 23; Cynthia L. Nakashima, An Invisible Monster: The Creation and Denial of Mixed-Race
People in America, in RACIALLY MuraD PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 162;
Spickard, supra note 136, at 18; Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 536; Wright, supra note
17, at 513.
167. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 532 n.7. Similarly, Project RACE proposes a
census category that would define "multiracial" as a "person whose parents have origins in
two or more of the above racial categories [namely, American Indian or Alaska Native,
Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic or White]." Hearings, supra note 14, at 113. Pay-
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intellectual momentum for this category is drawn, in large part,
from the rejection of the one drop rule. For example, in a thought
ful recent Note focused on the issue of transracial adoption, Julie
Lythcott-Haims forcefully rejects the one drop rule16s and proposes
a broad multiracial category. Her discussion of the "Black is Beau
tiful" movement provides insight into the theoretical basis for this
broad, new category:
The "one drop" rule is so ingrained in the American psyche that
Blacks and Whites do not think twice about it. For example, part
Black people of all hues joined Blacks in embracing the "Black is
Beautiful" slogan advanced in the late 1960s, finally taking pride in
their skin color, their hair and other aspects of their black ancestry.1 69

Here, Lythcott-Haims acknowledges that the "psyche" of American
Blacks was such that they never "thought twice" about the fact that
they were Black. As I have argued above, this self definition arose
from the social history that solidified African Americans into a sin
gle racial group. But notwithstanding African Americans' self
definition and social history, the broad category which Lythcott
Haims and others propose would draw a line between Blacks who
have White blood ("part-Black people of all hues") and those who
do not ("Blacks"). In doing so, this category could establish a one
drop rule of its own: one drop of White blood would transform a
"Black" person into a "part-Black person of all hues."170 In fact,
this new one drop rule could transform 75 to 80% of African Amer
icans into multiracial persons:
It is now believed that Multiracial Americans are more common than
many Americans recognize: "It has been estimated, for example, that
between three-quarters and four-fifths of all so-called Negroes in the
United States have some White ancestry. How many so-called Whites
in the United States have Negro blood is unknown, but it must run
into the hundreds of thousands. if not millions. "171
son correctly observes that "if multiracial is defined as having parents with origins in two or
more groups, most African-American and Hispanic persons, and even a significant propor
tion of white persons in this country would fall under the multiracial category." Kenneth E.
Payson, Comment, Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of
Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1280 (1996).

168. See Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136,
169. Id.

at

at

533.

539 (emphasis added).

It is important to remember that the proponents of this category have the noblest of
intentions. Lythcott-Haims, for example, states: "In no way do I suggest that being Black is
undesirable and that Multiracial people should be given the opportunity to break free of the
'Black' label. . . . I implore that recognizing and accepting the fullness of one's ancestry is
critical to developing a healthy identity." Id. at 541.

170.

171. Id.
AND

at

539-40

(quoting CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY
BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 185 (1986)).
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At bottom, this broad multiracial category is based on a biological
view of race, specifically, that the multiracial box should be made
available for all those African Americans with some admixture of
White blood in their "ancestry." This biological recategorization is
not confined to the Black race. The purpose is apparently to draw a
racial dividing line, with those Americans who are pure blooded
(pure Whites, pure Blacks, pure Native Americans) on one side,
and those who have mixed blood on the other. In accomplishing
this task, blood lines may be followed endlessly to their source, and
the histories of peoples may be ignored. Lythcott-Haims, for exam
ple, adopts Maria P.P. Root's observation that "virtually all Latinos
and Filipinos are [m]ultiracial."172 In this cosmology, then, it is the
fact of the mixture that is important; what is mixed pales in compar
ison. Consequently, all Filipinos can consider themselves as "multi
racials" due to genetic mixing that occurred centuries ago and an
ocean away. In fact in her discussion of the wording of the census
forms, Lythcott-Haims emphasizes Root's practically limitless defi
nition of the "multiracial" category:

[I]t is estimated that 30-70% of African-Americans by multigenera
tional history are [M]ultiracial; virtually all Latinos and Filipinos are
[M]ultiracial, as are the majority of American Indians and Native
Hawaiians. Even a significant proportion of White-identified persons
are of [M]ultiracial origin. The way in which the Census Bureau
records data on race makes it very difficult to estimate the number of
biracial people, let alone [M]ultiracial persons, in the United States.
And estimates that have been made are conservative.173
With "multiracial" defined in this way, the Census Bureau
would need to forsake any accurate count of the racial groups cre
ated by the social history of this and other countries, so that it could
add a category that can accommodate anyone whose "multigenera
tional history" shows some genetic admixture.
As discussed in section IV.B below, the entire census could be
rendered meaningless by the addition of a category that can be read
to include some Whites, most Blacks, most Native Americans, all
Latinos, all Filipinos, and all native Hawaiians. More importantly,
while such a proposal would be a victory for those who want the
census to validate their genetic history, the inevitable cost of this
victory would be to make the census an assessment of genetic con
tent rather than a measure of the racial groups that have been cre
ated by the

social history

of our country.

172. Id. at 544.
173. Id. at 44 (quoting Maria P.P. Root, Within, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY
MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 9).
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The Proposal for a Majoritarian Classification System

On a more abstract level, another proposal for the complete re
writing of American racial categories is made by Luther Wright,
Jr.174 At the end of a Note that offers an insightful and persuasive
analysis of some of the aspects of the American racial classification
system, Wright briefly proposes a scheme that would use elements
of both the mulatto and majoritarian systems in order to realign
racial definitions in this country. For example, he would define Af
rican Americans and European Americans as follows:
African Americans All natural born citizens having the majority of
-

their origins in the original peoples of sub-Saharan Africa.
European Americans All natural born citizens having the majority
of their origins in the original peoples of Europe.11s
-

Under a majoritarian system such as this one, people would count
their ancestors in order to determine their race. Thus, a person
with seven Black and nine White great grandparents would be
White.176 It is interesting to imagine which famous African Ameri
cans would be transformed into White people under this system.
For example, would Thurgood Marshall, Lena Horne, and Colin
Powell be White or Black? Moreover, what if records that racially
identify one's ancestors are lost? Would the determination then
turn on skin color, hair texture, or facial features?
In addition, Wright proposes a biracial category to be defined as
follows:
Biracial Americans
All natural born citizens who have origins in
-

two or more racial groups or have the majority of their origins in the
original peoples of Northern Africa and the Middle East.177

174. See Wright, supra note 17, at 513.
175. Id. at 563.
176. Wright suggests a return to the practice of including race on birth certificates. Once
this is done, he claims, "there would be no need
to delve into an individual's ancestry
beyond [what is indicated on his or her parents' birth certificates]." Id. at 567. But Wright
does not suggest how, for example, a Black father who is filling out his daughter's birth
certificate is to determine whether a "majority" of his own "origins [are] in the original peo
ples of sub-Saharan Africa." Id. at 563. Perhaps the father can look at his own parents' birth
certificates but these documents may be silent as to race altogether, and they certainly will
not tell him whether a "majority of [his] origins [are] in the original peoples of sub-Saharan
Africa" or Europe. Id. To answer that question, the father may have to look back over ten
or fifteen generations.
177. Id. at 563. As Wright defines his African-American and biracial categories, there is
a great deal of overlap, and he does not fully explain how he would draw a line between the
two. See id. at 567 & n.346. He suggests, however, that the biracial category is meant only
for those people with an even split in their ancestral origins. A person with one Black grand
parent and three White grandparents would be White, not biracial. See id. ("When only one
parent is biracial the designation of the child should be the race that predominates.").
.

•

•
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Wright's placement of Arabs, Iranians, and Israelis in this cate
gory is based partially on the assumption that this is where they fit
genetically. He notes, for example, that:

[T]he common perception that physical appearances change gradually
from northern Europe to southern Africa leaves northern Africa and
the Middle East as the regions on the Old World Continuum where
people would "appear" to be in the middle of the two extremes. . . .
The very essence of the Biracial category is the perception that the
individual so classified is thought to be in the center of two
extremes.178
Of course, only a spectrum of skin colors places Middle Easterners,
as a people, at the center of two extremes. Using other more mean
ingful measures, they are no more likely to be in the center, or at
the extremes, than any other people. While Wright's categorization
systeµ:i is suffused with such neat, genetic redefinitions of racial
identities, what is most interesting is his mistaken perception that
his categories "seem to reflect more accurately America's socio
political notions of race."179 In fact, he makes the following surpris
ing claim for his system: "By adopting a sociopolitical definition of
race based on a majority rule, biological notions of white
supremacy give way to cultural, historical, and perceptional notions
of race." 1 80 Like so many other scholars who have joined this dis
course, Wright simply does not realize that his redefinition of race
is based on biology rather than on the "sociopolitical" history of
this country. To illustrate, consider two famous Black Americans,
Thurgood Marshall and Colin Powell. Under the "cultural, histori
cal and perceptional notions of race" in this country, both of these
men are Black. Under a majoritarian system, Justice Marshall and
General Powell could become White or biracial. Why? Because of
their White blood.
The flaw in Wright's analysis is that, for good or for ill, the social
and political history of this country has defined the Black race using
the rule of hypodescent. Those who view race as a sociopolitical
construct must view Marshall, Powell, and the thousands of others
like them as Black people, even though a "majority of their origins"
may have been White. On the other hand, those who wish to create
neater, more symmetrical contours for the Black race will have to
base these contours on something other than the social and political

178. Id. at 564 n.336.
179. Id. at 564.
180. Id. at 566.
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history of this country. Usually they choose blood. Often the
choice is' unwitting. 181
4. Biological Passing for Black
Another, more subtle, suggestion for reemphasizing biology in
racial classification systems comes in an essay by Cynthia L.
Nakashima.182 In the beginning of her piece, Nakashima argues
that "social scientists agree that race is a socially constructed, as
opposed to a biologically concrete, concept."1 83 Nakashima, how
ever, gives social forces little room to draw the line between races.
For example, in a discussion of "passing," she reveals a completely
biological understanding of race. Speaking of someone who passes
for White, she argues: "In reality if the character who passed as
White had instead chosen to live in the Black community as a Black
person, this would be just another version of passing. "184
In order to evaluate this assertion, let us step back and ask who
were the people who passed for White? Biologically they had more
"White genes" than Black. But as race is socially constructed in this
country, they were Black. And since they were Black, we cannot
say that they would be passing for Black if they had chosen to re
main in the Black community. That is, we cannot say this unless we
think that race is simply a function of biology.
I see the fallacy of Nakashima's argument as I look over the old
photos of generations of my forebears. When I do this, I see some
ancestors who look more White than Black, but I do not see any
White people; society defined all these faces, from the 1890s to the
1990s, as members of the "Black" or "Negro" or "Colored" race. If
any of them had chosen to pass (and a few did), that meant that
they left their socially defined race, hid their Negro background,
and pretended to be White. Nakashima's suggestion that all my
lighter ancestors who stayed in their race were "passing for Black"
is thus wrong, because, legally and socially, they were Black.
181. This trend toward rebiologization of race is seen in Ruth Colker's recent article Bi:
Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1995). There, Colker
considers the suggestion that "light skinned blacks . . . could more accurately be considered
to be a subcategory of multiracial individuals." Id. at 9 n.36. She suggests that, in moving
toward a "spectrum of race . . . we begin by truly investigating our racial heritage. The
assumption would be that each of us is of mixed racial heritage, and the challenge would be
to fully discover our family trees." Id. at 28.
182. Nakashima, supra note 166, at 162.
183. Id. at 163.
184. Id. at 176. For a similar view, see Spickard, supra note 136, at 17. For different view,
see F. JAMES DAVIS, supra note 3, at 14.
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Of course, if Nakashima were to ignore the laws and social real
ity in which my family and many like it have lived (for example, the
fact that until this generation, all the parents, spouses and children
shown in these family pictures are Black) and if she were to look at
race as only a matter of biology, then maybe she could say that
some of the lighter ancestors in these photos were White and that
they were passing for Black. But this would be a gene counter's
conclusion; it would ignore the fact that social forces created a
Black race in this country and put all these ancestors - light and
dark - into it. Since Nakashima views race as a social construct,
she cannot logically argue that people who are socially defined as
Black are "passing for Black. "185

5.

The Harlem Renaissance and Cultural Suicide

In the last sections, I have reviewed proposals for bringing no
tions of biology back to our racial classification system and I have
suggested that these proposals are based on a misunderstanding of
the Black experience. I now tum to the work of philosopher Naomi
Zack, who has used the example of the Harlem Renaissance to
raise similar biological notions of race. I suggest that her proposals,
likewise, are tainted by a misunderstanding of the African
American experience.
Zack's book,

Race and Mixed Race,186

offers a fascinating cri

tique of the hypodescent system and of race itself. In focussing on
hypodescent, Zack offers a unique hypothesis. She argues that if
the artists of the Harlem Renaissance had declared that they were
mixed race instead of Black, White racism would have been so con
fused that it would have fallen. Zack laments that these artists re
jected their multiracial heritage in favor of their Blackness, thus
committing "cultural suicide."1 87
I see Zack's work as a telling example of the tunnel vision that
afflicts even the most perceptive proponents of a broad separate
185. The literature now contains several serious articles and books on the subject of
White-skinned Black people. Perhaps the most elegant, trenchant and personal discussion of
the issue is Adrian Piper's Passing for White; Passing for Black, 58 TRANsmoN 4 (1992).
Professor Cheryl Harris provides a moving account of the experience of her Grandmother
who, like countless other light-skinned African Americans of her day, worked as White and
came home as Black. Harris uses her Grandmother's experience as the touchstone for her
examination of "Whiteness as property." Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1707, 1710-12 (1993). Three books on the subject each make compelling reading:
SHIRLEY HAIZUP, THE SWEETER THE JUICE (1994); SCALES-TRENT, supra note 133; GREG
ORY H. WILUAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE (1995).
186. ZACK, supra note 166, at 74.
187. See id. at 95-111.
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category for multiracial persons. While her analysis is full of origi
nal insights, Zack falls into the same traps that ensnared the multi
racial theorists discussed above. First, she sees racial injustice in the
drawing of the boundaries around the Black race rather than in ra
cism itself. Second, after the de rigueur denunciation of "race as
biology," she embraces, perhaps unwittingly, a purely biological
view of race. Thus, she criticizes DuBois, Hughes, and Hurston for
viewing their own racial identity in sociohistorical terms rather than
biologically,188 and she discusses a vast biological redefinition of the
Black race that would remove from its numbers the 21 % to 75 % of
African Americans who are not biologically pure Black.189 Finally,
she never slows down to consider the practical consequences of her
major proposal: How would White Americans have reacted if the
great leaders of the Harlem Renaissance had taken her suggestion
and renounced their negritude by making a joint, impassioned claim
that they were mixed race?
a. Zack's View of the Hypodescent Schema. Zack begins her
analysis by carefully describing the "schema" of the one drop rule
and its moral failing: "This schema unjustly excludes people with
black forebears from white designation."190 She thus states at the
outset that the focus of her concern is with those Blacks who are
"unjustly excluded" from the "white designation." She then devel
ops the following proof, which is intended to establish that hypo
descent is unjust:
More precisely, the injustice of the kinship schema can be presented
this way, if we suppose that Alpha could be anyone:
(1) If Alpha has a black ancestor, Alpha is black.
(2) If Alpha is black, Alpha is treated unjustly.
(3) If Alpha has a black ancestor, Alpha is treated unjustly.
(4) Therefore, it is unjust to say that Alpha is black if Alpha has a
black ancestor.191

To which, in my view, we could logically add:
(5) Every Black person has a Black ancestor.
(6) Therefore, it is unjust to say that any Black person is Black.
This illustrates the difficulty that philosophers such as Zack face
when they try to prove that hypodescent is unjust. From the stand
point of justice, if people who are called Black are treated unjustly,
there are two solutions: (1) Stop treating Black people unjustly; or
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. at 105-11.
See id. at 75, 95.
Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
Id.
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(2) stop calling any of them Black.1 92 Either way, tinkering with the
boundaries of the category is not going to stop the injustice. My
disagreement with Zack, therefore, is that in focusing on her fourth
assumption ("it is unjust to say that Alpha is black"), she forgets
that it is her second assumption ("If Alpha is black, Alpha is
treated unjustly") that houses the injustice.

b. Zack's View ofthe Harlem Renaissance. Zack's most provoc
ative and original contribution to the discourse on hypodescent is
her suggestion that the Harlem Renaissance was a form of cultural
suicide. She begins by acknowledging that the Harlem Renaissance
was a "magnificent enterprise,"193 and she admits that her criticism
of it is "theoretical," colored by choices "available later in his
tory. "194 But she concludes that if Hurston, Hughes, and the other
leaders of this movement had renounced the one drop rule and de
clared themselves persons of mixed race, this declaration would
have been a weapon "against American racial designations, which is
to say, against the core of American racism."195 She argues:
During the Harlem Renaissance, the people who were designated
non-white in the sense of black, by white America. all took up their
black designation on the premise of a democracy among themselves.
This was a magnificent enterprise: Much was gained in black pride,
culture, and achievement, and nothing of substance, of immediate
practical value, was lost. What was lost was the concept of mixed race
as a theoretical wedge against racism and against the concept of phys
ical race - the new combined black community threw away any ef
fective intellectual weapon against American racial designations,
which is to say, against the core of American racism. It lost all means
of challenging the asymmetrical kinship schema of racial inheritance
and the attendant oppressive biracial system. Designated American
blackness, as a cultural force capable of defeating American racism,
thereby cut off its own head during the Harlem Renaissance.1 96
Zack then goes on to explain how this joint proclamation of mixed
race identity would have undermined American racism:
If it is possible for people to be of mixed race, based on their genetic

endowment alone, then race is not an essential or even an important
division between human beings, either naturally or culturally. If race
were a natural division, individuals of mixed race would simply not
exist. . . . Furthermore, if individuals of mixed race are granted a sepa
rate racial identity, then all of the myths of racial purity and stability

192. For a powerfully written and eye.opening variant of this latter suggestion, see Fields,
note 115, at 117-18.
193. See ZAcK, supra note 166, at 97.
194. Id. at 99.
195. Id. at 97.
196. Id.

supra
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break down because there is then such a large universe of possible
race that the historical contingency of any group's racial identity be
comes transparent.191
In my view, Zack's theoretical rethinking of the Harlem Renais

sance suffers from several fatal flaws. First, it assumes that "Ameri
can racial designations" (how the line around the Black race is
drawn), rather than anti-Black prejudice itself, is "the core of
American racism." As argued above, however, these designations
were not the core of American racism; this racism could have flour
ished just as well, if not better, under any of the other systems of
"racial designation," and the designations provided by hypodescent,
in practice, often provided powerful tools against racism.
But even if we leave that argument aside, Zack never fully ex
amines how such a joint declaration of mixed-race identity would
have worked as a wedge against racism and against the concept of
physical race. She merely assumes that such a statement would
have highlighted the existence of mixed-race people, and that their
very existence would have shown that "race is not an essential or
even an important division between human beings" and "all of the
myths of racial purity and stability would [therefore] break
down." 198

I

doubt the walls would have fallen so easily. Certainly a few

White Americans, on hearing some of the Negro literati claim that
they were multiracial, might have taken the lesson that race was not
so important after all. But most White Americans were already
well aware that mixed-race people existed - they did not need
Zora Neale Hurston or Langston Hughes to tell them so - and this
knowledge did not end their belief in races.199
More importantly, Zack mispredicts entirely how the White lis
tener - trapped in the racism of the times - would have reacted
when the icons of the Harlem Renaissance declared that they were
not Black after all and jointly laid claim to their White blood.
White America would have taken this as an admission that White
blood is better; it would have attributed the successes of the Harlem
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. A review of the racist literature shows not only an awareness that mixed-race people
existed, but a tremendous fear that miscegenation would create more mulattoes. For exam
ple, in 1905, William Benjamin Smith argued:
If we sit with Negroes at our tables, if we entertain them as our guests and social equals,
if we disregard the colour line in all other relations, is it possible to maintain it fixedly in
the sexual relation, in the marriage of our sons and daughters, in the propagation of our
species?
Quoted in JOHN G. MENCKE, MULA'ITOES AND RACE MIXTURE 130 (1979).
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Renaissance to its leaders' White ancestry; it would have concluded
that White blood earned DuBois his "A"s on his Philosophy papers
for William James at Harvard;200 that White blood gave Langston
Hughes his gift of language; that White blood is why Hurston was
an anthropologist; when she later worked as a domestic, that was
because of one of those "tricks of blood that always betray" Ne
groes.201 Neither the Klan nor Philip Bruce could have done any
thing that would better have reinforced the absurd but common
White view of the times: that race was based on blood and Negro
"blood" was inferior.202
While I believe the above discussion states compelling reasons
why the leaders of the Harlem Renaissance did not do as Zack
wishes they had done, I do not believe that these were their central
motivating considerations. The main reason they did not deny be
ing Black is that they were Black, as Black was defined by the
sociopolitical history of this country. Zack, however, tries to claim
them posthumously as mixed race, primarily on the basis of the
"natural facts of their ancestry," that is, biology. For example, as to
DuBois, she notes: "He knew that he was both black and white,
according to the natural facts of his ancestry. But he did not use a
mixed-race designation for himself, based either on his ancestry or
his early participation in white culture."203
But her most stunning and telling claim is for Zora Neale
Hurston. Zack argues that Hurston was mixed race and implies
that she had no "logical" basis for considering herself Black.204 As
the basis for this claim, Zack seizes on the following passage in
Hurston's autobiography:

I saw no benefit in excusing my looks by claiming to be half Indian.
In fact, I boast that I am the only Negro in the United States whose
grandfather on the mother's side was not an Indian chief. Neither did
200. See DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DuBms, BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 95 (I.993)
(reporting that DuBois earned a grade of A from James).
201. Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANsmoN 4, 8 (1992) (quot
ing FRANCES E.W. HARPER, loLA LEROY, OR SHADOWS UPLIFTED 229 (Oxford Univ. Press
1988) (1893)).
202. See MENCKE, supra note 199, at 128·29. Mencke notes that "Indeed, whites for the
most part were convinced that the only Negroes who had ever[ ] evidenced particular ability
or intelligence were of mixed blood." Id. at 128. " 'So far,' Philip Alexander Bruce noted in
1889, 'the only persons of unusual capacity whom the Negro race has produced have been
men who were sprung, either directly or indirectly, from white ancestry."' Id. (quoting
PHILIP A. BRUCE, THE PLANTATION NEGRO AS A FREEMAN: OBSERVATIONS ON HIS CHAR·
ACTER, CoNDmON, AND PROSPECTS IN VIRGINIA 244 (New York & London, G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1889)).
203. ZACK, supra note 166, at 105.
204. See id. at 105·07, 14647.
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I descend from George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, or any Gover
nor of a Southern state. I see no need to manufacture me a legend to
beat the facts. I do not coyly admit to a touch of the tarbrush to my
Indian and white ancestry. You can consider me an Old Tar-Brush in
person if you want to. I am a mixed blood, it is true, but I differ from
the party line in that I neither consider it an honor nor a shame.
I maintain that I have been a Negro three times - a Negro baby,
a Negro girl and a Negro woman.2os
In reading this, Zack passes over the metaphors206 and clear state
ments that Hurston is Black, proud of it, and not making any ex
cuses for it, and concentrates on the fact that Hurston has mixed
blood:

But Hurston does not explain how, if she sees herself as mixed race,
she can logically identify herself as a Negro. To be sure, Hurston de
scribes herself with charm; she not only has a folk identity but is a folk
heroine. No philosophical analysis or excursion into racial theory can
belittle her identity as a designated black person who is loyal to other
designated black people. But Hurston illustrates all too well how
morally good American identities of mixed race collapse into black
racial identities.201
How could Hurston "logically" identify herself as a Negro?2os
Hurston's life provides a clear and easy answer to this question, and
I will now take a brief detour to review this life up to the time of the
Harlem Renaissance, not only because it shows that Hurston was
"logically" Black, but because it gives some insight into the "logic"
of Zack and other multiracial theorists who have posthumously de205. ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, DuST TRACKS ON A ROAD 171-72 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
ed., Harper-Perennial 1991) (1942).
206. Hurston used this same metaphor of "excuse" or "extenuation" in her famous essay,
"How It Feels to Be Colored Me." There, she wrote:
I am colored but I offer nothing in the way of extenuating circumstances except the fact
that I am the only Negro in the United States whose grandfather on the mother's side
was not an Indian Chief.
Zora Neale Hurston, How It Feels to Be Colored Me, in NEW NORTON AN1HOLOOY OF AFRI·
CAN AMERICAN LITERATURE 1008, 1008 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. & Nellie Y. McKay eds.,
1997). In both passages, being Black is metaphorically seen as an infraction that could be
excused on a showing of extenuating circumstances; but Hurston was not about to admit that
her identity was a crime, nor would she offer a plea. As Barbara Johnson notes:
(Hurston] implies that among the stories Negroes tell about themselves the story of In
dian blood is a common extenuation, dilution, and hence effacement of the crime of
being colored . . . . Hurston is saying in effect, "I am colored but I am different from
other members of my race in that I am not different from my race."
Barbara Johnson, Thresholds ofDifference: Structures ofAddress in Zora Neale Hurston, in
" RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 317, 319 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986).
207. ZACK, supra note 166, at 146-47.
208. Hurston, of course, did not say that she saw herself as "mixed race." She said she
was "a mixed blood," but her race was Negro and that she was not making any apologies
about it. Trying to find logic here, Zack sloughs off Hurston's Blackness as an expression of
loyalty or folk identity by a folk heroine.
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termined that Hurston's true "mixed-race" identity "collapse[d]
into black racial identit[y]."209

c. Zora Neale Hurston. Zora Neale Hurston was born Black to
Black parents and grew up in an all Black town. In her autobiogra
phy, Dust Tracks on a Road, she describes her mother as "dark
brown Lucy Ann Potts" ;210 her father, John Hurston is pictured as a
"tall, heavy muscled mulatto," a "bee-stung yaller nigger" and as
"one of dem niggers from over de creek."211 In one passage,
Hurston sketches her father's light features and then immediately
concedes their lack of importance: He had "gray-green eyes and
light skin [which] stood out sharply from the black-skinned, black
eyed crowd he was in. Then too, he had a build on him that made
you look. A stud-looking buck like that would have brought a big
price in slavery time."212 John Hurston inherited his light features
from his father (Zora's grandfather) who, apparently, was a White
man.213 Zora never names her White grandfather in her autobiog
raphy, and while she admits she is a "mixed blood," it appears she
never knew any of her White or Native American ancestors.214
Hurston describes Eatonville, Florida, where she grew up, as a
"pure Negro town."215 According to her biographer, "Eatonville,
Florida, existed not as the 'black backside' of a white city, but a
self-governing, all-black town, proud and independent, living refu
tation of white claims that black inability necessitated Jim
Crow."216 Hurston's father was elected mayor three times; he
wrote all the laws.217
209. Zack also emphasizes Hurston's "non-Negro" attributes:
Hurston herself was middle-class, educated, and light in complexion. (She looked like a
Native American; the great love of her life, "A.W.P.," said that she reminded him "of
the Indian on the Skookum Apples.")
ZACK, supra note 166, at 106. A look a Hurston's pictures, however, shows a woman who
most people would easily identify as Black. Moreover, being "middle class" and "educated"
did not deprive Hurston of her Black racial identity.
210. HURSTON, supra note 205, at 7.
211. Id. at 7-8.
212. Id. at 8.
213. See ROBERT E. HEMENWAY, ZORA NEALE HURSTON, A LITERARY BIOGRAPHY 190
(1980).
214. In Dust Tracks on a Road, Hurston quickly breezes by her father's White ancestry,
noting: "Folks said he was a certain white man's son." HURSTON, supra note 205, at 8-9. She
reports that her maternal grandmother always called her father "dat yaller bastard." Id.
215. HURSTON, supra note 205, at 1.
216. HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 11-12.
217. See id. at 14; cf. MELVIN DIXON, RIDE OUT THE WILDERNESS: GEOGRAPHY AND
IDENTITY IN AFRO-AMERICAN LITERATURE 85 (1987).
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Young Zora learned Negro folk culture on the steps of Joe
Clarke's Eatonville General Store. There, the men of the village
"sat around . . . on boxes and benches and passed this world and the
next one through their mouths";218 they held their lying sessions
and told their stories of "God, Devil, Brer Rabbit, Brer Fox, Sis
Cat, Brer Bear, Lion, Tiger, Buzzard and all the wood folk."219 Not
allowed to sit on the steps and tell tales with the men, Zora would
walk the steps slowly and "h[a]ng around and listen[ ]" as long as
she could.220
The village folklore was seared into Zora's nine-year-old soul as
she stood at her mother's deathbed. The folkways required certain
measures in the moments before death: The pillow must be re
moved from beneath the dying person's head, so that death would
come easily and the escaping spirit would refrain from haunting the
survivors; the mirror needed to be covered so that it would not per
manently capture the image of the dying person; and the clock had
to be draped with cloth lest it stop forever when the spirit, on escap
ing the body, looked on its face.221 In her last hour, Zora's mother
apparently rejected these folk ways; she called Zora and gave her
"certain instructions. I was not to let them take the pillow from
under her head until she was dead. The clock was not to be cov
ered, nor the looking-glass. She trusted me to see to it that these
things were not done. I promised her as solemnly as nine years
could do, that I would see to it. "222
Of course, nine-year-old Zora had neither the power nor the
persuasion to set her "will against my father, the village dames and
village custom. "223 As her father held her tight, the elders covered
the clock and the mirror and removed the pillow from under her
mother's head. Just then, Death "with big soft feet and square toes
. . . finished his prowling through the house . . . and entered the
room. He bowed to Mama in his way, and she made her manners
and left us to act out our ceremonies over unimportant things. "224
Zora spent years thinking she had failed her mother: "[S]he looked

218. HuRSroN, supra note 205, at 45.
219. Id. at 47.
220. Id. at 47.
221. See HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 16-17; HuRSroN, supra note 205, at 62.
222. HuRSroN, supra note 205, at 62.
223. Id. at 63.
224. Id. at 63-64.
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at me, or so I felt, to speak for her. She depended on me for a
voice. "225
Because of Hurston's experiences in the heart of the African
American folklore tradition, her biographer notes: "She had lived
African-American folklore before she knew that such a thing ex
isted as a scientific concept or had special value as evidence of the
adaptive creativity of a unique subculture. "226
For her formal education, Hurston travelled north, first to How
ard, then to study under Franz Boaz at Barnard, where she was the
only Negro in the college (its "sacred black cow").227 In these stud
ies, she realized the importance of chronicling the Negro folklore
she had lived as a child, and she realized that although the White
world had reported this folklore to some extent, "often the collec
tions carried interpretations twisting the material beyond recogni
tion";228 even in the stories of Joel Chandler Harris, it was reduced
to "a childish pastime."229 More ominous for Hurston, tl}is folk cul
ture was simply fading away.230 She therefore came "to think of
herself as a woman with a mission": she would become the tradi
tion bearer.231 The voice that Hurston had been unable to give to
her dying mother, she would give to the folk literature and folk
ways of her people: "she would demonstrate that 'the greatest cul
tural wealth of the continent' lay in the Eatonvilles and Polk Coun
ties of the black South."232 And she was uniquely suited for the
task. When she started, "only one other member of her race . . .
had equivalent professional training and knowledge."233 Hurston
understood her material because she had lived it; unlike White
transcribers, there was little danger that she would make racist or
unwitting changes in the oral texts she was to elicit and preserve.
Moreover, because she was Black, because she had the "map of
Florida on her tongue," her informants came to trust her.234 After
225. Id. at 63.
226. HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 22.
227. See id. at 21-22.
228. Id. at 87.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 82, 113.
231. See id. at 87, 113.
232. Id. at 113. For an analysis of this metaphor of "voice," see Henry Louis Gates,
Afterword, Zora Neale Hurston: "A Negro Way of Saying, " in HURSTON, supra note 205, at
260-67.
233. HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 87.
234. See id. at 9, 90, 110-15.
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an initial failed trip, years of field work and witing resulted in her
famous volume of African-American folklore, Mules and Men.23s
Hurston's interests were not limited to folk tales but spread to
every aspect of Negro art. Her "memory was overflowing with the
acquired narrative legacy of her race, and . . . this was something
she brought to the Renaissance."236 She rejected the propagandistic
aspect of the bourgeois Negro literary philosophy, which stated that
"black art should avoid reinforcing racist stereotypes by refusing to
portray the lowest elements of the race";237 she wanted to be an
authentic, not a bowdlerized, Negro voice. She rejected Howard
students' characterization of Negro spirituals as "low and degrading
. . . product[s] of . . . slavery" and "not good grammar."238 She had
lived the value of the spirituals. She rejected the portrayals of
Black themes in the dramas of the day; White playwrights - even
O'Neill - failed to get it quite right.239 So she created to take the
place of what she rejected. Of these creations, Saturday Review
said: "No one had ever reported the speech of Negroes with a more
accurate ear."240 Her riveting novel, Their Eyes Were Watching
God, painted a world only a Black woman could paint. Speaking of
"resistance" literature in Africa, Appiah has commented:

A proper comparison in the New World is . . . with the world that
Zora Neale Hurston records and reflects, both in her more ethno
graphic writings and in her brilliant novel, Their Eyes Were Watching
God - a black world on which the white American world impinged
in ways that were culturally marginal even though formally politically
overwhelming.241
When a producer noted that "practically all the plays [about
Blacks] . . . were serious problem dramas" or minstrel shows, and
there were no comedies, she teamed up with Langston Hughes to
write a Negro comedy, Mule Bone. 242 While the partnership dis
solved in bitterness, Hurston's biographer notes: "Yet in a sense
[Mule Bone] was written by neither Hurston nor Hughes. Much of
the language in the play belonged to the race itself, making the ar
gument over its ownership even more ironic."243 In fact, Hurston
235. See id. at 160.
236. Id. at 79-80.
237. Id. at 41.
238. Id. at 52.
239. See id. at 115.
240. George Stevens, Negroes by Themselves, SATURDAY REV., Sept. 18, 1937, at 3,
quoted in HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 5.
241. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 9.
242. See HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 137.
243. Id. at 156.
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alone among the great Harlem artists could tell the old story that
"she was once arrested for crossing against a red light but escaped
punishment by explaining that she had seen the white folks pass on
green and therefore assumed the red was for her," and make it
sound like it had really happened to her.244 Hurston's self confi
dence in her racial identity, her wit, her style, and her talent made
her a fixture of the Harlem Renaissance. She called herself the
"Queen of the Niggerati."24s
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has commented that Hurston summed
up her philosophy in bringing what she did to the Harlem Renais
sance when she observed:
Roll your eyes in ecstacy and ape his every move, but until we have
placed something upon his street corner that is our own, we are right
back where we were when they filed our iron collar off.246

d. The "Logical" Basis for Zora Neale Hurston's Race. This
brings us back to Zack's suggestion that Hurston could not logically
identify herself as a Negro. By "logic," Zack must mean biology,
blood, and genetics. By these measures, Hurston was not a pure
Negro, and Zack can therefore claim her as a mixed-race person.
But if one believes that race is a social construd based on some
thing more than mere biology, then Hurston's brief for identifying
herself as a Negro is compelling: her parents were Black. Africa
predominated in her face. She had White and Native American an
cestors, but she never met them and they warranted no mention in
her autobiography. She grew up in an all Black town where she
lived, laughed, and grieved Black culture and Black folklore, and
then went on to become the only Black student in her class at Bar
nard. She saw White writers misperceive and misrepresent Black
folk and high culture and made it her mission to preserve and prop
agate the folk culture and to add a few masterpieces to the high
culture. When she went south, she spoke with the voice of her peo
ple, and so they took her in and told her their tales, and she heard
them with such a keen ear that national magazines raved. In New
York, she styled herself the Queen of the Niggerati, a term that
even in the 1930s would not have found its way from her mouth
into respectable print if she had been anything other than Black.
Her metaphors, from Jim Crow traffic lights to slave collars, are
those of a Black woman.
244. Id. at 78.
245. Id. at 44.
246. Gates, supra note 232, at 267.
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Of course, multiracial theorists, such as Zack, are free to claim
Hurston as one of their own, but when they do so they are staking a
genetic claim; when they decry the "collapse" of Hurston's mixed
race identity "into black racial identity"247 and lament Hurston's
failure to see her own true essence, essence is defined biologically.
Under any other definition, Zora Neale Hurston was Black.248

e. An Abstract Category vs. a People. As argued above, I be
lieve that Zack and other theorists have set off on the path toward
redefining "Black" without first pausing to survey the terrain.
From their path, "Black" looks like a "category" that can easily be
repackaged or redefined. A closer look, however, shows that Black
is more than a category and far more difficult to redefine.
For example, looking back on the lives of the heroes of the Har
lem Renaissance, Zack suggests that they could have used their
White blood - their ties to White ancestors whom they had, by and
large, never met - to declare that they were members of "a racial
category distinct from the black race":

Neither the leaders of the Harlem Renaissance nor [Historian Joel]
Williamson, writing 60 years later, could free themselves from the in
tellectual tyranny of the one drop rule. They did not and perhaps
could not conceptualize a category of mixed black and white race as a
racial category distinct from the black race, in the same way that
black race has always been distinct from the white race.249
Perhaps they could have, perhaps they did, conceptualize such a
"category," but in writing the following passage, Hurston clearly ex
plains why such a category would be irrelevant: "There is no The
Negro here. Our lives are so diversified, internal attitudes so va
ried, appearances and capabilities so different, that there is no pos
sible classification so catholic that it will cover us all, except My
people! My people! "250 Hurston saw herself as part of a people,
not a category.
The work of Langston Hughes contains strikingly similar senti
ments. Zack uses the metaphor of "rules for acceptable behavior at
a party" to minimize Hughes's identity and to explain his failure to
embrace a multiracial category:
247. ZACK, supra note 166, at 147.
248. In infra Part III.D, I argue that socio-historical forces made people like Hurston
Black and they had little choice in the matter. For the argument that Hurston's racial iden
tity was "constructed," see Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 615 (1990). Using either yardstick, Hurston was Black.
249. ZACK, supra note 166, at 103.
250. HURSTON, supra note 205, at 172 (emphasis in the original).
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Hughes describes the surfaces of black culture so smoothly that there
is no way the reader can raise a question of mixed race to Hughes, the
writer, without violating the unspoken rules of politeness in his rhe
torical space. It is an exquisite and elaborate kind of politeness that
allows people to enjoy their lives with grace under pressures that are
totally lacking in grace. Hughes's rhetorical rules are very like the
unspoken rules for acceptable behavior at a party!251
But it was not rules of "politeness" or "acceptable party behavior"
that made Hughes Black. It was centuries of American history that
made him morphologically and culturally part of the African
American race. Consequently, though he and Hurston had a bitter
parting of the ways, he, like Hurston, thought of the Black race as a
"people," not a "category"; a people whose faces, he wrote, held
the beauty of the night:

The night is beautiful
So the faces of my people
The stars are beautiful
So the eyes of my people
Beautiful, also is the sun
Beautiful, also are the souls of my people.2s2
And he saw his own face among those of his people:

To fling my arms wide
In the face of the sun
Dance! Whirl! Whirl!
Till the quick day is done.
Rest at pale evening . .
A tall slim tree . . .
Night coming tenderly
Black like me.253
.

If one views race as a matter of genetics, as Zack apparently
does, these verses require some immediate explanation; after all
Hughes was brown, not black, and his face favored twilight more
than the night. So Zack suggests that we cannot ask Hughes about
his racial identity without violating "rules for acceptable behavior
at a party." But no such consultation with Emily Post is necessary.
Hughes has already told us about his real identity, which transcends
genetics: He is part of a people, and this people includes many,
many other Black men and women like him, with White blood and
White ancestors.
251. ZACK, supra note 166, at 109.
252. LANGSTON HUGHES, My People, in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES

(1974).

13

253. HUGHES, Dream Variations, in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES, supra note

252, at 14.
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This is something that Alice Walker understands. After Walker
paid to place a monument on Zora Hurston's unmarked grave in a
pauper's cemetery in Florida, she wrote: "We are a people. A peo
ple do not throw their geniuses away. If they do, it is our duty as
witnesses for the future to collect them again for the sake of our
children. If necessary, bone by bone."254 Where Zack and others
see a racial category, Hurston, Hughes, DuBois, and Walker see a
people. While Zack is nonplussed because they "did not and per
haps could not conceptualize a category of mixed black and white
race as a racial category distinct from black race,"255 it was - in
fact - not a "category" that they were looking for. They were part
of a people, and it takes more than a gene pool to create a people.
6. Race, Biology, and the Law: The Racial Credential Cases
I now tum to history to illuminate the dangers of "neat" biologi
cal redefinitions of American racial categories. I examine the racial
credential cases (the cases that adjudicated whether someone was
Black) as a reminder of how things work when race is seen as a
function of biology and when people count their great grandfathers
to determine their racial identity.256
As racial mixing continued largely unchecked by the laws that
purported to prohibit it, the result was children. As intermixture
continued through the generations, many children became light
skinned, even White-skinned. While in most statutes mulattoes
were classified with Blacks, "logic required . . . some demarcation
between [mulattoes] and white men"257 in order to establish a clear
way of distinguishing someone White from someone who would not
be considered White.
Without a bright line to distinguish White from mulatto, the effi
cient administration of American society, in which substantial legal
rights were based on being White, would have been impossible.
Guarding the port of entry to White status was essential to the pro
tection of the delicate social order of a racial caste system, and the
persistence and extent of illegitimate race mixing made this an issue
of both importance and some delicacy. On the one hand, families
254. Alice Walker, Foreword to HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at xviii (emphasis omitted).
255. ZACK, supra note 166, at 103.
256. The cases used as illustrations here have been taken from a review of the following
compilations: HELEN CATIERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
THE NEGRO (1926); CHARLES MAGNUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO {1940);
THOMAS MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW 1619-1860 {1996).
257. See JORDAN, supra note 30, at 168.
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considered White for generations had to be protected, from the so
cial consequences of an unknown dalliance by a distant ancestor.
"To have pushed the definition [of black] any further would have
embarrassed too many prominent 'white' families."258 As the court
noted in State v. Davis, "[i]t would be dangerous and cruel to sub
ject to this disqualification [being regarded as someone in the de
graded class] persons bearing all the feature of a white on account
of some remote admixture of negro blood."259 On the other hand,
steps had to be taken to curb "[t]he constant tendency of this
[mixed-race] class to assimilate to the white, and the desire of eleva
tion, [that] present frequent cases of embarrassment and diffi
culty."260 Finally, maintaining the color line, however ethereal, was
important as a matter of social etiquette. As Chief Justice Lumpkin
lamented in Bryan v. Walton: "Which one of us has not narrowly
escaped petting one of the pretty little mulattoes belonging to our
neighbors as one of the family?"261
The cases are perhaps most instructive, however, in giving his
torical context to the movement to create a multiracial census cate
gory that would be available to all Americans with mixed blood in
their multigenerational ancestry. A chief concern expressed by the
proponents of such a category is that the current racial configura
tion of Black and White is "inaccurate." They argue that the lim
ited number of racial choices now available on the census forms
force "the multi-racial/multi-ethnic family to signify a factually false
identity for their child."262 A multiracial category is necessary "if
accurate data is what we want. "263 Like the Courts in the racial
certification cases, the more radical proponents of a broad multi
racial category often state their goals in terms of biological accuracy
when, in fact, no such accuracy is possible.
258. GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 420.
259. State v. Davis, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 558, 559 (1831), quoted in 2 HELEN CATIERALL,
JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 346 (1929).
260. White v. Tax Collector of Kershaw District, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 136, 139 (1846).
261. See Bryan v. Walton, Suppl. to 33 Ga. 11, 24 (1864), quoted in 3 HELEN CATIERALL,
JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 87 (1932).
262. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel, 103d
Cong. 126 (1993) (statement of Carlos A. Fernandez, President of the Assoc. of MultiEthnic
Americans). Similar concerns were made in the Testimony of Susan R. Graham, Executive
Director of Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally) and reprinted as an article. See
Susan R. Graham, Grassroots Advocacy, in AMERICAN MlxEo RACE, THE CULTURE OF
MICRODIVERSl.TY 185 (Naomi Zack ed., 1995).
263. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel, 103d
Cong. 107 (1993) (statement of Susan Graham, Executive Director of Project RACE).
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While the litigants in the racial credential cases attempted to
draw a line between Black and White, the radical wing of the multi
racial movement can be viewed as promoting a variation of the
same game - they are simply changing the place where the line is
drawn. Just as the racial credential cases used biological factors to
draw a line between Black and White, the proponents of the broad
multiracial category draw a biological line between "Multiracial"
and "Black." Just as the following cases define race in terms of the
degree of White ancestry, so do those who now wish to rebiologize
race, effectively embracing the view of "race as blood," as they ar
gue that any White blood converts a Black person into a multiracial
or a White person. The advocates of the broad multiracial category
thus stand not as a repudiation of the methodology of racial certifi
cation cases but as an extension of them. In fact, this wing of the
multiracial movement, rather than exploding the "myth" of race or
rebutting the stereotypes of what it is to be Black by including
multiracial people within its definition, distance� itself from the
"full black nigger[s],"264 unwittingly relying on the ideal that race is
biological, ancestral, and blood-borne. Rather than challenge the
notion of race, this branch of multiracial theory merely attempts to
reset the margins established in the racial credential cases discussed
below.
Finally, the racial credential cases foreshadow the difficulties
that lie ahead, if the current system of racial classification is further
muddled by the addition of a broad, biologically based multiracial
category. As the cases below reveal, turning the clock back to biol
ogy compounds the difficulties of fighting group race-based
discrimination.

a. Adjudicating Fractions of Blood. In one type of racial cre
dential case, courts were asked to determine whether a litigant had
a sufficient fraction of Black blood to be considered Black. As ex
plained in section II.B.6 above, many states had laws that specifi
cally set forth the fraction of Negro blood necessary to make a
person Black. Over the years, this fraction ranged from one-quar
ter to one drop.
The statutory standards thus imply that race was determined by
the "scientific" notion of quantifiable "blood in the veins" and that
the blood could be measured with some sort of scientific accuracy,
ascertained by visual inspection and that all of this could be done by
264. BLASSINGAME, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting fugitive slave Lewis Clarke).

March 1997]

One Drop Rule

1225

the court.265 By virtue of judicial wisdom, a litigant could enter a
courtroom Black and leave White by adjustment of a fraction, the
verdict received like a note from the Internal Revenue Service in
forming the litigant that it has made an error in her favor.
The concept of "pure blood," based as it was on pure conjec
ture, proved difficult both to litigate and adjudicate. Even though
fractional definitions of race gave the appearance of judicial objec
tivity, fairness, and consistency, the rational for the decisions
switched fairly quickly from a pseudo-scientific basis to the com
mon social meaning of race. In the end, the cases may say more
about the nature of adjudication, the rules of civil procedure, the
political sentiments of the judiciary, and the personal sensitivity of
the particular judge, than about the nature of race and mixed race.

b. Racial Adjudication Prior to Fractional Statutes. We begin
our analysis of these cases with State v. Thurman,266 an Alabama
case in which the stakes based on racial classification were highest
- life or death, and in which there was not a statute defining
White, Negro, or mulatto. The question presented to the court was
whether the defendant Thurman, who was convicted of rape or at
tempted rape of a White woman, would be executed or impris
oned.267 If he were a Negro or mulatto, the law provided for his
execution. If he were neither Negro nor mulatto, he would not be
executed. The opinion does not specify whether the conviction was
for rape or attempted rape, and while this may have been of some
concern to the victim, to the court the sole focus was whether the
defendant was a mulatto or "White." While the court noted that
the fact the defendant had "kinky hair and yellow skin" would
"tend to prove that he was a mulatto," it was not conclusive enough
to prove that he was mulatto, rather than someone closer to a
White person. The court's anguish was over the lack of "clear lan
guage" from the legislature in defining who was mulatto. "If the
statute against mulattoes is by construction to include quadroons,
then where are we to stop? . . . This discretion belongs to the Legis265. The idea of race as being transmitted by blood has been a persistent theme in Amer
ican racial history. For an excellent discussion of the significance of the misuse of this idea in
the context of miscegenation law, see Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, RARITAN,
Fall 1988, at 39.
266. 18 Ala. 276 (1850).
267. Every state that adopted statutes to deal with rape by a slave or free person of color
limited its victims to White women. There were no statutes prohibiting the rape of Black
slave women by White men. See MORRIS, supra note 256, at 305. Indeed, it appears that
there was neither a legal nor a moral taint to White male relations with Black women. As de
Toqueville noted, "To debauch a Negro girl hardly injures an American's reputation; to
marry her dishonors him." See Saks, supra note 265, at 43.
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lature."268 Uncomfortable with having Thurman's fate rest on such
an imprecise standard, the court spared Thurman's life due to the
inability of the prosecution to sustain its burden of proving that the
defendant was a mulatto. Thereafter, the Alabama legislature
passed a definition of race, which, like so many other states, defined
race using racial fractions.269

c. Counting by Fractions. The apparent mathematical clarity of
the fractional statutes gave the appearance of objectivity and ra
tionality,210 and while a few cases attempted to apply this fractional
268. Thurman, 18 Ala. at 279.
269. After this decision, the Alabama legislature apparently moved quickly to include
quadroons in the boundaries of the Black race. See Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and
the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860's-1960's, 70 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 371, 374
(1994). In the twentieth century, Alabama adopted the one drop rule providing that a Negro
was a person "descended on the part of the father or mother from negro ancestors, without
reference to or limit of time or number of generations removed." Id. at 407.
270. Indeed, in explaining the operation of the statute one legal scholar writing in 1910
offered to "clarify" the statutory definitions as follows:
The following diagram will probably clarify these definitions:
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Suppose it is desired to ascertain whether son X is a white person or a Negro. The
first generation above him is that of his parents, M and N. If either of them is white and
the other a Negro, X has one-half Negro blood and would be considered a Negro every
where. The second generation is that of his grandparents, I, J, K, and L. If any one of
them is a Negro and the other three white, X has one-fourth Negro blood, and would be
considered a Negro in every State except possibly Ohio. The third generation is that of
his great-grandparents, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. If any one of these eight great
grandparents is a Negro, X has one-eighth Negro blood and would be considered a Ne
gro in every State which defines a person of color as one who has one-eighth Negro
blood or is descended from a Negro to the third generation inclusive. Suppose, for in
stance, the great-grandfather A was a Negro and all the rest of the great-grandparents
were white. The grandfather I would be half Negro; the father M would be one-fourth
Negro; and X would be one-eighth Negro. Thus, though of the fourteen progenitors of
X only three had Negro blood, X would nevertheless be considered a Negro.
In the above illustrations only one of the progenitors has been a Negro and his blood
has been the only Negro blood introduced into the line.
GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 18-19 (1910).
After this structural analysis, the author understandably concludes, "It is safe to say that
in practice one is a Negro or is classed with that race if he has the least visible trace of Negro
blood in his veins, or even if it is known that there was Negro blood in any one of his progeni
tors." Id. at 19.
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approach, it too proved difficult to litigate for the party who bore
the burden of proof. Thus, in criminal cases, when race was an ele
ment of the offense, convictions were difficult to obtain when the
physical appearance of the defendant made him appear racially am
biguous. The party bearing the burden of proof had to undertake a
kind of human title search,271 by either tracing the defendant's an
cestors for several generations and proving their race or relying on
physical characteristics as a precise indicator of the fraction of
Black ancestry.
In such cases, the prosecution often lost for failure to sustain a
difficult burden of proving the fractions. For example, in the 1885
Virginia case of Jones v. Commonwealth, 212 Isaac Jones appealed
his two year and nine month sentence imposed for the felony of
marrying a White woman "against the peace and dignity of the
commonwealth" in the face of a statute that defined a Negro as "a
person who had one-fourth or more negro blood in him." Jones's
defense was that his blood was not one-quarter Black273 within the
meaning of the statute. Although the court found that Jones was a
"mulatto of brown skin" and that his mother was a "yellow
woman." the conviction failed due to the prosecution's failure to
sustain their burden of proving "the quantum of negro blood in his
veins" exceeded one-fourth.
The difficulty of this human title search is further illustrated by
the case of Ferrall v. Ferralf274 in which the petitioner-husband
wished to have his marriage declared void on the grounds that his
wife "was and is of negro descent within the third generation." The
issue in the divorce case, which would determine the husband's re
sponsibility for spousal and child support, was whether his wife's
271. In the context of discussing miscegenation cases Eva Saks wrote:
Tracing the defendant's genealogy became the equivalent of a title search, the search
for an authoritative legal representation of race. However, it also led to the same prob
lem besetting any title search: how did title originate? In the context of race, this meta
phorical title to blood, if traced back far enough, revealed the actual, historical fact of
legal title: the "title in a Negro" which could be sold, deeded, or bequeathed to another
white person, in the transfer of ownership that was "chief of all property rights." Blood
therefore revealed itself as part of a social rather than biological pattern. While this
historical origin explained the social status of blacks, it absolutely challenged the legal
and "scientific" myth that the boundary between the races was natural, ahistorical, and
biological. It was like other property boundaries, like the legal family itself, the positive
creation of the law. Blood was merely law's representation, one that tried to render
natural and scientific that which was instead legal and metaphorical.
Saks, supra note 265, at 52-53.
272. Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 18 (1885).
273. Of course, none of his blood was Black as blood cannot be typed according to race.
For a discussion of this topic, see SPENCIE LOVE, ONE Bwoo 155-57 (1996).
274. 69 S.E. 60 (N.C. 1910).
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great grandfather was a "real negro," that is, one who did not have
any White blood in him, so that the fractional requirement could be
met. In rejecting the notion that the racial origin of the great
grandparent should be ascertained by the general consensus of the
community, the court strictly construed the statute and found that
since the husband could not prove that the great grandfather was a
real Negro of unmixed blood, his wife could not be shown to be
one-eighth Negro as required by statute.
Similarly, the court strictly construed the fractional require
ments in the later case of Moon v. Children's Home Society.21s In
that case, two children were removed from their White mother on
the grounds that their stepfather had Negro blood in his veins. It
was irrelevant that their natural father had died leaving the family
penniless and that the stepfather had provided for them comforta
bly - the inquiry was one of fractions. The children were returned
to their mother, however, based on the unrefuted testimony of the
step-grandmother that she was only one-eighth Black, that her hus
band was White, and therefore her son, the children's stepfather,
was only one-sixteenth Black, less than the fraction required.276
The children's mother won because there was no way that the court
could check the math.
Where the fractions could be "objectively" substantiated, how
ever, the fractional requirements were strictly construed. For ex
ample, in Peavey v. Robbins, 277 plaintiff sued the voting inspectors
for not allowing him to vote. He testified that both his mother and
grandmother were White and that his father was a "dark colored
man with straight hair" and that his grandfather was a "dark red
faced mulatto, with dark straight hair." The court simply did the
ancestral mathematics and concluded that if the plaintiff's grand
father were a mulatto, that is, half White and half Black, "the plain
tiff would be within the fourth degree" and therefore ineligible to
vote.278

d. Expert Testimony. When the difficulty of the ancestral title
search became apparent, the court sometimes resorted to the use of
"scientific experts" who could divine quantum of blood by visual
inspection. Two Arkansas cases illustrate the limits of the use of
275. 72 S.E. 707 (Va. 1911).
276. See 72 S.E. at 708.
277. 48 N.C. (3 Jones Law) 339 (1856), cited in 2 CATIERALL, supra note 259, at 198.
278. Another example of the court strictly construing the fractional statutes is Van Camp
v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio St. 407 {1859) (noting that children who were admittedly
three-eighths African and five-eighths White were forbidden from attending "White"
schools).
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"experts" to determine race. In Daniel v. Guy,279 the petitioner and
her four minor children sued for freedom based on their allegation
that they were not Black within the meaning of the law. The court
allowed the jury to consider the interpretation of lay testimony by
two "expert" physicians "skilled in the natural history of the races
of men." A lay witness testified that, while the p�titioner's mother
had the complexion of a dark White person and had dark straight
hair, she had a telltale "curl on the side of her head." One expert
testifying on behalf of the plaintiff then opined that "the hair never
becomes straight until after the third descent from the negro. . . .
The fiat nose remains observable for several descents. "280
In Gary v. Stevenson,281 another suit for freedom, the "expert" t'
witnesses disagreed. One testified that upon visual inspection, "he
could discover no trace of the negro blood in [the plaintiff's] eyes,
nose, mouth or jaws - his hair is smooth and of the sandy complex
ion, perfectly straight and fiat, with no indication of the crisp or
negro curl; his eyes blue, his jaws thin, his nose slim and long."282
The "expert" concluded that it would take "at least twenty genera
tions from the black blood to be as white as complainant.''283 A
second expert disagreed, judging the complainant as having "a
small amount of negro blood; not more than a sixteenth, perhaps
not so much. . . . [his] upper lip rather thicker than in the white race
- temperament sanguine."284 The thick lip and pleasant tempera

ment was "scientific" evidence of the Black blood.
Sometimes, the certified "experts" allowed to testify before the
jury did not pretend to have scientific training at all. In State v.
Jacobs,285 the court's expert was certified on the grounds that "he
was a planter, an owner and manager of slaves . . . more than twelve
years, that he . . . had had much observation of the effects of the
intermixture of the negro . . . blood. "286 The court affirmed both his
expertise and his opinion, stating:

it would often require an eye rendered keen, by observation and prac
tice, to detect, with any approach to certainty, the existence of any
thing less than one-fourth of African blood. . . . A free negro . . . may
. . . be a person who . . . has only a sixteenth. The ability to discover
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

19 Ark. 122 (1857).
19 Ark. at 127.
19 Ark. 580 (1858).
19 Ark. at 583.
19 Ark. at 583.
19 Ark. at 584.
51 N.C. (6 Jones) 284 (1859), quoted in 2
51 N.C. at 284.

CATIERALL, supra

note 259, at 226.
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the infusion of so small a quantity of negro blood . . . must be a matter
of science . . . admitting of the testimony of an expert [such as]
Pritchett.287
With experts of this caliber, it was not a quantum leap for the
court to allow such "scientific" expertise to give way to lay opinion
of the witnesses on the theory that racial identification was a matter
of common knowledge. Thus, in an

1892 North

Carolina case, lay

testimony was competent to show that a litigant was of "mixed
blood": "It was not necessary that the witness should be an expert
to testify to a matter which is simply one of common observa
tion."288 Similarly in an

1829

case, a jury awarded freedom to a

litigant announcing, "We of the jury . . . find, from inspection, that
the said plaintiff . . . is a white woman."289 Finally, in State v. Hayes,
a criminal defendant urged that she was White because her mother
was White. In rejecting her contention, the court stated,

"I was sat

isfied from inspection that she was a mulatto. . . . The African taint
reduced her to the same degraded state, as if she were a free
negro."290

e. Litigating Biological Race.

With race defined as a function of

biology and blood, the courts thus struggled with fractions, experts,
relatives, and visual observation in order to draw the line between
Black and White. As ridiculous as these racial classification cases
seem to the modem reader,

I

include them here because they have

some relevance to today's proposals for redefining the racial iden
tity of an African American with any White blood or with a major
ity of White blood. If, as some argue, many Blacks are in fact
multiracial due to miscegenation that occurred generations ago,
how are we to determine where we each belong?291 And if, as some
commentators suggest292 entitlements are appended to one cate287. 51 N.C. at 284.
288. Hopkins v. Bowers 111 N.C. 175, 178 (1892).
289. 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 121 (quoting Hook v. Pagee, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 379
(1811)).
290. 2 CATIERALL, supra note 259, at 339 (quoting State v. Hayes, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 275
(1829)).
291. For a thorough discussion of this problem of people who might falsely claim to be
Black, see Wright, supra note 17, at 559-61. For a persuasive, common-sense approach to this
problem, see Karst, supra note 28, at 322-52.
292. For some such suggestions, see Colker, supra note 181, at 12-23. In this article, I
have not discussed "affirmative action" because I believe that it has limited relevance in
defining the African-American race. The boundaries of our race were drawn long before
affirmative action was conceived, and affirmative action can have only a limited effect on the
identity of people within those boundaries; affirmative action will not turn Black women into
White men. For thought provoking suggestions on varying the degree of affirmative action
available within and between minority groups, see Colker, supra note 181; Deborah Ramirez,
Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. Rav. 957
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gory and not the other, will racial "authenticity" be determined in a
fashion so different than these cases suggest?

C.

The Dangers of Redefining Black: Distancing

In the previous two sections of this Part, I have raised caution
signs on the road toward the re-biologization of racial categories.
Section IT.A discussed the good that the one drop rule did in unit
ing African Americans in the fight against racism, and it compared
the Devil's work in promulgating the one drop rule in the United
States, with his creation in South Africa, where a more symmetrical
classification system was very effective in ensuring racial subordina
tion. Section Il.B argued that the one drop rule created a people
and that it would be difficult and wrong to biologically recategorize
a people. These sections thus looked backwards over the African
American experience. With this experience in mind, section Il.C
will look forward to examine how the recategorization of the
African-American race may move us closer to the South African
system, where the evil the Devil did outweighed the good.
This section, then, addresses the phenomenon of "distancing,"
which is the creation of unnecessary and pernicious distinctions be
tween light-skinned and dark-skinned African Americans. I discuss
two kinds of distancing: (1) addressing problems that face all Afri
can Americans with solutions that benefit only the lighter part of
the race; and (2) shying away from legitimate criticism of racism.
1.

Finding Solutions for the Lighter Part of the Race

In one species of distancing, we find proponents of the multi
racial category drawing a line through the African-American race
and then finding solutions to 'social problems for only those persons
on the multiracial side of the line. In contemporary discourse, the
field of transracial adoptions provides the clearest examples of this
type of distancing. The National Association of Black Social Work
ers (NABSW) has repeatedly stated its opposition to allowing
White families to adopt Black children, and, in his recent law re
view article, Kenneth Karst carefully examines this issue. Karst
thoughtfully discusses the applicable constitutional and ethical prin
ciples and the factual studies of children who have been adopted
transracially, and he concludes with a nuanced but compelling state-

(1995). For the views of an opponent of affirmative action who believes that an accurate
census count of African Americans is crucial, see Nathan Glazer, Race for the Cure, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1996, at 29.
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ment of support for transracial adoptions, noting that the alterna
tive is usually a foster home or an orphanage.293
In this discussion, Karst reports a proposal that would let multi
racial children be adopted by anyone but would leave Black chil
dren to languish in their foster homes. He notes that "[s]till other
positions might be considered. For example, a general preference
for black parents might be put aside in adoption of biracial children
- the children of parents who self-identify with different races."294
In a classic example of distancing, this proposal takes a problem
that affects all Black children awaiting adoption and solves it only
for those who have known White ancestry.
Another example of distancing involves private adoptions. In
some states, a huge percentage of adoptions are now handled pri
vately through attorneys, facilitators, and private agencies without
much involvement from the state and county bureaucracies that his
torically have been responsible for race matching. These private
adoption professionals report that there is not a sufficient demand
for Black babies.295 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that Blacks
have fallen behind those with physical limitations in the competi
tion for acceptance by White families. Some White families who
are caring and committed enough to accept children without limbs
or with other physical disabilities check "No" on the form when
asked if they will accept a Black child.296 Against this background,
skeptics could be forgiven if they see the "Multiracial" category in
this context as a sort of marketing tool, a Tiffany box in which light
Black children can be placed to get them through the doorways of
White homes - doorways that might be quickly closed· to children
293. See Karst, supra note 28, at 347-52. Likewise, Lythcott·Haims paints a compelling
portrait of African-American children languishing in foster homes while qualified White
adoptive parents are turned away due to the policy of "race matching." Lythcott-Haims,
supra note 136, at 553-56.
294. Karst, supra note 28, at 348. Lythcott-Haims describes a broader "compromise" proposal that would apply to any child with mixed ancestry.
A different approach, such as permitting Multiracial children to be adopted by parents
who represent at least one of the heritages in the child's ancestry, would create many
more parental options for Multiracial children. Instead, Multiracial children wait in the
current race-matching scheme.
Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136. at 553 (citation omitted).
295. Dorothy Roberts observes that "[i]n the American market, a Black child is indispu
tably an inferior product." Roberts, supra note 162, at 246. Similarly, one private adoption
attorney reports that his firm cannot find enough Americans of any race interested in adopt
ing Black infants, although economic considerations may play a role. "The problem is so
pronounced he [the adoption lawyer] had to go all the way to Holland and Switzerland to
find homes for a bi-racial and a black child." Kathleen Schuckel, Black Couples Face Delays
for Babies Too, INDIANAPous STAR, June 30, 1996, at J2.
296. See Interview with J. Potter at Silver Spoon Adoption Agency in Temecula, Califor
nia (Nov. 1995).
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labeled as "Black" or "African. "297 Of course, such categories are
of limited effect in the world of private adoption, where prospective
parents scrutinize the skin color and virtually every other known
attribute of the birth parents and the child. For the government to
give its blessing to such a use of the multiracial category, however,
would be another form of distancing.
Karst convincingly explains how the NABSW has used the one
drop rule in its misguided fight to keep all Black adoptable children
in the race.298 But if we take time to examine fully the use of the
one drop rule in the adoption controversy, we again see Mephis
topheles doing his good works. Thus, the one drop rule insists that
if "race matching" is wrong; we should right this wrong for all Black
children, not just for the ones with White blood. The rule also de
mands that if White Americans are wary of adopting African
American children, we should not address this problem by wrap
ping the lighter ones in the official bunting of a multiracial category,
leaving the darker babies unadaptable.
All this brings us back to Uncle Clarence's decision not to argue
that he was too light to fall under the restrictive covenant as he
fought to save his home. Arguments that solve problems only for
the lighter half of the race are self-defeating and morally flawed.299

2. Sanitizing our Attacks on Racism
A second example of distancing is seen when multiracial advo
cates shy away from legitimate criticism of racism because this criti
cism breaches their loyalty to their White ancestry. In her recent
Note, Lythcott-Haims provides an example of this distancing when
she critiques an African-American satire of the one drop rule. The
Note makes the historical observation that some African Ameri
cans "refuted the conclusion of the 'one drop' rule by deducing that
if one drop of 'Black blood' makes a person Black, the blood must
be powerful, strong,[ ] and superior."300 As an example of such a
297. I emphasize that neither Karst nor Lythcott-Haims has made (or even mentioned)
any such proposal to use the Multiracial label to make certain Black children more attractive
to White adopting families.
298. See Karst, supra note 28, at 351.
299. Similarly, the lawyers for Homer Plessy, who was only one-eighth Black, ultimately
downplayed the argument that Plessy was too light to be effectively categorized as a Negro.
See CHARLES A. LoFGREN, THE PLESsY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 55
(1987); cf. Colker, supra note 181, at 7 (arguing that the case reflected a challenge to the
arbitrary nature of racial categories).
300. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 539.
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"deduction," the Note quotes the mid-twentieth century movie star,
Herb Jeffries:

I'd always heard that if you had any Negro blood you were a Negro
and that was that . . . . Then it can't be such inferior blood, can it? If
you had a [B]lack paint that was so powerful that two drops of it
would color a bucket of [W]hite, that'd be the most potent paint in
the world, wouldn't it? So if Negro blood is as strong as all that it
must be pretty good - maybe I'd better find out where I can get
some more of it.301
In response to Jeffries's satire of the one drop rule, the Note draws
a line between the "Black community" and the "Multiracial":

[W]hile these exercises seem self-empowering and may have done
wonders for the collective psyche of the Black community, they did
nothing to help the plight of the Multiracial, for the Multiracial per
son can hardly advocate the superiority or inferiority of one race
without touching off a potentially damaging identity struggle within
herself.302
Here, the Note exemplifies two aspects of "distancing." First, it
distances multiracial people from the criticism of racism. The quo
tation from Herb Jeffries is in itself instructive. Jeffries was a light
skinned Black actor who refused his agents' suggestions that he
"pass" as a South American or Latino, even though doing so would
have greatly enhanced his career.303 In the quoted passage, he
playfully but effectively satirizes the illogic of racism without dis
playing any anti-White racial venom or dislike of White people.
Nonetheless, the Note finds even this mild satire painful enough to
touch off a "damaging identity struggle." Of course, if the author of
the Note had wanted words that could legitimately be said to cause
anguish, she could have chosen the famous words of Malcolm X:

I was among the millions of Negroes who were insane enough to feel
that it was some kind of status symbol to be light-complexioned that one was actually fortunate to be born thus. But, still later, I
learned to hate every drop of the white rapist's blood that is in me.304
Instead, the Note focuses on the humor of Herb Jeffries. The net
effect is the suggestion that Blacks must be careful even when they
playfully poke fun at racism, lest they offend multiracials' White
side.
Second, in its discussion of Jeffries, the Note conveys the sugges
tion that multiracials do not benefit from the fight against anti301. Id. at 539 n.47 {alterations in original).
302. Id. at 539.
303. See Spickard, supra note 136, at 332.
304. MALCOLM x, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM x, at 2 (New York, 1965), quoted in
Spickard, supra note 136, at 323.
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Black racism. Specifically, the Note concludes that "exercises" such
as Jeffries's satire "did nothing to help the plight of the multi
racial."305 I believe that the contrary is true, that it was decades of
such (often subtle) attacks on racism that led to

Brown

and

Loving

and the downfall of Jim Crow. While many of these attacks may
have been painful to some White ears, without them many multi
racial people would not even exist, and the ones who did find their
way into the world past racist antimiscegenation laws would cer
tainly face a far less friendly society. While it is the fight against
racism that has brought them this far, some multiracial voices seem
prepared to distance themselves from this fight and to replace it
with a fight for distance from the Black race. The Note, for exam
ple, suggests that benign satire must be removed from the arsenal of
antiracist weapons, lest it offend; instead it concentrates on more
"accurate" redefinitions of American racial categories.

I believe that this combination of strategies is self-defeating. To
the eyes of most Americans, children of Black-White unions are
inextricably identified with the Black community, and while these
biracial children

certainly

have the right to define and enjoy their

own unique identity, what will "help [their] plight" the most will be
the end of anti-Black racism.

3.

Conclusion

This Part has been intended to place caution and destination
signs on the path toward the adoption of a new multiracial census
category. These signs remind us of the good the one drop rule did
in creating a people and uniting it in the struggle against racism.
They also warn us that this path may lead us toward the adoption of
racial categories that ignore American social history and, instead,
find their bases in blood and biology. Finally, the signs tell us of
dangers posed by these new categories: They may formally divide
the Black race into two races, one light and one dark; and they may
create a distance between those two new races that ultimately re
sults in different treatment for each group.

III.

FROM THE ONE DROP RULE TO THE DISCOURSE ON RACE

I now tum to the larger discourse on race itself. Here, all of the
I discussed in the previous Part form only a
small, but nonetheless important, part of the terrain. The construc
tion of the boundaries around the African-American race informs
considerations that

305. Lythcott-Hairns, supra note 136, at 539.
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the debate over the nature and definition of "race" itself; the an
swers drawn from this debate will, in turn, be answers to the ques
tions regarding the identity of multiracial Americans.
In section III.A, I address the question whether there is such a
thing as "race," and I conclude that the African-American experi
ence proves that race does exist. In sections III.B and III.C, I argue
that race is something sui generis - that it is not simply a metaphor
and that it is more than culture but less than essence. In section
III.D, I criticize recent arguments that race is volitional. I conclude
by focusing on the argument that we chose our race by our daily
actions, and I discuss how this argument can become suffocating for
African Americans.
A.

There is Race

No one has made a greater impact on the philosophy of race in
the last decade than Kwame Anthony Appiah, who, among other
things, has advanced the now-famous argument that there is no
race.306 In the preceding sections, I discussed the abstract compari
sons that certain commentators have made between hypodescent
and more "symmetrical" classification systems and how these com
parisons ignored the reality of the African-American experience.
In concluding that there is no race, Appiah operates at the other
end of the spectrum and engages in a similarly unsatisfactory ab
straction - an abstraction that is again disproved by the African
American experience. Just as the Black experience in America
shows that hypodescent was - in practice - no worse than the
symmetrical South African system, so African-American history
shows that there is such a thing as race.
Appiah begins his argument by demolishing the biological basis
for race.307 From biology he turns to history, and he considers
DuBois's argument that races are bound together by a "common
history":308 "The issue now is whether a common history is some
thing that could be a criterion that distinguishes one group of
human beings - extended in time - from another."309 Appiah
306. See APPIAH, supra note 163, at 31-32.
307. See id. at 35-38.
308. DuBois's definition of race, which inspired Appiah's analysis, is: "What then is a
race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always
of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striv
ing together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life."
\V.E. BURGHARDT DuBOIS, DUSK OF DAWN! AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
A RACE CONCEPT 75-76 (1940), quoted in APPIAH, supra note 163, at 29.
309. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 31.
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concludes that a common history, such as the African-American
history of slavery and segregation, cannot create a group. He ar
gues that it is tautological to claim that a group shares a common
history; in the end, he concludes, notions of "shared history" bring
us back to biological notions of race:

To put it more simply: sharing a common group history cannot be a
criterion for being members of the same group, for we would have to
be able to identify the group in order to identify its history. Someone
in the fourteenth century could share a common history with me
through our membership in a historically extended race only if some
thing accounts for their membership in the race in the fourteenth cen
tury and mine in the twentieth. That something cannot, on pain of
circularity, be the history of the race.
Whatever holds DuBois's races conceptually together, then, it cannot be common history.31 0
Appiah thus believes there must always be something besides
shared history that identifies the group, and in the case of race, this
"something" is simply false notions of biology. Having eliminated
any historical or biological grounds for grouping people into races,
he concludes that there is no race.

I disagree with this portion of Appiah's argument, at least as it
applies to the African-American race. As argued in the previous
sections, history not only created the African-American race (draw
ing its boundaries to include the issue of Europeans and Native
Americans), it also imposed on this race a tumultuous shared expe
rience that has made the race what it is today. But before

I discuss

the African-American experience further, let me give a clearer ex
ample that undermines Appiah's argument that "shared history"
cannot create a group.
This example is the Buraku caste that has existed in Japan from
the Tokagawa period to the present.311 This caste - whose mem
bers are morphologically and genetically indistinguishable from the
general population of Japan312 - has its origins in ancestors who
chose to work with leather in Medieval Japan. (Because leather
was associated with death, leatherwork was considered an "un
clean" occupation. )313 During the Middle Ages, the boundaries of
310. Id. at 32.
311. See IAN NEARY, PoLmCAL PROTEST AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN PRE-WAR JAPAN:
THE ORIGINS OF BURAKU LIBERATION (1989); see also J. SUGINOHARA, THE STATUS DIS
CRIMINATION IN JAPAN (1982).
312. See David Sanger, A Japanese Group Disrupts the Sale of a Book, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1990, at 4.
313. See NEARY, supra note 311, at 13.
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this caste were not hardened, and the "[c]onnection with the leather
trade was not yet the basis for defining a social group. If a family
severed its links with the [unclean] trade they would lose all traces
of defilement."314
During the ensuing Tokagawa period, however, history worked
to permanently define these leather workers and their descendants
as members of a rigid, inescapable, outcast social group. Over the
years from 1700 to 1840, for example, an increasingly restrictive
"series of regulations . . . insisted they adopt specific styles of cloth
ing and behaviour which prevented normal social contact with the
surrounding communities," thus confirming "existing beliefs that
they were different. "315 These regulations dictated not only the
"type of clothing and hairstyles which were to be worn" but also
prohibited the Buraku people "from crossing the threshold of a
[non-Buraku] peasant's home."316 As Ian Neary notes: "These
measures firmly established a line which separated the majority
from the minority outcast group and the measures enacted in subse
quent years confirmed this division in society and widened the gap
between the two sections of it."317 In fact, the gap became so wide
that today the Burakumin remain an underclass, earning salaries
well below the mean salaries for the remainder of the Japanese
population, living in segregated communities, and suffering socially
imposed limitations on their interaction with their fellow Japanese.
Even now, "Japanese private investigators still do a huge business
tracing the family roots of job applicants, future spouses and others
to determine if they have any burakumin blood."31 8
314. Id. at 14. Neary notes that at the time:
Working with leather was still an occupation which caused the pollution of the
worker, but the period of defilement was finite and it did not necessarily affect the other
members of his family. A document dated 1558 warned:
To witness the death of a cow or horse and then to dispose of the carcass brings one days
pollution. To skin the hide of the carcass brings five days pollution
Id. at 14 (quoting W.L. Brooks, Outcaste Society in Early Modern Japan (1976) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University)).
315. Id. at 25.
316. Id. at 18.
317. Id. at 21. This division was quite useful to the ruling interests. Neary notes that
restrictions on Buraku clothing and hairstyle, on intercourse between Buraku persons and
peasants, and searches of large cities to find and return runaway Buraku were made partially
because the "government feared the emergence of the united action of the poorer urban
dwellers and discontented peasants." Id. at 18. "It seems to have been thought that the
rebelliousness of the peasants and urban dwellers would be reduced with the reminder that
there was a group which was even worse off than they were. On the other hand, by further
dividing the [Burakumin] from the rest of society, they became reliable as soldiers to be used
to suppress the peasant riots." Id. at 18.
318. Sanger, supra note 312, at 4.
• • . .
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The history of the Buraku people thus establishes not only that
common history can form a group, but that history can take a clus
ter of people who had nothing more in common than their ances
tors' choice - possibly made as long ago as the year 1500 - to
work with leather, and turn this people and their descendants into a
caste, a caste that functions very similarly to the way that races
function in the United States and South Africa.319
Thus, Appiah overstates his case when he argues that, because
we cannot identify groups by their common history, our only basis
for racial groupings is the false and discredited notion of biology.
History can form groups. As Haney Lopez notes:

I argue that races are peoples created by history. Before slavery
Blacks did not exist as the race we recognize now in this country.
Instead, slavery created a single group in North America defined by
the common disaster that befell the disparate peoples of Africa
brought to these shores. Slavery oppressed a group of people marked
in comparison with their oppressors by a common morphology. Afri
can Americans remain linked by the legacy of that oppression and its
current incarnation, which is the very systems of meaning that today
attach to Black morphology and ancestry.320
As emphasized in the previous sections of this article, history cre
ated this group not simply from the disparate peoples of Africa, but
also from the Native American and European peoples that inter
mixed with them.
Of course, race is different from caste, partly because notions of
biology did play a larger causative role in the formation of races. In
addition, any dynastic group, be it a race, a caste, or a group such as
the Daughters of the American Revolution, is bound together by
the "genetic tie" that connects ancestor to descendant. But none of
this means - as Appiah would have it - that discredited notions
of biology and genetics are the only possible building blocks for the
African-American race. The "genetic tie" between Walter White,
my Uncle Jack, Zora Neale Hurston, and Marcus Garvey was not,
by itself, strong enough to create a people, let alone hold it to-

319. The Buraku people show most of the salient markers of race: segregation, economic
deprivation, the strictly enforced taboo on out-marriage, and the absence of any feeling of
solidarity with people across caste lines even when those people have identical economic
interests.
320. Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illu
sion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994). In making this con
vincing argument, Haney Lopez unsuccessfully attempts to avoid disagreeing with Appiah.
He observes: "I do not argue that races are peoples who share a history; I argue that races
are peoples who are created by history." Id. But if a group is created by history, does it not
also share a common history? And is it not the shared history that gives the racial grouping
all of its importance?
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gether. History did that work. History drew the boundaries that
labelled all of these people "Black" and gave that label an overrid
ing importance in their lives, to the point where "Black," as Karst
notes, becomes "a label so powerful that it can seem to be the per
son. "321 There is nothing in the African-American morphology or
gene pool that dictated this result. History created this race and
gave it its significance.
B.

Race as a Metaphor

While Appiah has been largely unsuccessful in persuading other
scholars that there is

no

race, he has succeeded in knocking race

down a peg. For example, scholars such as Henry Louis Gates and
Kenneth Karst agree that race has no biological basis, but being
reluctant to go so far as to say that there is no race, they call race a
"trope,"322 a "metonym,"323 a "metaphor," or a "myth."324 In my
view, however, we can fairly and accurately use the term race with
out resorting to tropes, metaphors, or metonymy. My inspiration
comes from an unrelated footnote in Karst's article,

tity,

Myths of Iden

in which he humorously discusses his affiliation with the Auto

Club without ever examining whether the Auto Club is a myth,
metaphor, trope, or metonym.325 As I read this footnote and com
pared the ways in which the Auto Club and race have affected our
lives, I concluded that there is something odd about a theory that
counts the Auto Club as real and race as a myth or metaphor.326
321. Karst, supra note 28, at 286. After Arthur Ashe was diagnosed with AIDS, a re
porter asked him if that illness was "the heaviest burden [he had] ever had to bear." He
replied, to the reporter's surprise: "You're not going to believe this
but being black is the
greatest burden I've had to bear. . . . Race has always been my biggest burden. Having to live
as a minority in America. Even now it continues to feel like an extra weight around me."
Reflecting on this answer later, he noted: "I can still recall the surprise and perhaps even the
hurt on [the reporter's] face. I may even have surprised myself, because I simply had never
thought of comparing the two conditions before. However, I stand by my remark. Race is
for me a more onerous burden than AIDS." AR1HUR AsHE & ARNOLD RAMPERSAD, DAYS
OF GRACE 126 (1993) (internal quotation marks deleted).
322. A "trope" is "any literary or rhetorical device, as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche,
and irony, that consists in the use of words in other than their literal sense." RANDOM
HousE. WEBSTER'S COLLEGE D1cnoNARY 1429 (1991).
323. A "metonym" is a "word used in metonymy" which, in tum, is "the use of one object
or concept for that of another to which it is related or of which it is a part, as 'scepter' for
'sovereignty."' Id. at 853.
324. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Editor's Introduction: Writing "Race" and the Difference
It Makes, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 206, at 4-5; Karst, supra note
28, at 284, 288; see also Houston A. Baker, Jr., Caliban's Triple Play, in "RACE " WRITING,
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 206, at 383.
325. See Karst, supra note 28, at 283 n.76.
326. Here, I do not mean to slight the complexity of Professor Karst's analysis. While he
refers to race as "myth" and racial groups as "metaphors," he recognizes that these myths
and metaphors have become part of our "made world," id. at 312, 316, and he never down. . •

,
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Reflecting further on my own family history, I felt that it was a safe
assumption that neither the Los Angeles neighbors who sued to

have my Uncle Clarence ejected from his home, nor the Detroit

neighbors who rioted in order to cleanse their neighborhood of my
Uncle Jack, knew the meaning of the word "trope." Nevertheless,
they could all define the word "Negro" with sufficient precision that
they took time out of their daily affairs in order to drive my ances
tors out of their homes.

The problem that drives these scholars to metaphor is that
"race" was originally defined by biology, but science no longer sup

ports that original, biological definition. So these commentators

now say that race is a "metaphor," a "metonym," or a "trope," and

they thus suggest that race is some ineffable, barely existing concept
that can be described only with figures of speech. In making this
suggestion, however, they overlook the function of metaphor:

If we

say that race is a metaphor, we mean that race is something but we

are calling it something else. We are admitting that race exists but

we are, as they say, calling it outside of its name. However, if we
can describe the Auto Club and AT&T and the Los Angeles Lakers
without resorting to the use of metaphors and other tropes, we can

do the same for race. As Appiah notes, "Wittgenstein used to
quote Bishop Butler's remark that 'everything is what it is and not

another thing.' There is a piece of Akan wordplay with the same
moral 'Esono esono, na esono sosono,' . . . which being translated
reads 'The elephant is one thing and the worm another."'327 So it is

with race. It is (at least) one thing and we should call it that: not
false biological classifications, but the groups that history has con
structed from the morphological differences among human beings.

In the previous sections, I have discussed the ways in which his

tory defined the African-American race by drawing broad bounda
ries based on morphology and ancestry. With this in mind, I believe
that Professor Haney Lopez has stated it best: "In this Article I
define a 'race' as a vast group of people loosely bound together by
historically contingent, socially significant elements of their mor

phology and/or ancestry."328 I believe that instead of denying the

plays the quite concrete effects that race can have on people's lives. On the contrary, he
carefully and realistically analyzes not only these effects but also the· need to ameliorate
them. See id. at 324-38.
327. APPIAH, supra note 163, at xi. The trend is now to reject any single meaning of race,
and to recognize that race can be defined in many different ways simultaneously. See Lee,
supra note 115, at 778-79. While there is truth in this observation, it does not follow that all
definitions of race are necessarily correct. In the next pages, I will argue that some such
definitions are wrong and others are suffocating.
328. Lopez, supra note 320, at 7.
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existence of something as palpable as the nose on our face, we

should use Haney Lopez's definition - or something close to it in order to redefine race as what it is.
C.

Essential vs. Cultural Concepts of Race

The history of the boundaries of the African-American race also

helps us to navigate between two competing notions of race: cul

ture and essence. Some scholars argue that race is a metonym for

culture. Appiah, for example, argues: "For, where race works - in
places where 'gross differences' of morphology are correlated with
'subtle differences' of temperament, belief and intention - it works

as an attempt at metonym for culture, and it does so only at the
price of biologizing what is culture, ideology."329 But Haney Lopez

is correct when he comments: "I agree that there is a significant
overlap between race and culture . . . . Nevertheless, I am con

vinced that there is something else 'out there,' some central dy

namic of race that , is not captured by notions of culture or

community."330 Much of that "something else" is morphology and

genealogy. In the African-American case, history created a race

from these factors, and this race runs broader and deeper than cul
ture; this race, which extends out to boundaries defined by appear

ance and known descent, provides the anchor for culture. In other

words, a person with Black morphology or known Black ancestry is
part of the race, even if he has "lost" the culture. As Walter Benn

Michael notes:

Thus, for example, the idea that people can lose their culture depends
upon there being a connection between people and their culture than
runs deeper than their actual beliefs and practices, which is why, when
they stop doing one thing and start doing another, they can be de
scribed as having lost rather than changed their culture.331
I do not, however, argue that there is any racial essence.332 Tak

ing Benn Michael's metaphor, we also say that we "lose" our reli
gion, but this does not suggest that people are "essentially"

329. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 45.
330. Lopez, supra note 320, at 18.
331. Walter Benn Michaels, The No-Drop Rule, in IDENTITIES 401 (Kwame Anthony Ap
piah & Henry Louis Gates, Jr. eds., Chicago, 1995).
332. Lee defines racial essence as "the real, true essence of things, the invariable and
fixed properties which define the 'whatness' of a given entity." Lee, supra note 115, at 766
n.91 (quoting DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE, at
xi (1989)). Similarly, Omi and Winant define racial essence as some "real, true human es
sences, existing outside or impervious to social and historical context. " MICHAEL OMI &
HowARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN nm UNITED STATES 181 n.6 (2d ed. 1994) (citing
Fuss, supra, at xi).

March 1997]

One Drop Rule

1243

Episcopalian or Shi'ite, or even Christian or Muslim. Similarly, we
do not need to be essentially Black in order to be able to "lose" our
Black culture.
One defender of a certain amount of racial essentialism is Jayne
Lee, who suggests that essentialist concepts of race may be politi
cally useful.333 Her analysis is driven by a post-structuralist aver
sion to binarisms: She argues that our acceptance of socio
historical definitions of race should not preclude other definitions,
including essential definitions. She therefore concludes that any
definition of race that furthers the struggle against racism is
justified.334
My objection to essentialist definitions of race, however, is not
based on the feeling that the social definition of race that I asserted
above has preempted the field, but on the lack of evidence to sup
port the essentialist definitions. Appiah, for example, has master
fully demolished any meaningful argument for essential race among
Africans, and since African Americans are even more diverse in
their origins than Africans,

a fortiori,

there are no essential charac

teristics of the African-American race either335 - unless, of course,
those essential characteristics have been acquired during our time
on this continent, but that would be, to quote Barbara Fields, just a
"latter-day version of Lamarckism."336

333. See Lee, supra note 115, at 778-79.
334. See id.
335. For a discussion of African diversity, see APPIAH, supra note 163, at 25, 174. Appiah
argues that the peoples of Africa are so diverse that it is hard to think of any generalization
which applies to all of them. Accordingly it cannot be any essence inherited from our Afri
can ancestors that makes African Americans what they are. On the contrary, I, and many
other African Americans, can testify that the Blackest people we have known have had light
skin and straight hair.
336. Fields, supra note 115, at 101. Put simply, Lamarckism is the theory that acquired
characteristics can be inherited and passed on to one's offspring.
Lee herself implicitly rejects essentialism when she takes sides in the great debate as to
which came first, slavery or race. Commentators are divided on this issue: Some think that
the African workers who came to Virginia in the seventeenth century looked and sounded so
different from the English colonists that they were immediately seen as a separate "race."
See Carl N. Degler, Slavery and the Genesis ofAmerican Race Prejudice, in RACE PREJUDICE
AND THE ORIGINS OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 44-45 (Raymond Starr & Robert Detweiler eds.,
1975). Others believe that these Africans were reduced to slavery first, and the concept of
race was developed later, as a justification that a liberal society needed for holding a part of
its population in permanent bondage. See LoPEz, supra note 41, at 12-13; Fields, supra note
115, at 101, 104. Lee takes the latter position, arguing that subordination came well before
race. Speaking of the history of early colonial Virginia, she concludes "that historically, it
was not the members of other races who were subordinated, but rather the subordinated
people who became members of other races." Lee, supra note 115, at 761 n.64.
This view, however, is inconsistent with Lee's defense of racial essentialism. For to define
race essentially is to admit that these first African arrivals in Virginia had some "real, true
human, essences, existing outside or impervious to social and historical context. " OMI &
WINANT, supra note 332, at 181 n.6. And if these African immigrants had these racial "es-

1244

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1161

Nor will theories of a racial essence further the struggle against
racism. The argument that "they" are "Ice Men" and "we" are
"Sun People" is destined to fail; worse, in its long, painful death,

this argument will close for us all of the doors that society opens
only for Ice People.337 In addition, we must reject these theories

because they deprive us of choice in a more horrifying way that Jim
Crow and George Wallace ever did. They do so by telling us that

there is something in our essence - something neither we nor our
oppressors can change - that steers us as a people toward certain

results and away from others.
D.

Race as a Choice

This brings us to the issue of choice. Drawing on the experience

of Black Americans like my Uncles who chose different paths in

response to White racism, scholars have recently seized on the no

tion that people can choose their race; that what matters most in

questions of racial identity is self-identification; and that we each -

to some extent - select our race though the life decisions we make
every day. In this section, I analyze this discourse from the stand

point of the African-American experience that I have described in

the previous sections, and I raise a few more caution signs on the
path.

1. Appiah, Lee, and the Choice of Our Racial Identity
In

In My Father's House

and "An Uncompleted Argument,"

Appiah uses the "multiracial" heritage of W.E.B. DuBois as the

touchstone for his argument that racial identity is something that

we can choose.338 In her influential review essay, Navigating the
Topology of Race, Jayne Lee analyzes Appiah's argument and
echoes the portion of it that asserts the voluntary nature of race.339
In my view, Appiah and Lee give too much importance to individ
ual choice in defining race and too little importance to history. Ap-

sences" before they ever saw any White Virginia planter, then race came before subordina
tion, and Lee's claim that subordination created race necessarily fails.
It is interesting that Lee, in spite of her poststructuralist rejection of binarisms, views this
as a binary "either-or" debate: She concludes that either race came first or subjugation came
first, ruling out the view they arose at the same time, building on each other. See Winthrop
D. Jordan, Modern Tensions and the Origins ofAmerican Slavery, in RACE, PREJUDICE AND
THE ORIGINS OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, supra, at 72.
337. This "theory" is attributed to Leonard Jeffries. See Jack E. White, The Black Brain
Trust, TIME, Feb. 26, 1996, at 58; A Rebufffor a Racist, THE RECORD, Apr. 6, 1995 at B6.
338. See APPIAH, supra note 163; Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: DuBois
and the Illusion of Race, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 206, at 21.
339. See Lee, supra note 115, at 765.
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piah gets off on the wrong foot at the beginning of his discussion

when he takes the example of the royal lineage of the Queen of

England. He notes that " [i]f there were no overlaps in [the] family
tree, there would be more than fifty thousand billion" lines of de

scent from William the Conqueror to the present generation. He
concludes: "We chose one line, even though most of the population

of England is probably descended from William the Conqueror by
some uncharted route. "340 In summarizing Appiah, Lee moves the
choice into the present tense: "No single line can establish descent.

Instead, we must choose the determinative line. "341
But

If

"we " have not chosen the royal line of descent, nor can we.

on a visit to England we were to pursue this example and

"choose" the British Sovereign by saying "good morning your maj

esty" to any of the millions of people who are descended through

fifty thousand billion lines from William the Conqueror, we would
probably be regarded as harmless lunatics; we would not be choos

ing the Queen. And, while Appiah notes that there are millions of
people who are biologically qualified to become Queen thanks to

their descent from William the Conqueror, none of these people

can "choose" to become the Queen either, because the Queen's
identity has been dictated by history. Which is not to say that this is

the only choice history could have dictated - if the Armada had

not failed, if Charles II had fathered a "legitimate" child, if Henry

VIII had been faithful to his first wife - someone else would be
Queen. But it is history - long, complex, and irrevocable history

- and not "we" that has made the choice.

Having suggested that we can choose the Queen, Appiah fo

cuses on the experience of DuBois, an African American with
White ancestry, and makes the equally flawed argument that we can
"choose" our race: "Consider, for example, Du Bois himself. As

the descendant of Dutch ancestors, why does not the history of Hol
land in the fourteenth century (which he shares with all people of
Dutch descent) make him a member of the Teutonic race?"342

Appiah concludes that the answer to the question - and the basis

for DuBois's self-identification as a Negro - is fatally circular:

The answer is straightforward: the Dutch were not Negroes, Du Bois
is. But it follows from this that the history of Africa is part of the
common history of African-Americans not simply because African
Americans are descended from various peoples who played a part in
340. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 31.
341. Lee, supra note 115, at 765.
342. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 32.
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African history but because African history is the history of people of
the same race.343
Appiah concludes: "History may have made us what we are, but
the choice of a slice of the past in a period before your birth as your
own history is always exactly that: a choice."344 And Lee
comments:

Ultimately, it was not a common history that determined DuBois'
race; DuBois had many common histories that might have led to any
number of racial affiliations. Rather, it was DuBois' choice to iden
tify with a certain race that determined which common history out of
the many possible ones would be defining.345
In other contexts, this argument might be more successful. For

example, an American of DuBois's generation whose ancestry was
half Dutch and half French would have faced few constraints in

choosing either nationality as "defining" his identity. But, applied
to DuBois, the argument that "it was DuBois' choice to identify

with a certain race" collapses into irrelevance. Its basic flaw is that
it ignores the substance of the "many possible histories" from

which, according to Appiah, DuBois could have chosen. It forgets

that one of DuBois's "common histories" - the African-American
one - eclipsed the others. It overlooks the fact that history treated

African arrivals in this country in strikingly different ways than it
treated Dutch settlers, and history dealt with people like DuBois,

who were part African, in a way that it reserved fc. no other racial
or ethnic intermixture.346
Thus, history acted in three ways to prevent DuBois from
"choosing" to identify with his Dutch side. First, for DuBois, any
meaningful outward manifestation of a Dutch "identity" would

have been illegal and dangerous. DuBois grew up in Great Bar
rington, Massachusetts, where he notes that " [t]he color line was
manifest and yet not absolutely drawn."347 Nevertheless, it was
with the quintessentially American ritual of exchanging Valentine
greetings that he learned that any choice to identify with his Dutch
ancestors faced severe practical constraints:

I remember well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little
thing, away up 'in the hills of New England, where the dark Housa
tonic winds between Hoosac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee
wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads
343. Id.
344.

Id.

345. Lee, supra note 115, at 765.
346. See supra Part I.
347. DuBois, supra note 308, at 10.
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to buy gorgeous visiting cards - ten cents a package - and ex
change. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, re
fused my card - refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it
dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from
the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out
from their world by a vast veil.348
As DuBois moved south for his education, history placed far
greater restrictions on DuBois's ability to choose to identify with
his Dutch side. In Tennessee, for example, history dictated that if
DuBois entered a Dutch club, he would have been ejected; that if
he had married a Dutch woman, the marriage could have been an
nulled and he could have been jailed as a felon;349 and that if he had
made unwelcome romantic overtures toward a Dutch woman, he
would have placed himself in danger of being beaten, castrated, or
lynched.350 Thus, if DuBois had "chosen" to identify with his
Dutch ancestors, he would have needed to enjoy this choice as a
closet Dutchman. Everywhere else the choice would have been in
effective, somewhat like "our" choice of the Queen.351
Second, history has given most American Blacks little reason,
except biological lineage, to identify with their White ancestors.
While Appiah decries biology as a basis for racial identity, his sug
gestion that DuBois could have chosen to be Dutch gives supreme
importance to DuBois's biological makeup, for what would have
been the basis for this choice? The primary answer is biology, more
specifically, the genetic link that connected DuBois with Dutch
forebears two generations removed that he had never met. History
had cut all the other lines that usually connect a person to his or her

348. W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SouLS OF BLACK FOLK 2 (Bantam Books 1989) (1903). For a
riveting account of this scene replayed in the 1950s and 1960s, see WILLIAMS, supra note 185,
at 46, 219, 269.
349. See TENN. CoNsT. OF 1870, art. XI, § 14, quoted in STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND
COLOR 427 (Pauli Murray ed., 1950). The Tennessee Code, section 8409, provided that "[t]he
intermarriage of white persons with negroes, mulattoes, or persons of mixed blood de
scended from a negro, to the third generation inclusive, or their living together as man and
wife in this state, is prohibited." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8409 (Williams 1934), quoted in
STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra, at 438. Section 8410 further provided that "[t]he
person knowingly violating the provisions of [8409] shall be guilty of a felony, and undergo
imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one [1] or more than five [5] years
.'' TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8410 (Wtlliams 1934), quoted in STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra, at
438-39.
350. For an account of instances where "Black men were beaten, hanged, dismembered
and dragged behind automobiles for having romantic encounters - or being accused of
freshness - with White women," see Spickard, supra note 136, at 292, 283-92.
351. Karst reminds us that "[a]s the notions of outing and passing remind us, a person's
interior sense of his or her own race or sexual orientation may or may not be enacted in
public." Karst, supra note 28, at 283. But as the following text shows, at the same time that
history outlawed any exterior expression of DuBois's Dutchness, it used several powerful
tools to deprive DuBois of any interior sense of Dutchness.
. . •
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ancestors.352 History connected DuBois to the African side of his
ancestry in a much different way, not just by biology but by shared
experience. His close family members were - identified by them
selves and society - Negroes.353 Legally and culturally, he was a
Negro, although like many Negroes in Northern towns, he had sig
nificant interactions with Whites. As he travelled south and as he
grew older, even the narrow options for choice that he enjoyed in
Great Barrington evaporated.354 And so, even if DuBois had the
choice to follow his bloodlines and identify with his Dutch ances
tors, intelligent, rational people seldom choose to identify with
things they know little about to the exclusion of things that they
hold dear. History thus gave DuBois little reason to choose to be
Dutch.
Third, history placed a final limitation on the agency of DuBois,
the putative Dutchman - a limitation that arose from something
more nettlesome and ultimately more binding than laws. History
first made him a part of a "people" - an oppressed people - and
then created a moral imperative that holds that it is evil for mem
bers of oppressed groups to sell out and join the other side. Adele
Logan Alexander recounts DuBois's discussion of the Hunts, a fam
ily of African Americans who were so light that they did have the
choice of passing into the White race:

If everyone in Adella Hunt Logan's generation of the Hunt family
looked white, Du Bois queried, if only one of their many antecedents
was "black," and if life in the nineteenth-century South routinely
heaped pain and humiliation on people of color, as it surely did, why
then did the Hunts and other similar "voluntary Negroes" choose to
remain a part of the African-American community. . . . DuBois un352. DuBois's biographer provides an example of how these ties were cut: DuBois's
great-grandfather, James DuBois, was "a wealthy physician of French Huguenot origins" liv
ing in Haiti, who sired three children by his slave mistress. He took the two lightest of them
- including DuBois's grandfather Alexander - to New York and enrolled them in Connect
icut's "exclusive" Cheshire School for Boys. When he died, the two "Creole sons found
themselves disowned by their white relatives and forced to give up boarding school for
skilled labor." LEWIS, supra note 200, at 20. While DuBois did daydream about his White
great-grandfather and his famous Dutch and Norman Ancestors. none of these dreams af
fected his racial identity. See id. at 46.
DuBois's case was by no means unique. Spickard, for example, cites the work of Robert
Roberts who interviewed more than three hundred Chicago "mulattoes" between 1930 and
1960. Of these three hundred, "almost none . . . had ever enjoyed a close relationship with
his or her White grandparents, and most had no such relationship at all." See Spickard, supra
note 136, at 330.
353. See LEWIS, supra note 200, at 11-25.
354. Williamson notes that from 1850 to 1915, the South "led the nation in turning from a
society in which some blackness in a person might be overlooked to one in which no single
iota of color was excused." WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 109. See also id. at 64; Spickard,
supra note 136, at 272 & 440 n.7.
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derstood the ludicrous social and political ramifications of race as well
as any American of his time. "From long teaching and deeply planted
conviction," [DuBois] explained with obvious distaste, "the over
whelming opinion of white Americans is that the fact of one black
ancestor in eight or sixteen makes [a] tremendous difference of iden
tity, of treatment and opportunity . . . . "
Yet even as he pinpointed and exposed the prevailing prejudices
of white Americans, he had little doubt that the choice was clear for
the Hunts. They and others chose to remain and identify with the
darker race for two predominant reasons: responsibility and love,
both providing secure anchors in a hostile world. DuBois . . . knew
that "to take a stand in America as anything but a Negro would have
made [the Hunts] extremely unhappy, because here there was oppor
tunity for battle and battle on the highest plane." . . . "After all" he
concluded, "life is primarily family and friends [and] one cannot
lightly cast off his enveloping . . . bond of love and affection and seek
to create a new place in a strange world."355
Of course, if DuBois had been a little lighter, he might have had
the same choice as the Hunts, and. he could have chosen to commit
moral "error" by trying to "pass";356 he also could have made good
arguments that choosing to be Dutch was not an error at all. What
he could not choose was the feeling, imposed on him by history,
that if he attempted to be Dutch, he would be doing something
wrong.
Lee summarizes: "Appiah's insight is that our racial identity is
not dictated by our history but is always constructed."357 But, as
the above discussion shows, if DuBois's

racial

identity was con

structed, it was history, not choice, that drew the plans and did the
heavy lifting. History cut the familial ties between DuBois and his
White ancestors. History gave DuBois a sense of familial loyalty
and solidarity with his Negro relatives and forebears. Finally, his
tory threatened to punish any public expression of DuBois's Dutch
ness with sanctions ranging from humiliation to death. Moreover,
because of when and where he was born and the fact that nearly
half of his distant ancestors were White, DuBois had more choice in
this matter than most other African Americans. To say that most
Black people of DuBois's generation (or of the generations that im
mediately followed) had any significant leeway in constructing their

racial identity is

absurd.

355. ADELE LOGAN ALEXANDER, AMBIGUOUS LIVES, FREE WOMEN OF COLOR IN RU
RAL GEORGIA, 1789-1879, at 9-10 (1991).
356. In some writings, DuBois implied that he had this option, but had rejected it out of
loyalty to his race. Given his morphology, this left one of DuBois's contemporaries annoyed
and his biographer skeptical. See LEWIS, supra note 200, at 72-73.
357. Lee, supra note 115, at 765.
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2. Choice Today
News of DuBois's death was announced on the Capitol Mall
shortly before Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his "I Have a Dream"
speech,358 and much has changed in the intervening thirty-three
years. Now there is far more room for self-identification. In fact, in
reading some law review articles, it seems that is all there is. For
example, in his careful examination of racial and sexual identity,
Karst speaks only in terms of "self-identification."359
Some things, however, have not changed since the time that
DuBois wrote, and Karst is therefore least convincing when, in dis
cussing transracial adoption, he defines Black children as "children
of birth parents self-identified as black."360

In reality, when a

woman who is pregnant with a Black or biracial child goes to an
adoption agency, the self-identification of the birth parents has very
little importance. What matters most is how society will identify the
child. Second in importance is how society identifies the child's par
ents. The child's future will tum on these two factors.
identified as White, she will be in great demand.
biracial, the demand will be much lower.
mand will be lower still.361

If

If she

If

she is

is seen as

she is Black, the de

As I wrote this section, another example passed through the
newspapers: in March

1996,

a baby girl with an incomplete skull

was born to a Black father and a White mother in Thomasville,
Georgia. The baby died the day after she was born, and she was
buried in her mother's family plot at the local cemetery. A few
days after the burial, the elders of the church discovered that the
Black man who had stood by the grave - a man they may have
assumed to be an undertaker - was in fact the father of the child,
and this meant that a Black child had been buried in the previously
all-White cemetery. Of course, the child never had any chance to
self-identify or to learn or choose to be Black; and the deacons
never asked the baby's father how he self-identified before they
voted to command that the coffin of the dead infant be removed
from their graveyard.362 There is room for choice but, forty years

358. See LEWIS, supra note 200, at 1-4.
359. Karst, supra note 28, passim.
360. Id. at 347. Again, my disagreement is with Karst's descriptive labels. In spite of
what I feel is an overemphasis on self-identification, Karst presents a balanced and persua
sive discussion of the issue of transracial adoption.
361. See Roberts, supra note 162, at 246.
362. See Rick Bragg, Just a Grave for a Baby But Anguish for a Town, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1996, at A14.

March 1997]

One Drop Rule

1251

after the milling Detroit mob turned a deaf ear to my Uncle Jack as
he tried to self-identify, we must remember that even now at the
end of the twentieth century, many choices are still made for us
because of our race.

3.

The Choice of Our Race by Daily Actions

Those who wish to deconstruct race, who wish to remind us that
we reinvent it each day, often claim that we choose our race by our
daily activities. Haney Lopez, for example, correctly observes that
our "many daily decisions take on racial meanings."363 He notes
that "seemingly inconsequential acts like listening to rap and wear
ing hip hop fashions constitute a means of racial affiliation and
identification."364 From this he concludes that " [i]t is here, in de
ciding what to eat, how to dress, whom to befriend, and where to
go, rather than in the dramatic decision to leap races, that most
racial choices are rendered. "365 Such choices, he argues, make race
"to some extent volitional. "366 Lee basically agrees and suggests a
political basis for racial identity. Writing of Justice Clarence
Thomas, she notes that "[t]o the extent that racial identity is de
fined biologically and essentially, Justice Thomas is obviously
'black.' However, when racial identity is defined politically, as a
firm commitment to antiracist struggles, Justice Thomas's claim to
racial authenticity founders."367
These theories are attractive because they give the illusion of
choice. They tell us that our race is not dictated by society or gene
alogy; rather it is something that we can choose as we live our lives
each day. But these theories actually work to deprive people especially African-American people - of choice. In fact, there are
dangers in categorizing people racially based on the choices they
make every day. Looking back to one of the "place markers" for
this article, we see that this is the mistake that my Uncle Clarence's
neighbors made: they saw an urbane lawyer with three daughters at
UCLA, and they assumed that he and his family could not really be
Black. As the neighbors later discovered, they could not have been
more wrong. While Uncle Clarence chose to follow paths that were
363. Lopez, supra note 320, at 49.
364. Id. at 49-50.
365. Id. at 50.
366. Id. at 10. Haney Lopez repeatedly acknowledges the practical limitations on such
choices. See id. at 47, 49.
367. Lee, supra note 115, at 769.
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not open to many other African Americans of that era, those paths
never led him outside of his race.368
Worse, this suggestion that people choose their race by their
daily actions or political views or economic achievements limits the
choices available to Black Americans. Lurking beneath the surface
of this theory is the assumption that White Americans can make
limitless choices without ever implicating their race, while every
thing that African Americans think or do is to be defined and con
strained by their racial identity. White Americans, after all, can
occupy any point on the political spectrum, espousing the philoso
phy of Friedreich Engels or Adam Smith or Ayn Rand, without im
plicating or abandoning their racial identity. They can live at any
economic level, from the wealth of Warren Buffet to the poverty of
the homeless person who asked for a quarter this morning, without
raising any question as to their race. They can paint pictures as
diverse as Soup Cans and American Gothic without losing their ra
cial authenticity. They can straighten or curl their hair, darken their
skin, change the color of their eyes, and have collagen injected into
their lips, all without changing their race. Ironically, the argument
that we can choose our race by our daily activities denies such
choices to Blacks. For this argument dictates that if a Black person
is economically successful, she achieves this success at the cost of
her racial identity. If an African American takes the conservative
side on a political issue, her racial authenticity is called into ques
tion. If a Black person likes the Jupiter Symphony or The Magic
Flute or Water Music, her taste has taken her beyond the bounda
ries of her race.
Like one of those computer programs that spins a flat image
into three dimensions on the screen, this argument transforms the
race box on the census form into something tall and real. For White
Americans, this "race" box remains a two-dimensional square on a
government questionnaire; for Black people, this square rises off
the page like the fences at Manzanar - booby-trapped and barbed
wired - and becomes the perimeter of our lives: It tells us the
music we can appreciate, the 'people whom we can befriend, the
money we can make, and the politics we can espouse - if we want
to stay Black.
But as Barbara Fields has observed: "[An] absurd assumption
inseparable from race in its characteristic American form takes for
368. This is the converse of the mistake the deacons at the Georgia cemetery made: they
saw a Black man standing next to the grieving White mother and assumed that he was the
undertaker.
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granted that virtually everything people of African descent do,
think, or say is racial in nature."369 In fact, all of our actions do not
turn on racial axes, and to say that each quotidian deed not only
takes on racial meaning but defines our racial identity is not only
exaggeration, it is suffocating. Appiah is correct when he says that
"there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for
us,"37° but this is not because there is no such thing as race, but
because we are asking race to do too much.371
Toward the conclusion of her eloquent essay, Lee argues that
"[i]n the theories of racial subjectivity, there must always be room
for agency, a place for choice, a margin for intention, and many
possibilities for change. "372 I write as a reminder that in the world
in which my great uncles lived, and in the world half a century later
in which we live, race, at least African-American race, is not just a
matter of self-identification. While we do have choices, to a large
extent our race is not one of them. Instead, we are "raced."373 If
we see every act as an expression of our racial identity, we trap
ourselves in categories we cannot really change; we deny ourselves
choice, intention, and agency. Fields correctly observes that we as a society in the largest sense - reinvent race daily.374 And as we
do so, as we work for justice and take pride in our racial identity, let
us avoid implicating race in every daily choice. Let us understand
that we can make our choices and enjoy our "margins for intention"
without necessarily bringing our race into every question. Other-

369. Fields, supra note 115, at 98.
370. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 45.
371. In speaking of transracial adoptions, Karst eloquently comments on the healthy diversity within the Black community:
Given the multiple dimensions of diversity that characterize the culture of black Ameri
cans, even a child who is socially defined as black but "raised to be white" will find
kindred spirits within black culture and may bring to that culture new interpretations
of her own making. . . . This multidimensional quality of individuals is not a complication
to be lamented but a vital force within every culture. Cultural change is the very oppo
site of genocide. A culture that stands still is something for archaeologists to exhume
from the dust.
Karst, supra note 28, at 352 (footnotes omitted). Hurston's comment, which recognized this
same diversity over half a century earlier, is worth repeating:
There is no The Negro here. Our lives are so diversified, internal attitudes so varied,
appearances and capabilities so different, that there is no possible classification so catho
lic that it will cover us all, except My people! My people!
HURSTON, supra note 205, at 172. For a more detailed examination of this issue, see Roy L.
Brooks, Race as an Under-Inclusive and Overinclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POLY. REP.
9 (1994).
372. Lee, supra note 115, at 765 (footnote omitted).
373. One commentator has observed: "[R]ace is not so much a category but a practice:
people are raced." D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible, Law, Metaphor, and the Racial
Self, 82 GEO. LJ. 437, 440 (1993).
374. See Fields, supra note 115, at 118.
_
-
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wise we will need a separate race category on the census form not
just for the Marxist, dark-skinned African American who loves
Puccini and straightens her hair, but also for the thirty-three million
other African Americans whose lives are arranged in thirty-three
million other, differing ways.
Which brings us to the census box.
IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR THE CENSUS

Much has changed in the generation since Loving. Thirty years
ago the number of children who knew parents of two different races
was minuscule. Today there are hundreds of thousands of such chil
dren and their number is increasing rapidly.375 Unfortunately, the
debate over how the census should deal with this demographic
trend has become needlessly polarized. On one side of this debate
are traditional civil rights and minority groups who depend on the
census's racial statistics in order to safeguard voting rights, job op
portunities, and school integration plans, as well as to effectively
enforce antidiscrimination laws. At the Congressional hearings on
this issue, a representative of one such civil rights organization
stated:
Our society's ability to discourage . . . discrimination is based in part
on the effective implementation of our civil rights laws. In this re
spect, the collection of race and ethnic data in the census is funda
mental. Any changes to the data collection of race and ethnicity must
be strictly scrutinized to ensure that the integrity of our civil rights
laws are not compromised.376
Similarly, one commentator notes that the addition of multiracial
category could lead to an inaccurate count "which could have dire
political consequences. "377
On the other side are several multiracial groups who see the
matter as one of personal "validation," self-esteem, and the right of
self-definition. Lythcott-Haims, for example, argues that the ab
sence of a multiracial category deprives "millions of Multiracial citi
zens of the right to freely express their true racial identity"37B and
concludes that "[i]f we send in our forms but the Census [Bureau]
chooses not to recognize us for what we are, it is as if we do not
375. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
376. Hearings, supra note 14, at 182 (statement of Steven Carbo, Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
377. Lynn Norment, Am I Black, White Or In Between?, EBONY, Aug. 1995, at 108, 110
(quoting Halford Fairchild).
378. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 542.
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officially exist."379 Similarly, Bijan Gilanshah argues: "This gov
ernmental recognition would validate the existence of the multi
racial community and identify the mixed movement as possessing
unique cultural and social attributes. "380 While the multiracial
groups focus on personal "validation" rather than jobs, housing,
voting rights, and anti-discrimination laws, their desire for official
recognition on the census is still deeply felt. As Gilanshah ob
serves: "Indeed, for the multiracial movement, failure of the gov

ernment to include a multiracial category would result in cultural
genocide."381
This Part attempts to navigate between these two points of view.
It concludes that the most accurate way of counting the new gener
ations of Americans with parents from different racial groups is to
leave the multiracial inquiry off of the race line and isolate this in
quiry on a line of its own.
A.

The Broad, Blood-based Multiracial Category

I first examine the addition of a simple "Multiracial" category to
the race question on the census forms to serve the purpose of
counting all those Americans with mixed ancestry in their "multi
generational history." Using the figures of Maria P.P. Root, such a
category could include:
•
Thirty to seventy percent of all African Americans. (But not
those African Americans who lack the necessary one drop of White
blood.)
•
The majority of Native Americans. (Again, the Native Ameri
cans who need not apply for this version of the multiracial category
are those who cannot locate any White blood when conducting
their genetic title search.)
•
•

Virtually all Latinos.
Virtually all Filipinos. .

A significant portion of Whites. (Here, history does get in the
way of this scheme, because most Whites are unaware of their
•

multiracial background.)382
Rather than attempting to count accurately the members of the ra
cial groups that have been created by sociohistorical forces, this
proposal would attempt to count a group that has no social meaning
379. Id. at 545.
380. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 197.
381. Id. at 197.
382. See Maria P.P. Root, Within, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY MIXED PEO·
PLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 3, 9.
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whatsoever: the group of people with "mixed blood." Moreover,
this category could draw so many people from the traditional, so
cially and historically real racial groups that each of the census' ba
rometers of racism would give a completely useless reading. With
race finally gaining recognition as a socially constructed category,
this is not the time for the census to bring biology back by launch
ing such an inventory of the nation's genetic content. Conse
quently, this broad multiracial category has no place on the census
questionnaire.
This, however, is not to say that there is no place for a multi
racial inquiry on the census form. If the question, thirty years after
Loving, is how many biracial people are there - people whose par
ents are from different racial groups - this is a question that the
census should ask and answer. But the question must be asked
more skillfully and carefully.
B.

Counting Loving's Children on the Race Line

Of course, not all the proponents of a multiracial category want
to "rebiologize" race, and there have been two proposals for limit
ing the multiracial category to a socially important category: the
burgeoning group of people with parents of different races. One
proposal would include a multiracial box on the race line together
with an instruction explaining that this box is to be checked by peo
ple with parents from two distinct racial groups.383 A second pro
posal would also add this multiracial box, but would require the
persons who check it to identify the race of their parents.384 Both
proposals place the multiracial category on the race line, thereby
decreeing that people can have a racial identity or a multiracial
identity, but not both. There are three flaws in these proposals: (1)
they incorrectly assume that multiracial status is race; (2) they force
people to choose between their racial and multiracial identities; and
(3) they will lead to an inaccurate count of biracial Americans.

1. Multiracial Status as Race
In proposing a new "multiracial" answer to the race question on
the census form, sonie theorists claim that multiracial people have
enough in common to be considered a race of their own. The pro
ponents of this category suggest that what binds this group together

383. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 107 (testimony of Susan Graham, Executive Director
of Project RACE).
384. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 137. For a thoughtful discussion of the effects of the
RACE and AMEA proposals, see Payson, supra note 167.
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as a race is its members' common experience in coping with a "dual
identity." Bijan Gilanshah, for example, describes this argument as
follows:

In sum, experience of the "dual" self serves as a common unifying
characteristic of multiracial individuals. The new multiracial move
ment is composed of individuals that have either successfully come to
terms, socially and psychologically, with their dual racial identities or
those who continue to seek to reconcile their dual racial selves.385
There is no question that this dual identity is an important personal
experience that is shared by the new generations of multiracial peo
ple, but there are several reasons why this experience is not unify
ing enough to qualify this group as a race. First, the nature of a
multiracial person's dual identity will depend on the races of his or
her parents. A child with a Black parent and a White parent, for
example, will feel a very different kind of dual identity from that
experienced by the child of a White and a Japanese parent. As
evidence of this, we need only compare the intermarriage rates: the
Japanese intermarriage rate exceeds fifty-five percent, while the
African-American intermarriage rate is less than ten percent.386
Obviously, society tliinks of these two mixtures differently (one is
the norm while the other remains uncommon) and the dual-identity
experiences facing the children of these mixtures are thus also likely
to be quite different.
In addition, multiracial persons will deal with their dual-identity
experience in vastly different ways. As Gilanshah notes, some
multiracial persons will come to terms with this identity, others will
continually struggle with it. Still others will simply reject any dual
identity by "accepting one racial heritage."387 Consequently, the
dual experience in itself is not unifying. Indeed, the claim that this
experience has created common racial traits is unconvincing.
Gilanshah, for example, argues:

Government recognition may lead to significant positive inter-group
consequences in which mixed individuals may act as sensitive, objec
tive negotiators of inter-group racial conflict. As one author noted,
"[t]he multiracial often find themselves acting as ambassadors among
fractious peoples, preaching what is to them biological reality: We
can live together." With biological, psychological and sociological at
tachments to multiple racial heritages, multiracial possess unique cre
dentials for mediating racial conflict. Governmental recognition
385. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 192.
386. See supra note 9.
387. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 189.
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could facilitate and legitimize the multiracial individual's assumption
of this negotiator role.388
Of course, it is true that multiracial children are living examples
that "we can get along." But the attempt to find common ground
among multiracial people by asserting that they are natural
mediators is an unpersuasive form of stereotyping. There is no rea
son to think that a person with one Black and one White parent will
be significantly more "sensitive" or "objective" or any better at me
diation than a person with two Black parents or two White parents.
Like members of any other category, each biracial person will have
a different aptitude toward "bridge building": Some will be sensi
tive, others insensitive; some will be objective, others biased; some
will be good negotiators, others obstreperous; some will take from
the biracial experience a desire to build bridges, others will take this
experience in their stride and it will have no effect on their negotia
tion skills; and still others will hold a resentment toward one par
ent's people that will undermine any tendency toward bridge
building. It is unrealistic to tie mediation and bridging skills too
closely to any racial or multiracial status.
Another reason that dual identity does not form the basis of a

racial identity is that countless other people in our society deal with
dual identities in situations that do not involve race. When the son
of an Orthodox Jewish family marries the daughter of a conserva
tive Catholic family, the child of that marriage is likely to develop a
dual identity which is just as profound as that of many biracial chil
dren, but this dual identity is not seen as a

racial characteristic.

Of course dual identity is important, and the fact that this iden
tity is not evenly shared by biracial people does not deprive it of its
importance, any more than the fact that all Blacks do not share the
same morphology and culture lessens the importance of those fac
tors in defining the African-American race. But even if all multi
racial

people

shared

this

dual

identity

evenly,

this

shared

characteristic would not form an adequate foundation upon which
to build a race, because races are built on far more substantial foun
dations. These foundations include shared genealogy, shared mor
phology, shared history, and some degree of shared culture and
community. The new generations of multiracial Americans share
none of these things. As Michael Thornton notes:

388. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 197-98 (citations omitted). Similarly, Christine C. Iijima
Hall states that "[t]he future role of mixed people may be that of negotiators." Christine C.
Iijima Hall, Coloring Outside the Lines, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra
note 136, at 328-29.
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Further, the other groups that have designated census categories have
more clear-cut bases on which to expect similar experiences, both be
cause society identifies and treats them as separate groups and be
cause they have common heritages (i.e. cultures). None of these
categories exists simply because of common experience. Do multi
racial[s] have a core (cultural) heritage, or are they viewed as alike by
others in society? . . . In fact, what seems to bind multiracial people is
not race or culture, but living with an ambiguous status, an experience
similar to that of all people of color. Facing a different set of dilem
mas does not make one an ethnic or racial group, or signify a culture.
As a group, multiracials are too diverse to categorize. This group is
more biologically diverse than others, and has no common ancestry
and little community. These are things one cannot say about the
other census groupings.389
Zack recognized this as she mourned the "cultural suicide" of the
Harlem Renaissance.

If

Hughes, Hurston, and DuBois had fol

lowed Zack's advice and pronounced that "mixed race" Blacks
were a separate race, then there might now be a separate mixed
race culture and community in this country, like the Colored com
munity in South Africa. Of course, Hughes, Hurston, and DuBois
did no such thing, and, as a result, Zack laments that " [t]hus far no
historical basis for an American identity of mixed-race has
emerged."390 Multiracial identity, then, is not a racial identity, and
there is no basis to add a multiracial inquiry to the race question on
the census form.

2.

The False Choice Between Race and Multirace

The proposal for crowding the racial and multiracial categories
together on the same line is inappropriate for a second reason: it
forces biracial people to choose between two valid identities. As an
illustration, consider a young man with a Black father and White
mother who considers himself Black and who is identified on the
street and everywhere else he goes as Black. This proposal forces
this young man to choose one of his identities and deny the other as
he fills out the census form.

If he

checks "Black" he will not be

counted among the numbers of multiracial Americans; if he checks
"multiracial," he denies his Black racial identity, an identity that
both he and society strongly embrace. As Thornton notes, many,
many people will be in this position: It is predictable that many
people would exclude themselves from this [multiracial] category, a
trend perhaps more pronounced among those of particular combi-

389. Michael C. Thornton, Is Multiracial Status Unique? The Personal and Social Experi
ence, in RACIAILY MlxEo PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 321, 324.
390. ZACK, supra note 166, at 127.
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nations, Black-other than, say Asian-White, because of the virulent
nature of racism against Blacks.391
Similarly, Gilanshah comments: "Some multiracials, for various
reasons, adopt an either/or approach to identity definition by ac
cepting one racial heritage in virtual denial of their other racial
self."392 After an informal unscientific survey.

Ebony

magazine

concluded: "it appears that most individuals of Black-White par
entage opt to identify with African-Americans . . . .

Actresses

Jasmine Guy, Troy Beyer and Lisa Bonet have always made it clear
that they are

Ebony

Black

women, despite their biracial parentage."393

believes the views of Lenny Kravitz, son of a White father

and Black mother, are widespread:

My mother taught me: "Your father's White, I'm Black. You are just
as much one as the other, but you are Black. In society and in life,
you are Black." She taught me that from day one.
You don't have to deny the White side of you if you're mixed. . . .
Accept the blessing of having the advantage of two cultures, but un
derstand that you are Black. In this world, if you have one spot of
Black blood, you are Black. So get over it.394
While Kravitz certainly does not speak for all children of Black
White parentage, multiracial theorists should be the first to under
stand why it would be wrong to force him (and thousands of others
who feel the same way) to choose between his strong Black racial
identity and his weaker, but still important identity as the child of a
White father and a Black mother. For example, in criticizing oppo
nents of the multiracial category, Lythcott-Haims argues that
" [i]ronically, these groups seek to deny others the hardwon fight of
accurate classification they themselves struggled for."395 Placing
race and multirace on the same line denies accurate classification to
Lenny Kravitz and everyone like him. It requires him to be catego
rized as Black or biracial when, in fact, his racial identity is Black

and he is

biracial.396

391. See Thornton, supra note 389, at 324.
392. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 189 (citing Carla K. Bradshaw, Beauty and the Beast:
On Racial Ambiguity, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 79).
393. Norment, supra note 377, at 112.
394. Id.
395. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 546.
396. This proposal thus puts him in the same position that multiracial activists decry:
"[W]hich parent and heritage shall be denied today?" Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 548
(quoting Carlos A. Fernandez, La Raza and the Melting Pot: A Comparative Look at
Multiethnicity, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 135).
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Finally, multiracial theorists have criticized the Black commu
nity by asserting that "many blacks accept part-Black people as full
members of the Black community only to the extent that these part
Black people do not assert Multiracial identities."397 In proposing
to place race and "multiracial" in competition on the same line,
however, they commit the very same transgression: they insist that
Kravitz and all those like him can be counted as multiracial only if
they refuse to "assert" their Black identity.

3.

The Multiracial Category on the "Race" Line: Guaranteed
Inaccuracy

Placing race and multirace in competition on the same line is
also a blueprint for inaccuracy. The thousands of biracial Ameri
cans who identify strongly with the race of one of their parents will
check "Black" or "White" or "Asian," and, as long as "multiracial"
is on the race line, they will not be counted in the multiracial group.
On the other hand, thousands of African Americans with some dis
tant White or Native-American ancestor will understandably as
sume that "Multiracial" is a biological category and check that
box.398 Arthur Fletcher, chair of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission,
fears that some Black Americans will check the multiracial box sim
ply in order to escape the "stigma" of being Black in America.399
The Census Bureau will then have to guess as to whether the
overcount offsets the undercount, and the estimate of the number
of multiracial Americans will, sadly, be unreliable.4oo Com
pounding this inaccuracy will be one final, bitter irony: it is the
children of Black-White parentage who will be most likely to check
"Black" and therefore be excluded from the multiracial group; and
it is these same Black-White biracial children who, percentage wise,
still form the smallest multiracial group.401 Thus it is this small co
hort of trend setters, the group that most needs validation in num
bers, that will be most undercounted if "multiracial" competes with
"Black" on the race line.

397. Lythcott-Haims. supra note 136, at 540.
398. See Norment, supra note 377, at 108.
399. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 273 (testimony of Arthur A. Fletcher).
400. See Karst, supra note 28, at 339-40.
401. When multiracial voices seek validation in the census form rather than in the census
count, the result is far less validation.
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A

Line of Their Own

A possible solution to these problems is to place race and multi
race on separate lines. My proposal, therefore, is to leave the race
question as it is402 and follow it with a separate line containing a
"Multiracial Inquiry." This inquiry would instruct persons whose
parents are from two different racial groups to identify the race of
each parent. This proposal resolves each of the problems that arise
when the multiracial category competes with race on the same line
of the census form.

First, it recognizes that multiracial identity is not a racial iden
tity. Multiracial Americans share neither common culture, com
mon history, common genealogy, nor common morphology.
Instead, what binds multiracial people together is the experience of
dual identity. But even if this experience were evenly distributed
among multiracial people - which it is not - it would not be
enough to create a race.
Second, this proposal validates the socially significant identities
of mixed-race persons. Those multiracial Americans who primarily
identify themselves as multiracial can express that identity - to
gether with the races of their parents - in the separate multiracial
inquiry. On the other hand, the thousands of biracial people who
identify with one racial group can voice that identity in answer to
402. The 1990 Census "race" question reads as follows:
4.

R=

Fill ONE cin:le for the race that the person
considers himseltJborselfto be.

0 White
0 Black or Negro
0 lndian (Amor.)(Print thcnamc ofthc

� ;n_ro.?�.!''..P.�oP:'
.?
��)-;z

-I
I
I
·----------------·

IfIndian (Amer.), print the name ofthe
enrolled or principal tribe. ---

0 Eskimo
0 Aleut
Asian orPacificl<!anderlAP!l

Fijian, Laotian. Thai, Tongan, Pakistani,

0 Chinese
O Filipino
0 Hawaiian
0 Korean
0 ':'.i�

lfOtherrzce.printra<:e. ---- 1

0 �;:;.{Pri,;'t;:;.)

Is this person ofSpanish/Hispanic origin?

0
0
0
0
0

IfOther Asian or Pacific Islander (API),
print one group, for example: Hmong,

Cambodian, and so OIL ----

7.

Fill ONE cin:lc for each pcrsotL

0
0
0
0

Japanese
Asian Indian

Samoan
Guamanian

_ _ _ _ _ .9_ .9!!1�7,7
.:..t - - - �

No (not SpanishlHispanic)
Yes, Mexican, Mexican-Am., Chicano
Yes, Puerto Rican
Yes. Cuban
Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic

(Print one group, for example:
Algentinian, Colombian, Dominican,

Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Spanianl,

IfYes, other Spanish/Hispanic:,
print one group. -----

�I �:"_o���- -- - - - - 1I
· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·

GEN. Govr. Drv., U.S. GEN. Acer. OFF., supra note 15, at 5.
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the race question, and then, on the next line, they can be counted as
multiracial in response to the multiracial inquiry. Under this pro
posal there will be one limitation on self naming: there will not be a
pre-printed "multiracial" box on the race line of the census form.
As argued above, omitting this box is conceptually proper and it is
the only way to avoid the spurious competition between racial and
multiracial identities. However, anyone who wishes to identify her
race as "multiracial" will be free to write "multiracial" next to the
"Other" box on the race line, and more importantly, to fully ex
press her multiracial identity in response to the multiracial inquiry
on next line of the census form.
Third, and most importantly, this proposal is the most accurate
way to count Loving's children. The other proposals exclude from
the multiracial category all the thousands of multiracial people who
can be expected to identify with the race of one of their parents.
This proposal includes these people. The other three proposals at
tract members of traditional racial groups who may believe that the
multiracial category is inquiring into race mixing that may have oc
curred generations ago. This proposal excludes these people. It al
lows the census to achieve a complete and accurate count of the
increasing numbers of Americans with parents from two different
racial groups. With this proposal, there will be far less need for the
Census Bureau to aggregate and adjust figures to make up for con
fusion that would be caused by placing the multiracial box where it
does not belong. In addition, because the multiracial inquiry will
include parental information, a data base can be built up for each
cohort of biracial people (Black-White, Asian-Native American,
etc.) and these cohorts can be compared for statistical purposes
with the traditional racial groups.4o3
In summary, the proposal that I make here does not rebiologize
race, and it rejects the superficial, blood-based recategorization of
the races that has been created by American social history. This
proposal validates the emergence in our country since Loving of a
new category of mixed-race persons, but - unlike the other pro
posals - it does not require the multiracial category to compete
with the traditional races for the allegiance of these people. It rec
ognizes that in our society it is perfectly predictable that biracial
403. For a discussion of the usefulness of these statistics in the context of affinnative
action, see Payson, supra note 167, at 100-02. Another version of this proposal, suggested by
my colleague Michal Belknap, would ask all respondents to list the race of their parents.
Over time, this version would give a much better idea of how racial groups come to be con
structed. A disadvantage of this proposal, however, is that because the inquiry will not be
limited to multiracial persons, it will provide less validation to this group.

1264

[Vol. 95:1161

Michigan Law Review

persons may have allegiance to one parent's race and still wish to be
counted as

Lov�ng's

children. Most importantly, because it does

not set up such a "competition" between race and mixed race, it
allows for the most accurate count of mixed-race people.
The addition of this separate multiracial inquiry best celebrates
both

Loving and the emerging multiracial identity.

The worst way

to validate this identity would be to place it in competition with
racial identity by telling multiracial Americans that they cannot
have a race if they want to be counted in the new multiracial cate
gory. The worst way to celebrate

Loving would be to tell Loving's

children that they cannot call themselves Black. The best way for
the census to celebrate
of

Loving's

Loving is by accurately counting how many

children are flourishing in our society.
CONCLUSION

However imperfect the census may be, it is our main yardstick
for measuring the progress we as a society have made toward end
ing racism. We tamper with it at our peril. Racism is still with us,
and an accurate means for measuring its hold on our society is still
vital.
Few would deny that progress has been made since the April
day in

1956 when a mob

surrounded my Uncle Jack's new home in

Detroit. Civil rights laws have been enacted, perceptions have
changed, and racism has waned. What was unthinkable in 1956 intermarriage between Blacks and Whites - is now viewed with
acceptance by a plurality of Americans. There is, indeed, cause for
optimism.
But things have stayed the same too. For those who are too
young to remember struggles like those of my uncles, and for those
who think that "race" is no longer an issue worth the trouble of an
accurate count, let me close this paper with a final reference to my
Uncle Jack and to another incident that occurred on an April day,
this time in

1996.

As the mob milled outside of his home and the "neighborhood
improvement association" knocked at his door, Uncle Jack weighed
his options, and then told the
cision to move:
children.

Time reporter what motivated his de

"I would have held out except for the grand

If they lived here and went to school,

the kids would pick

on them, maybe rough them up. It could hurt them, maybe ruin
their lives."404 Forty years later, as I worked on the conclusion of

404. TIME, supra note 25, at 24.
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this paper, a Black woman named Bridget Ward moved into
Bridesburg, a White working-class neighborhood of Philadelphia,
and was greeted with "racial epithets scrawled in black ink on her
windows, doors and front porch" and with " [k]etchup, looking like
a trail of blood" leading up her steps.405 Later, after neighbors told
her she was not welcome, she received a letter threatening the lives
of her daughters, ages three and nine, if she refused to leave the
neighborhood.406 As she decided whether to stay or go, Ward
weighed the same options that had faced Uncle Jack. And, as if an
old movie script had been updated to reflect a modem setting and
scene, Ward's words to a UPI reporter hauntingly reprise my Uncle
Jack's words to

Time in 1956:

"When they threaten me and my chil

dren, I've got to go. If I didn't have these kids, I'd stay here to the
bitter end but I can't jeopardize my children because of these idi
ots. "407 Forty years after Uncle Jack lost his home, Ward lost hers
for the very same reason: not because of "self-identification" or
"choice," but because she is Black. Race still matters.
Since race still matters, we must be circumspect when presented
with proposals to redefine it. While we should sympathize with the
desire to abandon the one drop rule, we must examine how we can
repudiate this rule without rejecting the race it created; how we can
separate the evil the Devil did from the good. In my view, rather
than entangling ourselves in this impossible task, our primary goal
in designing census categories should be to ensure an accurate
count, a count that is necessary to gauge the racism that still faces
both minority and biracial Americans; our secondary goal should
be to validate the personal identity of those filling out the census
forms. Perhaps most importantly, we must not set these goals in
dubious battle against each other; we must find a way to reach each
of these goals without undermining the other.

405. See Michael A. Fletcher, A Neighborhood Slams the Door, WASH. PosT, May 18,
1996, at Al2.
406. See Black Family Moving from Racist Threat, UPI, May 2, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
407. Id.

